The Menderes–Gurion Meeting in the Light of Documents Relating to Israel’s Foreign Policy

The Secret Meeting Between Adnan Menderes and David Ben-Gurion

We are halfway through the year 2026. When we switch on the television, we see Iran striking Israel, Israel striking Iran, whilst the US is supposedly trying to find a middle ground. Iran is dealing a major blow to US oil operations in the region by utilising the Persian Gulf, and in response, the US is setting aside its ‘friendly’ image to issue threats of sanctions and air strikes against Iran – and is even taking steps to implement them. It began in much the same way in the 1950s. I’m not sure if I’d be going too far if I were to say that the events we’re witnessing today are the exact same scenario, with only the actors having changed. However, the Middle East was in exactly the same state back in the 1950s. This time, the main characters in the story were not the US and Iran.

Egypt and Britain were the main characters in this story back in the 1950s.

What did Egypt do? What did Britain do? Let’s examine this together and then assess Turkey’s stance following the events I am about to describe.

Immediately following the First World War, serious protests against the British had begun in Egypt. By 1922, Britain had granted Egypt independence (!) and established a monarchy there. When the Second World War began, Britain was reluctant to withdraw its troops from the region in order to protect its interests there. Britain has pursued a policy of violence, coups and suppression against any government or country that threatened its interests. To give an example, Mossadegh’s move to nationalise the Abadan oil fields serves as a good illustration, both in the context of Iran and Egypt. Like Nasser, Mossadegh had sought to ensure that his country’s resources remained within the country. However, his fate was sealed by Britain’s Operation Ajax. As a result of Britain’s operations, Mossadegh was ousted from power, having paid a heavy price for his actions.

Now, without digressing too far from the subject, we must turn our attention back to Egypt!

Under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Free Officers Movement had emerged from the chaos of the country at that time and, having analysed their situation carefully, seized power through a coup. However, a major challenge lay ahead of them. The nationalist Free Officers Movement began working towards the complete expulsion of Britain from the region. The process Egypt underwent during Nasser’s rule could be seen as one of modernisation, but Nasser’s moves were perceived by the Western bloc as overstepping the mark. A radical decision taken by Nasser, much like that of Mossadegh, had plunged the country into chaos. One of the regions where Britain safely conducted its commercial activities—known as the ‘Imperial Route’—was the Suez Canal. Both Britain and France held concessions over this canal. The nationalisation of this canal, much like that of the Abadan oil fields, would have dealt a severe blow to British interests. The feared outcome materialised, and Nasser implemented this radical decision by nationalising the canal in 1956. The nationalisation of the canal dealt a major blow to the commercial interests of Britain and France. Moreover, Egypt was already refusing to allow Israeli ships to pass through the region, which meant that Israel had become one of the supporting characters in this story. Britain had to find a pretext as soon as possible and regain control of the Suez.

Britain had closely observed this dispute between Egypt and Israel and had begun making plans with Israel. Israel would attack Egypt, whilst Britain would deploy troops to the Suez to restore peace and security in the region (!). And so it came to pass. Israel launched an offensive against Egypt in accordance with the plans drawn up by Britain and France. Britain was attempting to kill two birds with one stone. Nasser’s closeness to the Soviets had begun to catch Britain’s eye. Nasser and the Soviets were signing trade agreements and moving towards closer political and economic ties. Britain would both threaten Soviet influence in the region and, at the same time, regain the rights it had lost in the Suez. The operation, in which Britain, France and Israel acted in concert, had begun and was proceeding as planned. However, as the United States’ stance had not been factored in, events did not unfold as intended. The United States had sought to prevent a conflict from breaking out in the region. Consequently, following protracted political wrangling and negotiations, Britain was forced to move towards peace. However, events did not unfold as Britain had planned, and Britain had largely lost its power and legitimacy in the Middle East. The war had brought Nasser more benefit than harm. As the story unfolded, the vacuum left by Britain’s departure gradually began to be filled by the US, and in the years that followed, the US would begin to assume Britain’s role in the region.

So where exactly did Turkey stand in this process, and what transpired between Turkey and Israel in the years that followed?

With the DP government in power, Turkey had joined NATO and, during the Cold War, had become the US’s partner in the Middle East. It is impossible to overlook the countless news articles and opinion pieces published in Turkish newspapers, particularly from the 1950s onwards, warning of the dangers of Soviet influence. Nasser’s activities were also assessed within the context of Soviet activities. From the establishment of Israel in 1948 until Turkey’s accession to NATO, relations between Turkey and Israel had proceeded in a normal manner. By this period, Turkey had embarked on a path of various rapprochements with Israel in the region. The meeting that is the subject of this article took place in August 1958 between the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Adnan Menderes, and the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. Indeed, Turkey had become the first Muslim country to recognise Israel. The decisions taken by Turkey during this process were criticised by the Arabs, and resentment towards Turkey had begun to grow. In some Turkish newspapers, particularly those known for their proximity to the government, such as Vatan, Turkey’s stance against Nasser is clearly evident. In the Turkish press, particularly from the government’s perspective, it was repeatedly emphasised that Nasser’s actions were unlawful.

So, what kind of cooperation was established between Turkey and Israel during this secret meeting, which points were emphasised, and what measures were taken?

The main issue addressed in the talks was Nasser’s expansionist policy. It was suspected that the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly were providing Nasser with advantages that facilitated his expansionist activities, and that he might extend his expansionist policy as far as Jordan, Lebanon and the Persian Gulf. Israel regarded the attempts by some European states to mitigate Nasser’s policies through appeasement as a grave mistake. In this report, Israel stated that appeasing Nasser to such an extent would not alter his ambitions. It was argued that, should these expansionist activities not be halted, both Turkey and Israel would suffer serious harm as a result of these destructive actions.

“Turkey’s position on this matter is significant because Israel may have determined its perception of the threat to Turkey specifically through Nasser’s attempt to unite Egypt and Syria. I leave it to you to assess what kind of threat perception Nasser, as a Soviet ally bordering Turkey at that time, might have represented.”

The document goes on to state that Israel aimed to form a balancing force alongside Turkey against Nasser and to limit the influence of Communist-Nasserist forces in the region. Within the framework of this cooperation, Israel and Turkey would work together to rally pro-independence and pro-freedom forces in the region, whilst securing the support of the US and Western states in doing so. During this process, discussions took place between the two countries’ diplomatic missions, both in writing and verbally. It is claimed that agreements were reached on numerous issues and that steps towards cooperation were initiated. At a recent meeting of Foreign Ministers, it was decided that representatives of the two countries would work in a coordinated manner in Western capitals. Procedures were clarified regarding the cooperation of representatives based in the United States in the political, economic and public relations spheres.

At the meeting held in August 1958, an agreement was reached on the development of these existing political, military, economic and cultural relations. State institutions would establish direct contact with one another to further this cooperation. The necessary arrangements were to be made to ensure that relations between the General Staffs, economic institutions and scientific organisations commenced as soon as possible. As a sign of the desire for closer cooperation, it was agreed that the ambassadors of both countries would return to their posts at the earliest opportunity and that political representation would commence without delay.

The implications of Turkey’s NATO membership could also be examined as a separate subject of research in this context. However, it would not be incorrect to state that, in the Middle East—which began to undergo political reorganisation following the Second World War—the United States emerged as a prominent ‘rule-setter’ on the scene.

Reference

Israel Documents, תעודות למדיניות החוץ של ישראל (Documents on Israel’s Foreign Policy), 2001, Jerusalem (Jerusalem-Yerushalayim), pp. 819–820.