Threat Perception in Turkey–Israel Relations: Security Dilemma, Uncertainty and Future Risks

Introduction

Turkey–Israel relations have begun to evolve towards permanent crises and politically harsh shifts due to increasingly harsh rhetoric, regional crises and mutual distrust in recent years. In particular, the conflicts that began in Gaza, the competition in the Eastern Mediterranean, and comparisons made based on the military strength of the parties make it imperative to address this relationship not only diplomatically but also in terms of security. The fact that there has been no direct military conflict between the two countries and that relations have not been completely severed despite all the fluctuations suggests that there may be more complex security issues underlying the harshness reflected in public opinion.

This article has been written with the aim of examining the extent to which mutual threats could turn into lasting enmity, drawing on security approach theories to analyse the current tension in Turkey-Israel relations. It appears that Turkey and Israel are pursuing an approach that seeks to balance threat capacity rather than balancing each other's power. This is because Turkey possesses far more than enough power to counterbalance Israel's entire national power elements. Therefore, it seeks to counterbalance the power elements that pose a threat by separating them. This situation creates the security dilemma problem encountered in international relations.

In summary, the security concerns between Turkey and Israel are shaped more by the military capabilities they possess and seek to develop, the uncertainty of intentions, and perceptions reinforced by rhetoric, rather than by the total military strength of the parties. This process has not yet reached an irreversible threshold of hostility, but it is highly fragile due to potential areas of conflict and increasingly harsh rhetoric.

Within this framework, this article focuses on the following questions:

· Under what conditions do Turkey and Israel perceive each other as threats?

· Is this perception translated into policy based on a balance of power or a balance of threats?

· How do potential areas of conflict fuel this perception?

· Could the historical memories of both sides be a limiting factor in the escalation of the security dilemma?

· And finally, what policy options are available for a more stable future?

The Security Dilemma and Threat Balance: A Conceptual Framework for Turkey–Israel Relations

The approach known as the security dilemma in international relations is a concept introduced to the literature by Kenneth Waltz and Robert Jervis. The security dilemma refers to a situation where a state develops military power solely to enhance its own security, but this is perceived as a potential threat by other states, and this perception generates mutual distrust and the need for armament, continuing in a cyclical manner. In this context, even if the intention behind developing such power is explained as defensive, the other side may perceive it as an aggressive intention.

The classical security approach, also known as realism, assumes that states engage in efforts to balance the power of the opposing side. According to this approach, the fundamental determinant of threat perception is the total military and economic capacity of the opposing side. However, the threat balance approach developed by Stephen Walt argues that states respond to the perceived threat rather than to the power itself. Among the factors determining the perception of threat, geographical proximity, the nature of military capacity (i.e., the ability to be used for offensive purposes) and perceived intent stand out, rather than all elements of national power.

When explaining Turkey-Israel relations using one of these approaches accepted in the literature, I believe that the concept of threat balance is more appropriate for the current situation. This is because there is no clear military balancing between the two countries, no search for balance through alliances, or arms race; on the contrary, uncertainty, the risks posed by potential areas of conflict, and a silent effort to develop power for the future come to the fore. This situation shows that the relations operate on the logic of threat balance rather than power balance.

There are two dimensions to the perception of threat. The first is existing capabilities and established military power capacity, i.e. the given threat elements. The second dimension is the constructible nature of threat perception. This second feature is based on the assumption that threat perception can change depending on time, intent, and rhetoric. Taking these two features into account, I have attempted to explain the perspectives of the parties in the following section.

Israel and Turkey's Mutual Threat Perceptions

Turkey's Military Power and Israel's Perception

The nature of Turkey's current military power, the deployment and organisation of its forces, does not lead Israel to define it as a direct, immediate and existential military threat. What distinguishes Turkey's situation from that of Israel's traditional enemies is that it is a member of the NATO alliance, which includes allies that have supported it in its most difficult times. Apart from certain rhetoric, it is difficult to speak of any explicit intention by Turkey to attack Israel. There has been no direct conflict between the two countries in the past or present, nor has there been any development leading to lasting enmity. However, over the past decade, advances in the defence industry have brought about a qualitative transformation in Turkey's military and strategic capabilities.

Alongside conventional weapons and equipment, investments in electronic warfare, air defence, long-range missile programmes, UAV/UCAV/UCAV production and operational experience, space and satellite programmes, and nuclear energy infrastructure reflect not only Turkey's desire to enhance its defence capabilities but also its pursuit of strategic autonomy. There is no military objective directly targeting Israel behind this increase in capacity. However, the issue that concerns the Israeli security bureaucracy is not so much the intentions as the rapidly developing potential.

The capabilities developed by Turkey in recent years are considered by Israeli intelligence and security agencies to be closely monitored and irreversible strategic capability gains. Even if a country does not possess a military capability, knowing how to produce it when needed constitutes a strategic gain and deterrent for that country. Therefore, considering the distances involved, Turkey's current military capabilities may not pose a direct threat to Israel. However, they are noted as a risk factor for the future. The real danger for Israel is that the capabilities gained through the defence industry are irreversible. Once acquired, these capabilities are not erased from the memory of the institutions that shape security policies, even during periods of political détente. Such a situation would lead to the threat perception becoming resistant to time and embedded in institutional memory.

