The 'Kurdish Question' on the Axis of Iraq and Syria (1)

After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 during the First Gulf War, the UN decided to embargo Iraq. Thereupon, the Turkish Government announced that it closed the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline.

In September, the TGNA authorized the government to send troops to the Gulf and to deploy foreign troops in Turkey. Since Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait, the US-led coalition forces decided to intervene. Although Turkey did not actually participate in the war, it allowed the use of the bases by the coalition forces. On the other hand, due to the possibility of Iraqi retaliation, he requested security guarantees from NATO forces, but failed to provide the support he had hoped for.

Turkey; It immediately closed the pipeline to Iraqi oil without waiting for the UN Security Council's decision numbered 678 (29 November 1990). After that, he declared that the Turkish Armed Forces would open a second front against Iraq if necessary.

It can be said that the most important reason why Turkish administrators supported the coalition forces during the first gulf crisis was to increase the strategic value of Turkey in the eyes of the West, especially the USA. Özal was worried about the allegations that Turkey's role and importance for the Western Alliance did not remain after the Soviet threat had disappeared. After reading the Gulf war conjuncture and developments according to his own vision, he preferred to be on the side of the West and especially the USA.

By acting as a regional power, the Turkish Government has thought to consolidate its position in the Western and US-centered power balances, to support US politics and to increase its economic interests. The support it provided in the Gulf Crisis was seen as an opportunity in terms of increasing Turkey's prestige in the West. Expectations were set as follows:

To receive support for the protection of Turkey's national and country integrity,
To obtain financial, economic and commercial concessions that will compensate for the economic financial and commercial losses that Turkey will face.

The fact that Turkey acted together with the Western countries in the coalition against Iraq or supported their policies did not arise from the feeling of loyalty or interest in the West, but from the intersection of the similar interests of the two sides. The common values ​​defended by Turkey and Western states are reflected in the UN Security Council resolution. It has been seen once again that Turkey's international policy values ​​are in harmony with the understanding of the West. Thus, Turkey's reliability in the eyes of the Western world was once again tested and Turkey's importance was clearly understood.

However, it sided with the United States due to the danger of Iraq's strengthening, the importance of Kuwaiti oil, and the negative consequences of opposing US policies. However, he did not receive a response to his economic and political expectations regarding the USA. Economic losses have significantly affected the Turkish economy. In addition, Turkey realized that the USA does not have a direct policy towards Turkey, but has a secondary importance arising from its other regional interests.

The USA has given Turkey a guarantee to cover its losses. During the Gulf crisis, Turkish-American relations became much closer. The close relations established during the Gulf crisis could not be maintained at the same level. When Turkey's disillusionment after the crisis was added to the reluctant efforts of the American Congress to reduce aid due to reasons such as Cyprus, the Kurdish issue and human rights, and the interruption in additional materials and weapons program, there was a period of partial cooling in relations. So much so that sometimes he could not even get the weapons he paid for. The Turkish army's need for and dependence on this program in terms of technical materials and equipment prevented Turkey's orientation to other countries.

The most unfavorable outcome of the Gulf War for Turkey was to put the Southeast problem in a critical bottleneck. With the request of the USA and the support of Turkey, a security zone was established for the Kurds. The north of the 36th parallel was designated as the Kurdish security area and the USA, England and France deployed air forces to Turkey to protect the area.

The "Hammer Power" deployed at Incirlik Air Base after the Gulf War has been a topic of discussion in the Turkish public for a long time. It has been argued that this power, which has ceased to function, was effective in the unification and strengthening of the Iraqi Kurds. It has been claimed that the USA is in an effort to establish a Kurdish state in the region. In addition, the acceleration of the PKK's activities in this period, which took advantage of the authority vacuum in the region, was one of the factors that negatively affected Turkish-US relations until the end of the 1990s.

A de facto Kurdish political entity was established with the support of the West and Turkey became a tool for this. This situation not only accelerated the politicization of Kurdish identity in Turkey, but also prevented Southeastern Anatolia from Iraqi trade.

