US-GCASC Co-operation and Our National Interests

One of the foreign policy issues that has occupied the agenda of Turkey and the region in recent months is undoubtedly the regime change in Syria. The collapse of the 61-year old Baathist regime and the coming to power of Hey'etu Tahrîri al-Sham marks the beginning of a new era in the region. Naturally, this situation occupies an important place in Turkey's foreign policy agenda. On the other hand, another development that has not received as much publicity as expected but is expected to become one of Turkey's important foreign policy agendas in the future is the Cyprus issue.

Looking at the recent developments, it will be seen that the dialogue between the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC) and the United States of America (USA) has evolved after a certain process and has turned into a full cooperation in the political, economic and military fields.

Panorama of the Process:

On 17 June 2024, in Washington DC, the capital of the USA, Anthony Blinken, the US Secretary of State during the Biden era, and the Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Konstantinos Kombos held a meeting. Blinken; Making statements to the press after this meeting, which was described as ‘the beginning of a strategic dialogue’, Blinken said, ‘I think this is very strong evidence of the strengthening, deepening and broadening of the relationship between our countries, which act together in many different areas’, and said that the GCASC has become an important actor in its region and therefore the USA attaches great importance to the relations with the GCASC. On his part, Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Kombos brought up the Cyprus issue and said, ‘Cyprus is a reliable and predictable partner for the United States. In this very complex region, the US message is clear on the solution of the Cyprus issue. We rely on the support of the US in the face of the occupation of Cyprus by Turkey for 50 years’, clearly citing Turkey and the existence of the TRNC as one of the reasons behind their cooperation with the US. [1]

Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Kombos and then US Secretary of State Blinken, Washington D.C., 17.06.2024. (Image Source: US Embassy in Nicosia)

When the main topics of the meeting and the outcomes of the meeting are analysed, it is seen that in addition to political and economic issues (investments and visa liberalisation), the US is also cooperating with the SCGA in terms of military issues. According to the results of the meeting, issues such as the establishment of a military helicopter base by the US in the vicinity of Tatlısu village in Southern Cyprus and the US decision to deploy special troops to the island stand out as secondary steps of this military cooperation. The reason why we characterise these decisions as ‘secondary steps’ is that the first serious step was taken much earlier, during Donald Trump's first presidential term.

In 2019, the US policy of not selling arms to the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (SCGA), which had been in place since Turkey's Cyprus Peace Operation in 1974, changed for the first time. The White House had sent a message to the GASC that it could lift restrictions on arms exports if it ended the practice of Russian warships using GASC ports and made legal arrangements to combat money laundering. In 2020, for the first time in 46 years, the US announced that it suspended the arms embargo against the SCGA for a year. During Joe Biden's presidency, the scope of this practice was further expanded and it was announced that all US arms sales restrictions on the SCGA were lifted for the fiscal year 2023 [2].

On 10 September 2024, the US State Department announced that the US and the GASC reached an agreement on the Bilateral Defence Cooperation Roadmap covering the years 2024-2029. In the statement, it was emphasised that the cooperation between the US and the GASC is a great opportunity for regional peace, responding to humanitarian crises and protecting the interests of both countries in the Eastern Mediterranean [4].

Following these developments, in January 2025, the Biden administration announced that the SCGA was included in three US defence programmes. In this framework, the FMS (Foreign Military Sales) programme opened the door for the US to assist the SCGA in terms of both weapons and equipment and military training, while the EDA (Excess Defense Articles) programme paved the way for the US to supply the SCGA with excess weapons and equipment. [5]

Revisiting the US Cyprus Report Card:

One of the first facts that stands out when looking at the history of the Cyprus issue is that the US attitude towards the issue, as in other international issues, is shaped by pragmatic decisions taken based on the conjuncture. Throughout the history of the Cyprus issue, the United States did not favour a hot conflict between Turkey and Greece, two NATO allies in the region, over the Cyprus issue due to the possibility that the USSR could take advantage of a conflict between NATO member states, and at this point, as in the case of the 1964 Johnson Letter, the US tried to prevent the conflict, sometimes with an open threat and sometimes by making mutual concessions to appease the parties.

At this point, the general policy of the US followed a policy that did not contradict the Greek Cypriot leadership, which completely took over the state apparatus in Cyprus after 1963, as much as possible, seeing it as the sole legal authority of the island and ignoring the existence of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and society. In fact, it made a special effort to prevent the Republic of Turkey from exercising its right to intervene under the guarantee treaties against the Enosisist coup d'état carried out in Cyprus on 15 July 1974 with the support of the Greek junta. However, when the operation was realised as a result of both the political turmoil in the USA and Turkey's resolute stance, the USA tried to prevent the operation from proceeding to the second phase. However, when the Geneva Talks ended in failure, Turkey carried out the second phase of the operation and today's borders were shaped [6].