Construction of Perception through Discourse and Regional Crises: Considering the process of constructing threat perception, this issue emerges as a more decisive factor in Israel–Turkey relations. Harsh political discourse towards Israel, the highly critical language used in the context of Palestine and Gaza, and Turkey's claim to regional role and leadership are perceived as elements that complicate the reading of intentions and increase uncertainty in Israeli security circles. This perception is fuelled not only by rhetoric alone, but also by the possibility that this rhetoric, combined with the capabilities mentioned above that may emerge in the future, could turn into concrete threats. Thus, Turkey is viewed as an actor that could become a threat over time.

In this context, from Israel's perspective, Turkey is neither an explicit existential threat like Iran nor a traditional military rival. However, it is also not an actor that can be completely disregarded. Indeed, recent press reports have begun to mention Turkey alongside traditional non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah in the category of state threats. As Turkey-Israel relations have followed an uneven course, there have been returns after occasional ruptures. Therefore, in Israel's security memory, Turkey continues to be seen as a state with which relations can be revived, although this status has been seriously eroded in recent years. The intensification and hardening of rhetoric, coupled with increasingly frequent cycles of normalisation and crisis, are factors accelerating this erosion.

Consequently, from Israel's perspective, Turkey appears less as an immediate threat and more as a potential threat and a source of security uncertainty. This situation does not necessitate the development of overt military force and a doctrine of use for this purpose to counterbalance Turkey, but it does not preclude certain adjustments in military capabilities and scenario-based preparations for potential crises and situations that could create the potential for conflict. This is because, from a military perspective, it is necessary to prepare for the worst-case scenario. A political directive is expected for this to be put into practice. Given the current government's stance, it is likely that such a directive has been issued. In summary, Turkey is not an immediate threat to Israel today; however, it is an actor kept on file in Israel's security memory due to the possibility of becoming a threat in the future.

Israel's Military Power and Turkey's Perception

Considering the military power of the opposing side, its intentions to use it, and the indications it has given in this regard, Israel's situation may not be seen as an existential threat in the classical sense from Turkey's perspective. However, in terms of the dangers it creates in the region and its initiatives targeting Turkey's interests, it is a high-level security risk that must be monitored very closely and continuously; the consequences of certain scenarios, if they occur, cannot be predicted in advance.

Israel is an actor with advanced military capabilities and a low threshold for pre-emptive force use from Turkey's perspective. Its long-range precision strike capability, advanced air power, cyber and electronic warfare capacity, surveillance and intelligence capabilities, and combat experience make Israel a country that cannot be ignored. In addition, its nuclear capacity significantly increases its impact factor. However, there has been no clear declaration of intent or doctrine of use indicating that this power is directly targeting Turkey. Therefore, Israel is a high-capacity military power but a potential threat with questionable intentions from Turkey's perspective. Alongside its military power, Israel is also at the centre of multi-layered threats targeting Turkey's interests through its political, economic and psychological power elements and proxies.

Constructing Perceptions through Rhetoric and Regional Crises: In terms of the constructed character of the threat, perceptions are shaped by Israel's regional behaviour and rhetoric.

In particular, military operations conducted in the context of Gaza and Palestine, Israel's approach that prioritises security and disregards legal and political boundaries, have led to the glorification of hatred and othering towards Israel in Turkey and a strengthening of the feeling of unpredictability in terms of security. Events such as Israel's domestic espionage activities, as reported in the press, along with the language used in the media, academia, and institutional discourse, have reinforced this perception. This perception is fuelled not only by the capacity of Israel's power but also by the uncertainty surrounding the conditions and manner in which this power will be used.

Israel's military and security cooperation with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus is also among the factors feeding the perception of threat constructed from Turkey's perspective. This cooperation is often interpreted by Turkey not as a direct military encirclement, but as a regional security architecture that excludes Turkey and narrows its room for manoeuvre. This interpretation increases uncertainty about Israel's intentions and may lead to Israel being given a more explicit role in certain crisis scenarios.

Nevertheless, Israel has not yet been categorised as a permanent and irreversible enemy in Turkey's security thinking. Past experiences of cooperation between the two countries, the absence of direct conflict, and periodic attempts at normalisation create a window of opportunity to prevent an irreversible breakdown in relations with Israel. This historical and institutional memory can serve as a factor limiting the hardening of the threat perception.

Consequently, from Turkey's perspective, Israel does not currently pose an existential threat. However, its practice of using pre-emptive force and its unpredictable behaviour make it a high-risk factor for regional security. Should this behaviour continue, there is potential for the threat perception that will develop over time to rise rapidly.