Two actions for the establishment of a Kurdish state in the Gulf War 

it turns out that:

The first possibility is that the US uses the Kurds to weaken Iraq's power from within, and in return, rewards them for establishing an independent state, paving the way.
The second possibility was envisaged as Iraq's weakening after its defeat, its disintegration, and its establishment as a result of the emergence of a Kurdish rebellion.

In the words of Turgut Özal, President of Turkey at the time, “We are against the establishment of a new state in Iraq. We are always in favor of preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq. This is the core spirit of our (Gulf War) policy and efforts. A situation that we do not want should not be created. A Kurdish state should not be established.” He warned the USA.

The Turkish people inevitably saw some sort of link between their decision to support the United States during the Gulf Crisis and the escalation of Kurdish separatist violence. The public generally had difficulty grasping the role of Operation Peace in deterring Iraq and preventing the migration of Kurds to Turkey.

When the Turkish rulers supported Operation Peace and the creation of a security zone, they certainly did not think that this would lead to the declaration of a Kurdish Federal State in October 1992. Turkish diplomacy has declared that it is against any development that would harm the territorial integrity of Iraq.

Turkey has fallen into a "disadvantaged" situation as a result of the emergence of a "power vacuum" in the northern region of Iraq and the further growth of PKK terrorism settled there. The problem of Iraq in general, the problem of instability in the north of Iraq in particular, that started right after the Gulf War, dragged Turkey's southeastern borders into a security crisis. The developments in the north of Iraq have turned into a situation that threatens the security of Turkey.

In line with the periodic rhythm of the US and Britain's military pressure on Iraq, the US saw the Kurdish issue as a part of the basic Iraqi problem in the first place, while Europe adopted an attitude that basically saw the same issue as Turkey's own issue. According to the US, with the capture of Öcalan, the Kurdish Question in Turkey has now been withdrawn into its own sphere and under Turkey's full control. Therefore, the aspects of Iraq's status and the developments in the north of Iraq that make Turkey uneasy have been minimized. Thus, the USA thought that the concerns of Turkey, which saw the developments in northern Iraq as a part of its internal integrity, were over; therefore, it clung to the argument that there is no need for Turkey to cooperate with Iraq under Saddam. The USA has started to express on various platforms that it is of the opinion that Turkey will adopt a more flexible stance in the next moves regarding Iraq.

However, with the capture of Öcalan, the Middle East equation could not be fully resolved. For this reason, the moves of the chess game played behind Turkey's relations with the region continued without ending.

USA; He expressed his support for Turkey on the PKK issue at every opportunity and implied that he expected Turkey to adopt a policy close to the American preferences in its future moves towards the Middle East. Indeed, Turkey's decision makers have acted with the desire to see the United States as an indispensable ally in the fight against terrorism and for Turkey's security in the Middle East.

Commenting on this period, Graham Fuller said, “Ankara will never want an autonomous Kurdish state to emerge in Iraq on the grounds that it will directly affect the Kurds in Turkey. However, there is such a region and Turkey has accepted it and started to establish new relations. The status quo before the Gulf Operation will never be established again.”

After the rejection of the Bill on March 1, 2003, the relations were negatively affected, questioned and not improved until today, unlike the first Iraq Operation. Among the factors that led to the emergence of this situation, besides the rejection of the motion, the reshaping of the international geopolitical structure, the disappearance of the definitive and close alliance mechanism, and the fact that the logic of Turkish-American relations during the Cold War period is no longer valid can be counted.

(To be continued)

References:

Atalay S. (1993). “US Security Assistance, US-Turkey Relations” Eurasia File, c.I, Issue:3, Autumn.

Davutoglu A. (2001). Strategic Depth, Küre Publications, Istanbul.

Gözen R. (2004). “Turkey and the First Gulf War: Foreign Policy in a Crisis Environment”, (Edited by Faruk Sönmezoğlu) Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy, Der Publishing House, Istanbul.

Kirisci K. (1994). “Changes in the International System and New Directions of Turkish Foreign Policy” Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy, Der: Faruk Sönmezoğlu, Der Publications, Istanbul.

Ozdag U. (2005). “Crisis in Turkish-American Relations”, Yeniçağ Newspaper, 3 February.