The US Cyprus policy after 1974 did not differ significantly from the past. With the embargoes imposed immediately after the operation, Turkey was subjected to serious military and financial sanctions. When the Turkish Cypriot people declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 15 November 1983 by exercising their right to self-determination as a result of the lack of a concrete result from the Doruk Talks between the Turkish Cypriot side and the Greek Cypriot side between 1977 and 1979 and the Turkish Cypriots were forced to negotiate again on the federation, which was left in limbo by subjecting them to isolation and embargo policies, The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), led by the US, declared that the TRNC would not be recognised with Resolution 541 and defined the territory of the TRNC as ‘territory occupied by Turkey’ with Resolution 550. The US continued to see the GASC as the only legal interlocutor on the island and used the Cyprus issue as a ‘trump card’ against Turkey on many issues.

At this point, one of the best examples of the US view of the Cyprus issue and its use of this issue as a ‘weapon’ against Turkey was the meeting between Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and Foreign Minister İsmail Cem with the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1999. During the meeting with Ecevit and Cem, then Delaware Senator Joe Biden told the Turkish delegation, ‘You need the US, but the US does not need Turkey. Solve the Cyprus problem, fulfil the demands and we will help you. Otherwise you won't get anywhere’, clearly stating that the US wanted concessions in Cyprus at the point of helping Turkey, caused tension at that time, and Cem, the then Foreign Minister of the period, said in response to this outburst: ’If we don't get anywhere, we won't get anywhere. We did not come here to make concessions to anyone. We are not after making concessions and getting something. The USA and Turkey are two close allies. However, it is unacceptable to deliberately divert issues that we are sensitive to. You should know well, senator, that there are two separate states in Cyprus. No external pressure can change our voice and our view. The Cyprus issue ended in 1974, the bloodshed stopped.’ Ecevit, on the other hand, told Biden: ’The Cyprus issue ended in 1974. I am saying this for the last time. I don't know if I made myself clear’ [7].

The news published in the 3 October 1999 issue of Milliyet Newspaper about the incident.

Biden's performance as the US President years later was not different from his rhetoric in 1999. Biden, who promised federation in Cyprus even in his election manifesto, continued to take steps against Turkey and the TRNC.

The Danger Awaiting Turkey and the TRNC:

Today, when analysing the cooperation agreements between the US and the GCASC, it is of great importance to take into account the objective conditions and regional dynamics. The US is aware that the strategic position of the island of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean is of great importance in terms of establishing dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider region. In this respect, the US sees the option of supporting the SCGA politically, financially and militarily more than ever before as a reasonable strategy as a formula that will detach the SCGA, which previously had good relations with the Russian Federation, from its good relations with Russia and bring it to its side. In this way, it aims to benefit from the geo-strategic position of the island of Cyprus, where the GASC is located, and to obtain an important ‘base’ in the Eastern Mediterranean. At this point, GASC Foreign Minister Kombos stated in his statement to the press after his meeting with Blinken: ‘We have to be realistic. At the end of the day, we offer something to the US. And that is our strategic presence in the region.’ [5] is a simple expression of this situation.

At this point, if we touch upon the US relations with Turkey, for the US, which is uncomfortable with the fact that the relations between Russia and Turkey have shifted to a different ground, the move to support the SCGA can be defined as an attempt to ‘strengthen the hand’. Although the US does not aim to burn bridges in its relations with Turkey with this move, but to increase the alternatives at its disposal, it is obvious that this move is a serious threat to Turkey's national interests both in Cyprus and in the Eastern Mediterranean in a broader sense.

Especially in recent years, in the tensions over the Exclusive Economic Zone issue in the region, the GASC's attempts to violate the Turkish side's parcels and granting licences to international companies for exploration in areas on Turkish parcels and thus violating the sovereignty rights of the Turkish side are likely to increase further with the political, financial and military assistance of the US.

On the other hand, the arming of the SCGA should be considered as a move to further strengthen the Greek Cypriot side against the existence of the TRNC. At this point, it is obvious that these developments are quite threatening for the existence and sovereignty of the TRNC.

Remembering the S-300 Crisis:

The strategy that the Turkish side should follow in the face of the possible dangers that the military cooperation between the US and the SCGA may pose to Turkey and the TRNC is basically to demonstrate an example of effective deterrence. In fact, remembering that the military armament process of the SCGA did not start with the relations established with the US in recent years, at this point, looking at the example of the S-300 Crisis may be instructive.