The danger posed by Israel is also causing fractures in Turkey's perception of security. There has been a shift from a situation where threats were expected from directly neighbouring regions to a need to take precautions against an actor located in a more distant region. Undoubtedly, this development will also affect armament priorities, the positioning of forces and doctrines. By nature, soldiers tend to take precautions against all kinds of threats. The first question they seek to answer is what kind of power to develop against whom. As the answers to these questions will create a need for resources to develop power, a political decision is also necessary. Another method for deterrence and balance is the search for regional alliances; this also depends on the decision of the political authority. It is hoped that these developments will not lead to a security dilemma and an arms race that will cause both sides to spend their resources to the detriment of prosperity.

Analytical Reading of Threat Perception

Is it possible to measure the level of perception of this concept, which is formed at the cognitive level through discourses, facts and perceptions? Since levels of perception can now be made visible through coding and algorithms, it was thought that a formula developed for security studies could be used in the context of this article. This formula, which was also used in a previous article, is as follows:

Threat Perception = Capacity × Intent × Proximity × Sensitivity × Historical Memory

Note: This formula is not a quantitative calculation; it provides an analytical framework for understanding the mental processes of decision-makers. The basic components of the formula are derived from Stephen Walt's ‘Threat Perception / Balance of Threat Theory’ (1987) approach, while the sensitivity and historical memory multipliers are inspired by the Copenhagen School's securitisation literature (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998).

From Israel's perspective, Turkey appears to be a state with high military power capacity, uncertain intentions, and increasing strategic access capabilities. When considered quantitatively, Turkey's military capacity appears to be quite large; however, when geographical factors and deployment status are taken into account, some elements of this power have the potential to pose a threat. Geographical distance stands out as a safety factor that reduces the risk of direct conflict and allows the threat to be countered from a distance; however, the long-range capabilities developed by Turkey are strategically shortening this distance. Israel's small size and the ‘preparation for the worst-case scenario’ approach embedded in its security culture heighten the perception of sensitivity. Nevertheless, historical memory acts as a limiting factor, preventing this perception from reaching a completely hostile level.

From Turkey's perspective, Israel has a high capacity to access critical facilities and infrastructure. Its intentions, while not directly hostile, are at a level that creates insecurity. Geographical distance is also a security factor for Turkey. However, Israel's air power capacity, surveillance capabilities, and abilities such as borderless cyber attacks and espionage reduce the advantage provided by distance. Developments in Syria, in particular, have shortened distances and increased the risk of unwanted conflict. Turkey's large land area and its ability to disperse reduce its vulnerability. There are no negative traumas in its historical memory. The experience of coexistence that began with the acceptance of Sephardic Jews during the Ottoman period, along with the early diplomatic recognition and long-standing good relations during the Republican era, serve as a safety net for both countries, capable of preventing dangerous developments. However, it should not be forgotten that this perception may change as older generations give way to younger ones.

Potential Areas of Conflict and Risks of Miscalculation

Although the possibility of military conflict in Turkey-Israel relations is low, the risk of miscalculation and unintended contact cannot be ignored. This risk may arise not so much from a deliberate attack but rather from perceptions rapidly turning into intent in certain areas of contact. Some of these areas are given as examples below:

The possibility of contact in the Eastern Mediterranean sea and airspace is one of the most sensitive areas due to the protection of energy infrastructure and military patrol activities conducted in exclusive economic zones. Claims of interception, close flying or harassment have the potential to quickly escalate into a military crisis.

The risk of confrontation in the Syrian theatre of operations is high due to Israel's lawless and borderless pre-emptive air strikes and the possibility of Turkey's military presence on the ground coming face to face with Israel in terms of time and space. The main danger here is the risk of misunderstanding and the resulting damage, rather than intent.

The risk of blame being placed on proxy actors is particularly present in actions originating from Hamas and the SDF. Accusations that an action or preparation was carried out with the support of one of the parties could trigger pre-emptive reflexes on both sides. The consequences of this could give rise to issues of sovereignty and legitimacy and quickly inflame public opinion.

Cyber and electronic warfare activities are one of the areas most prone to chain escalation due to the difficulty of identifying perpetrators. There is a risk that an incident in this area could spill over into conventional military domains. For example, news stories fuelling public perceptions have emerged in relation to the two recent plane crashes in Turkey.

Other risk areas can be added to these. It is highly probable that scenario studies are also being conducted on similar possibilities in military and diplomatic work.

Conclusion: Fragile Balance and Warnings for the Future

The current picture in Turkey-Israel relations points to a managed security dilemma rather than a classic hostile relationship. The understanding of balancing threats, rather than the balance of power, is at the forefront of relations; while the parties avoid open military conflict, they also maintain an uncertainty-based tension.

It is unlikely that the perception of threat in relations between the two countries will disappear completely. A more stable future depends on not crossing irreversible thresholds that would create lasting hostility. Otherwise, the security dilemma trap could push relations to irreversible points. Preventing this is possible through the transparency of intentions, the establishment of mechanisms to prevent misunderstanding, and keeping backdoor diplomacy open when necessary. Reducing the risk of conflict depends on the ability to manage uncertainties.

References

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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