What was the benefit of Tehran and Riyadh's detente on 10 March last year for the Middle East?

Were Tehran and Riyadh's contacts with Beijing before 10 March 2023 a coincidence?

Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Riyadh between 7-10 December 2022. He attended three summits there, and given the poor state of US-Saudi relations, Xi's visit was interpreted as part of the geopolitical rivalry between Washington and Beijing. In reality, the visit was nothing more than part of a journey in which China's ties with Middle Eastern countries are gradually maturing, part of a much longer trajectory of deepening China-Middle East relations. China was aiming to develop a wider range of relations in the Middle East, especially through Saudi Arabia, in the areas of trade, investment, financing, technological co-operation, education and security. The Saudis and their Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbours, on the other hand, were beginning to see China as a major power partner with a seat on the United Nations Security Council, an important energy market and a source of technological support and investment that could help them build diversified economies. 

China has deepened its relations with Middle Eastern countries that see Iran as an "enemy", and in 2021 laid the foundations for the much-talked-about comprehensive strategic partnership with Iran. Indeed, about two months after Chinese President Xi's visit to Saudi Arabia, Iranian President Ibrahim Reisi was in Beijing on 14-16 February 2023. He travelled with a large delegation, including the foreign minister, the central bank governor, and the ministers of oil and mines. 

Following these two major visits, a delegation of senior Iranian and Saudi security officials met in Beijing a year ago today, on 10 March, and decided to end the tension between Tehran and Saudi Arabia and open a new chapter in bilateral relations. Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to restore diplomatic ties and revive the security co-operation agreement they signed in 2001. Secretary General of Iran's Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani and Saudi Arabia's National Security Adviser Musaid bin Muhammad al-Aiban signed the agreement.

China brings Tehran and Riyadh together on 10 March 2023

Iraq and Oman had worked hard, first and foremost, to overcome the coldness between the two capitals and to make possible the diplomatic breakthrough that took place on 10 March. In April 2021, Iranian and Saudi Arabian officials met for direct talks in Baghdad under Iraqi mediation, which then continued in Oman.

China then took over the mediation role. The absence of any role for the United States or European countries in the Tehran-Riyadh rapprochement was very significant. In 2022, with the Russia-Ukraine War, the US, which had asked the Arab world to minimise relations with Russia in particular and to keep oil and gas prices low throughout the war, had become unable to 'listen to its orders' in the Arab world. 

When Tehran and Riyadh came together under the mediation of China and decided to shelve the problems between them, the US was the most surprised. Many experts began to describe this new development as the "post-American Gulf era".

After 10 March, Iran reopened its embassy in Riyadh, while Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic activities in Tehran in June and August 2023, respectively. In September 2023, the new Iranian Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, arrived in the capital Riyadh, and on the same day, the new Saudi Ambassador to Iran, Abdullah Alanazi, began his diplomatic mission in Tehran. 

Given how hostile Iranian-Saudi relations were in the years preceding the 10 March 2023 agreement, this re-establishment of diplomatic ties was important for all countries in the region and even for Turkey. On 2 January 2016, Saudi Arabia executed 47 people, including Shiite cleric Nimr al-Nimr, on "terrorism" charges. Following the statements of Iranian officials reacting to the executions, the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and the Consulate in Mashhad were set on fire by demonstrators in Iran. In response to these attacks, Riyadh also severed its relations with Tehran. 

Since the severing of relations between the two countries, there were no diplomatic relations between the two countries until 2023. Moreover, the execution of the Shiite cleric by the Saudi state raised sectarian tensions in the Middle East. This incident increased the friction in Tehran-Riyadh relations, which gradually deteriorated due to the armed conflicts and political crises in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen after the 2011 Arab Spring, and caused the two countries to adopt a hostile attitude towards each other. 

The "Neighbours First" foreign policy strategy of the Ibrahim Raeisi government aims to mitigate the consequences of Western pressure on Tehran by improving relations with peripheral countries. In Tehran's view, better relations with the GCC countries - especially with a major player in the Arab and Islamic world such as Saudi Arabia - could to some extent help Iran escape its isolation. At the same time, easing tensions with Iran offers Riyadh an opportunity to focus on domestic development goals and increase stability and security. Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia's grandiose plan to diversify its economy away from oil, calls for massive investment in various non-oil sectors such as tourism, logistics, ports, entertainment, culture and defence.  