As it will be remembered, the SCGA purchased the S-300 Missile System from the Russian Federation in 1997, and it was planned to install this system in the Troodos Mountains. The range of the missiles was at a level that could target the airspace of Turkey and the TRNC. The then leader of the GCASC, Glakfos Klerides, said that the installation of this missile system was ‘a precaution against possible attacks by Turkey’, and on the other hand, he said that the installation of the system could only be considered if and only if negotiations on the construction of a federation in Cyprus started.

However, both Turkey and the TRNC reacted strongly against this initiative of the SCGA. Turkey officially announced that Turkey would shoot down the missile systems if the missiles were deployed in the SCGA and accused Greece of provoking the process. Following these developments, the Greek government and the western states also got involved in the process and tried to dissuade the Klerides administration from this idea by stating that if the S-300 missiles were deployed in Southern Cyprus, Turkey might indeed strike the missile systems and even engage in a small-scale military operation.

Kostas Simitis, the Greek Prime Minister of the time, stated in his meeting with Glafkos Klerides, the leader of the SCGA, that Turkey was determined not to place the missile systems in Southern Cyprus, that this move could result in provoking Turkey and causing a new war, and suggested that the S-300s be placed on the Greek island of Crete, not in Cyprus, as a solution to the problem. After a tense meeting, in which Klerides reminded the events of 1967 and 1974 and openly stated that ‘Greece had left Cyprus alone before’, the Klerides administration could not withstand the pressure from Turkey, Greece and international public opinion and had to accept to give the S-300s to Greece in 1998 and the S-300 systems were placed in Crete [8].

In this way, the deployment of the S-300 system, which is still referred to in the Greek Cypriot public opinion today as ‘weapons paid for by Southern Cyprus but confiscated by Greece’, was prevented.

Conclusion and Evaluation:

The evolution of the political, economic and military cooperation between the US and the SCGA to another point and the agreement reached by the two sides should be clearly considered as a step aimed at harming the existence and sovereignty of Turkey and the TRNC in the region and should never be ignored.

The policies of the US, which is known to have been arming Greece in various ways for some time, towards the SCGA are actually parts of a holistic policy and aim to frame both Turkey and the TRNC in the region.

At this point, what Turkey and the TRNC should do is to closely follow this process and, in addition, to take decisive and deterrent steps to prevent the progress of the cooperation between the US and the GASC. Turkey, as a NATO member country, should take the necessary diplomatic initiatives against such US assistance to a non-NATO member and a country not recognised by Turkey, and show that Turkey is not an actor in the region that can be ignored and squeezed.

This is only possible by adopting a foreign policy approach that prioritises national interests, is shaped by long-term plans rather than daily plans, and reads the existing objective conditions well and develops policies within the framework of this understanding.

Today, although there are some in the US who see Trump's presidency as a ‘good opportunity’ for Turkey after the Biden era, it should not be forgotten that the steps taken during Trump's first term were also very effective in the rapprochement between the SCGA and the US, and that the US pursued a policy in the same direction during both Trump and Biden terms. The interests and future of Turkey and the TRNC in the region are too sensitive and important to be left to the ‘good or bad intentions’ of the new US president and administration.

SOURCE:

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‘US lifts arms embargo on Cyprus once again for one year’. BBC News Turkish. US lifts arms embargo on Cyprus once again for a year - BBC News Turkish, 17.09.2022.

Statement by the United States Department of Defence dated 10.10.2024. Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Republic of Cyprus on the Signing of a Defence Cooperation Roadmap for 2024-2029 > U.S. Department of Defense > Release

‘Cyprus says US decree on security affirms island's stabilising role in region’.Cyprus says US decree on security affirms island's stabilising role in region. Voice of America. 16.01.2025.

Birand, M.A.(1990). Diet. Istanbul: Milliyet Publications. 2nd Edition.

‘Senator, Greek lobby militant’, Milliyet Newspaper. Senator, Greek lobby militant - Son Dakika Haberleri Milliyet, 03.10.1999.

‘Greek Foreign Minister Kombos met with Blinken within the framework of his US contacts... A visa exemption agreement is being signed between the SCGA and the USA’, Kıbrıs Gazetesi, Greek Foreign Minister Kombos met with Blinken within the framework of his US contacts... Visa exemption agreement is being signed between the SCGA and the USA - Kıbrıs Gazetesi - Kıbrıs Gazetesi - Kıbrıs Haber, TRNC Breaking News and Agenda News, 18.06.2024.

Birbari, N. (2019). Waiting for the S-400s: What was the S-300 Crisis? How Did It End? Diken. Waiting for the S-400s: What was the S-300 crisis and how did it end? - Diken