What is the Main Characteristic of the Mullah Regime in Iran?
The Persian word "Ahund" is the common colloquial title given to the clergy in Iran. On the other hand, the respected name of the "Ahund Regime" is the "Mullahs' Regime", but not the Ayatollahs' regime, as is often used.
You often hear people refer to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which came to power with great popular support after the overthrow of the Shah's regime in 1979, as the "Mullahs or Ahund Regime". By the way, let us immediately say that the word "Ahund Regime" is used more among the "Persian People". As you know, the Persian word "Ahund" is a colloquial title given to the clergy in Iran. On the other hand, the respectable name of the "Ahund Regime" is the "Mullahs' Regime", but not the Ayatollahs' regime as it is often used. Wrong.
The two distinctive features of Iran's "Ahund Administration" are, first, its "strategic patience" from the Persian state tradition and, second, the fact that it exports regimes in the region, often feeding on crises that it itself manipulates. The latter is even enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The "Ayatollah", meaning the symbol of God, is the head of the whole system, of the control, of the supervisory institution. The state is governed from two capitals: the ethereal capital "Qom" and the secular capital "Tehran". The supervisory power exercised by the ethereal capital is exercised by the "Friday Imams" who, like a formal network, encompass the country down to the smallest administrative unit.
From an Orientalist point of view, it is easy to say that it is a "theocracy rule". It means looking at Iran and the Iranian Government from a Western paradigm. In other words, it means not understanding the issue at all, in other words, not knowing it. To sum up, the task of "otherworldliness" is to organize the accountability of the worldly power. This is the most crucial point of the system. It is the antidote to nepotism, nepotism, deprivation, corruption. It is a sine qua non of the system to be accountable to the people at almost every level and to avoid being unaccountable. It is a necessity. It is the name of a formal system that extends from the 'Velayat-e Faqih', the guardians of the system in a sense, consisting of religious sharia scholars in the city of Qom, to the smallest administrative unit, down to the imams who lead Friday prayers. In a sense, this is the "check and balance system" that is a sine qua non of Western democracies. "Check", which literally means "control mechanism", is the product of a soft separation of powers; "balance", which means "balance mechanism", is the product of a hard separation of powers. It is accountability, transparency and balance of powers where no one gets away with anything. The term "balance" in Western democracy refers to the presence of the legislative power on one side of the scales and the executive/government/presidential power on the other side, and the constitutional powers given to these two powers to balance each other's constitutional powers without encroaching into each other's sphere of power, without checking each other.
The Iranian version of this system is a sort of otherworldly Sword of Damocles over the earthly trinity of governance consisting of the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is the name of a system that oversees the parliament, which makes laws according to the needs of the people; the government, consisting of ministries headed by the president; the bureaucracy and the armed forces organization; and the judiciary. The Ahund Regime is a system in which the constitution and the laws, but most importantly, each individual citizen has the obligation to prove that every step he takes in front of the citizen, based on the approval he receives from that person, is in the direction he promised." It is the primary duty of the Mullahs' Regime to stand behind the "Orphans' Nobody", to protect and look after the citizens.
As Mustafa Kemal Atatürk emphasized, "The Republic is especially for the orphans." However, while this should have been the philosophical purpose of the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the 45 years since 1979, the system has evolved into the rule of the Mullahs. The otherworldly Ahund Regime in Iran must continue at all costs. On the other hand, in a general framework, the institutions should be accountable to each other, not to the people, and should monitor each other, but in comparative advantage, the Ahund Regime has evolved towards non-accountability and has become uncritical at the top. Don't think of Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage as such an economic system, of course, there is not even a trace of it.
Now let's come to the current conjuncture. The issue of whether the Iranian Ahund regime's laissez-faire, I-did-it attitude can somehow be reined in. Mediocrity means an unaccountable, unaccountable, unresponsible, irresponsible entity. But can this power be harnessed? Over the past few weeks, senior White House officials have repeatedly called on the Chinese government to intervene in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the main geopolitical sponsor of the Houthis, in order to curb the destructive behavior of the radical militias. The US national security advisor even met with the Chinese Foreign Minister in Thailand last weekend to raise the issue. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said, "China has influence over Tehran... And they have the ability to speak in a way that we can't." Kirby was even more explicit that he wanted Beijing to use this influence to "help stop the flow of arms and ammunition to the Houthis".