The Saudi leadership needs Iran and Tehran-backed non-state actors in the region to 'sit tight'. The chances of Vision 2030's success are seen as directly related to security. Therefore, for Riyadh, Iran had to be transformed from a threat into a trusted neighbour on the Persian coast. Prior to 10 March, for example in September 2019, drone and missile attacks on the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities put Riyadh in a difficult situation. These attacks, which Riyadh blamed on Tehran, led Saudi Arabia to reduce its oil production by 50 per cent. In addition, the missile attack on a fuel depot in Jeddah during the Formula 1 Grand Prix in 2022 by the Iranian-backed Houthis also served as a warning for Saudi Arabia. This attack cast a shadow over Riyadh's efforts to present Saudi Arabia to the world as a stable country. Again, in order to build promising sports and entertainment industries in Saudi Arabia, the image of a 'safe country' had to remain intact.

The 10 March 2023 agreement led Tehran and Riyadh to make concessions. In exchange for Iran halting Houthi rebel attacks on Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia agreed to stop supporting militant Sunni groups such as Jaish al-Adl in Sistan and Baluchestan province, ethnic Arab separatist forces in Khuzestan and the Mujahedin-e Khalq. Also in May 2023, Saudi Arabia renormalised diplomatic relations with the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, a move that was probably linked to the diplomatic agreement with Iran.

What Impact Has the Situation in Gaza Had on Iran-Saudi Arabia Relations?

The main factor that pushed Iran and Saudi Arabia to resume diplomatic relations a year ago was pragmatism. Tehran and Riyadh saw that dialogue was the only way to reduce tensions and understood that further escalation of hostilities would not serve the national interests of both countries. 

However, despite the 10 March agreement, it cannot be denied that Tehran and Riyadh remain highly sceptical of each other. Iran still sees the Saudi-US partnership as a serious threat to Iran. Meanwhile, the revolutionary ideology of the Iranian regime and Tehran's ability to challenge the regional status quo through its networks of non-state actors in many Arab countries continue to worry Riyadh. In this context, I think it would be more realistic to say that the most accurate description of the current period in Iranian-Saudi relations is détente, not rapprochement. 

Meanwhile, the situation in Gaza, while leading to a degree of Iranian-Saudi rapprochement, has pushed the two countries into deeper diplomatic engagements. The leaders of the two countries agreed on the need to "end the war crimes against Palestine" and promote a stronger Islamic unity. Then, on 11 November 2023, Reisi arrived in Riyadh to address the joint Arab League-Organisation of Islamic Cooperation emergency summit on Gaza, becoming the first Iranian president to visit Saudi Arabia since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's 2012 visit.  

The Saudi authorities are keen to avoid any action that could damage the détente with Iran during the Gaza war and its regionalisation. It is well known that Riyadh does not favour joint US-UK military operations against the Houthis in Yemen. Western sources also claim that Saudi Arabia is among the Arab states that have begun to limit the US military's ability to conduct operations against Iranian-backed militias in the Middle East from its territory. 

Conclusion

China's hosting of the Tehran-Riyadh rapprochement on 10 March last year was shown as an indicator of China's increasing weight in the 'soft power' axis in the Middle East. However, the world has more expectations for the Middle East from China, which has been observed to be weak in terms of improving the situation in Palestine after 7 October 2023, re-establishing peace, and stopping the atrocities and massacres committed by Israel against Palestinians in Gaza under American hegemony and effective support. For now, China does not or cannot make moves that can fulfil this expectation. Nevertheless, even the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia seems to have helped the winds of peace in the Middle East equation to blow warm despite Gaza. The events of the last year show us that as a result of this rapprochement, despite all the tension in the region, at least it has ensured that no one can attempt a Shiite-Sunni divide.

References

BBC News Türkçe, “İran ve Suudi Arabistan 7 yıl sonra yeniden diplomatik ilişki kuruyor”, 10 Mart 2023, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c51kyd982wjo

Jonathan Fulton, “No, Xi’s visit to Riyadh wasn’t because of bad US-Saudi relations. It’s about much more.”, Atlantic Council, 15 Aralık 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/no-xis-visit-to-riyadh-wasnt-because-of-bad-us-saudi-relations-its-about-much-more/

Jonathan Fulton, “Iran’s economic future is uncertain. It’s no surprise why Raisi visited China.”, 22 Şubat 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/irans-economic-future-is-uncertain-its-no-surprise-why-raisi-visited-china/

Giorgio Cafiero, “A year ago, Beijing brokered an Iran-Saudi deal. How does détente look today?”, 6 Mart 2024, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/iran-saudi-arabia-china-deal-one-year/