China's ability to shape Iranian behavior is more extensive than many realize. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is currently the Islamic Republic of Iran's largest trading partner, accounting for about 25 percent of total Iranian trade. It is also Iran's largest oil customer, importing on average more than one million barrels per day last year at a time when Iran's oil production is increasing. (1)
Undoubtedly, Beijing's influence is not only economic, but China's leaders also wield significant political and strategic influence over Tehran. In 2021, Beijing and Tehran signed a broad framework agreement worth USD 400 billion over a quarter of a century. This arrangement, designed to mitigate the negative effects of the Trump administration's "maximum pressure" policy, also gave the PRC a first-mover advantage in terms of access to Iranian ports, development of Iran's telecommunications network, infrastructure construction and transportation projects. Naturally, it also laid the foundation for closer coordination between the militaries of the two countries.
Three years on, the deal remains mostly on paper, partly because the Biden administration's more conciliatory approach to Iran has significantly strengthened the Iranian economy. The US administration did this consciously or deliberately because of Iran's ability to organize the "Axis of Resistance" against the US-Israeli partnership in the Middle East. What needs to be done is the motivation of the "Axis of Resistance". In other words, the Biden Administration's preference to keep the axis of resistance under control through Iran is seen as a strategic assumption. However, Iran's strategy is constantly changing. For example, Iran continues to organize new militia groups under names that evoke "Iraqi nationalism and the spirit of resistance".
This is because Iran knows that militia organizations that use force to the point of killing to suppress the rising Shiite opposition in Iraq have lost their image in the eyes of the Iraqi people. In addition, Iran has also set as a goal to protect the organizations it supports from retaliatory attacks by the US. Accordingly, new militia groups were planned to take responsibility for attacks against the United States, instead of organizations with known ties to the Revolutionary Guards, such as Kata'ib Hezbollah. The attack on the Taji military base, which resulted in the death of two US soldiers and bore the imprint of Kata'ib Hezbollah operations, was claimed by a "new" militia group called Usbet us-Sairin. The Usbet us-Sairin organization, which means "Union of Revolutionaries" in Arabic, was disguised as a "resistance cell" in order to create the image of Iraqis rising up against the US. (2)
On the other hand, Beijing is positioned by Iran as a strategic lifeline. For this reason, the Ahund regime has persistently tried to ensure that the PRC deepens its stake in their country, allowing Beijing to exert considerable influence over Tehran. However, due to the US influence behind closed doors, Chinese leaders have not openly shown their willingness to use this balancing policy. Going even further, despite Chinese officials urging their Iranian counterparts to halt Houthi activities in Yemen, Beijing's superficial request to Tehran has not been effective. Beyond the appearance that the PRC is only interested in protecting its own economic interests, it gives no indication that it is prepared to take any decisive steps to stabilize the region.
On the contrary, contrary to the hopes of the Biden administration, it is not in Beijing's interest to rein in Tehran or its proxy forces in the region. On the contrary, the increasingly aggressive regional profile of both the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxy forces on the ground has profoundly benefited the PRC. It is a well-known fact that for years, the PRC has been trying to convince Middle Eastern states that the US-led established regional order can offer an attractive alternative. More precisely, the PRC itself is the only counter-option to the US presence in the region. The most obvious signs of this can be summarized as follows. The "New Security Architecture for the Middle East", which has been put forward through its diplomatic initiatives since last spring, such as mediating a détente between Saudi Arabia and Iran, is the most typical indicator of this.
The Islamic Republic of Iran's covert and the axis of resistance's direct drone attack against the United States, which resulted in the death of three American soldiers at the Tower 22 US base near the Jordan-Syria border, seems to have been aimed at exposing the bankruptcy of the Biden administration's Middle East policy and the weakness of the US deterrence. This not only helps to emphasize the growing attractiveness of China as a potential alternative, but also naturally reflects to Beijing's geopolitical advantage.
The question now is whether the "Axis of Resistance", which is largely led by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, is indeed, as the Tehran Administration insists, governed by its own decisions outside the control of the Ahund Regime. If this is true, it also calls into question the legitimacy of the Ahund Regime in Tehran. On the other hand, there can be no doubt, dear readers, that the United States' main strategy is centered on "successful withdrawal" rather than engaging in an extended military conflict in the region.
Footnotes
(1) Ilan Berman “Don’t Count On China to Curb Iran - İran'ı dizginlemek için Çin'e güvenmeyin”, Newsweek Dergisi, 01Şubat 2024.
(2) Irak Sahasında İran-ABD Gerilimi: Bir Askeri-Stratejik Değerlendirme,
Hadi Atay, “Irak Sahasında İran-ABD Gerilimi: Bir Askeri-Stratejik Değerlendirme”, İRAM Araştırma Merkezi, 10/04/2020; https://iramcenter.org/irak-sahasinda-iran-abd-gerilimi-bir-askeri-stratejik-degerlendirme-44/Erişim Tarihi 04 Şubat 2024/
