A Call for World Peace: Why Should Bahçeli’s Proposal for a ‘World Peace Council’ Be Taken Seriously?

I. A Call Born Out of Chaos

Throughout human history, major diplomatic breakthroughs have emerged not from the conventional rhetoric of established political actors, but from the bold and original voices rising from the very heart of crisis. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia followed thirty years of turmoil; the 1945 founding of the UN took shape during years when the world had turned into a burning inferno. Bearing this historical reality in mind, the value of the “World Peace Council” proposal put forward by MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli on 12 April 2026 must be fully recognised at this critical juncture, where the global system has once again reached an impasse.

The negotiations, which lasted approximately 21 hours and were conducted in Islamabad from 28 February 2026 onwards with the aim of ending the US-Iran war, collapsed without any agreement being reached. Immediately following this collapse, US President Donald Trump declared a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz; he explicitly threatened that they could target Iran’s nuclear facilities. The fact that a waterway through which twenty to twenty-five per cent of the world’s oil and natural gas trade flows has effectively turned into a theatre of conflict confirms that this crisis has transcended regional boundaries to become a genuine global threat. To turn a deaf ear to such a call at this very moment is tantamount to shirking historical responsibility.

Bahçeli has proposed the establishment of a new multilateral mechanism, in response to UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ call, bringing together the US, Russia, China, Turkey and the European Union, with Turkey hosting this initiative. This proposal is not a utopia devoid of realism; it is an expression of a vision that captures the spirit of the times, necessitated by developments that document the failure of the current institutional architecture, and befitting Turkey’s accumulated capacity. Critics may view this proposal with scepticism; however, the criticism of those unable to offer a better alternative is doomed to remain superficial in the face of the magnitude of the problem.

II. The Collapse of the Current System Can No Longer Be Denied

The quickest way to grasp the validity of Bahçeli’s proposal is to examine how the current international order functions—or, more accurately, how it fails to function. The UN Security Council has been reduced to a bystander, proving powerless in the war in Ukraine, the humanitarian tragedy in Gaza, and now the Iran crisis and the Strait of Hormuz blockade. The reason for this is not the foresight of its founders, but the fact that the veto mechanism has turned into a structural blockage that prevents the major powers from being held to account. The UN system, which managed to function within these constraints even during the Cold War, has now lost its capacity to fulfil its most fundamental duty—to maintain peace and security.

The data speaks for itself, laying bare this reality. The latest reports from the United Nations Peace Index document that the global conflict index has followed an uninterrupted upward trajectory since 2008. The current number of active conflicts is at its highest level since the end of the Second World War. Despite this, the international community, whilst watching accidents pile up at a junction where the traffic lights have broken down, is content merely to keep statistics on the accidents rather than repairing the lights. Bahçeli’s proposal is a concrete initiative aimed at repairing these lights. To dismiss this initiative is morally equivalent to choosing to let the accidents continue.

The transformation of the G20 into a functional global governance platform following the 2008 financial crisis demonstrates how new forms can rapidly gain significance in a crisis environment. The coalition formed under US leadership regarding Iraq in 2003, or the flexibility mechanisms repeatedly raised in climate negotiations, have empirically confirmed that new forms are both possible and functional, both within and outside the existing UN framework. Consequently, the structure proposed by Bahçeli is not an exotic idea unrecognised by international relations theory; it is a unique version of an approach that is consistent with historical tradition and naturalised by institutional reality.

III. Turkey’s Right and Capacity to Make This Proposal

In international politics, two fundamental conditions are required for a country to assume a specific diplomatic role: legitimacy and capacity. Turkey unquestionably meets both conditions. Turkey is a state possessing NATO’s second-largest land forces, ranking among the G20 economies, forming a critical link in global trade security due to its sovereignty over the Straits, and situated at the most strategic crossroads where Europe, Asia and the Middle East converge. These characteristics confer upon Turkey a unique strategic identity that no other country in the world could easily replicate.

The argument regarding capacity is not merely geographical or military in nature, but can also be defended on the basis of diplomatic experience. In 2022, Turkey succeeded in bringing both sides to the negotiating table during the grain corridor talks between Ukraine and Russia. This achievement is no minor detail; it is an extremely rare diplomatic success achieved in a context where Russia and the West were utilising every available means to destroy one another. Similarly, Turkey has implemented an exceptional balancing act in the Syrian civil war, maintaining contact with both the opposition and the regime whilst continuing to remain within the Western alliance without severing diplomatic ties with Iran. This accumulated experience constitutes a concrete institutional memory and experiential capital that can underpin Bahçeli’s proposal.

Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s assessments regarding the Islamabad process are also a clear indication of how functional this capacity is. Fidan stated that both sides were sincere regarding the ceasefire in the negotiations, that their initial positions were, by their very nature, maximalist, and that mediators could bring these positions closer over time. The fact that Turkey is able to articulate this insight to both the US and Iran represents a level of access possessed by no other country. An honest answer to this question must acknowledge that Turkey has effectively earned the right to champion this proposal.

IV. Response to Criticisms: Challenges Are Not Excuses, but Reasons

The main objections raised against Bahçeli’s proposal are predictable: Russia and the West cannot sit at the same table; the EU lacks a unified voice; the US maintains a distance from multilateral structures. These objections reflect reality to some extent; however, the crucial point is this: the existence of these challenges constitutes a justification not for rejecting the proposal, but rather for its urgent implementation. If Russia and the West cannot sit at the same table and this situation persists, the result will be a third world war. If the EU lacks a unified voice, this shortcoming must be addressed through a mechanism. If the US shuns multilateralism, the instability created by a unipolar world order will be inevitable.

Looking back at the history of major diplomatic breakthroughs, it is clear that none of them occurred simply because ‘the conditions were right’. When Nixon made his historic visit to China in 1972, the conditions contained dozens of reasons that would have made the visit ‘impossible’; yet the visit took place and changed the course of the world. In 1993, when Israeli and Palestinian officials sat down at the table in Oslo, it was common knowledge that the people on the other side of the table were representatives of groups sworn to annihilate one another; yet the negotiations took place nonetheless. History has sided not with those who wait for favourable conditions, but with those who force conditions to create new realities. Bahçeli’s proposal is part of this tradition.

As for the uncertainties regarding the proposal’s institutional design, this uncertainty should be interpreted not as a weakness but as the natural beginning of a maturation process. No major international structure has ever emerged with a complete and flawless constitution in its initial proposal. Even the UN Charter was revised repeatedly at the San Francisco Conference, and the debates lasted for years. What matters is that the principle is boldly put forward. The details are filled in through negotiation; the vision, however, is written in a single stroke. Bahçeli has written this vision.

V. Turkey’s Historical Responsibility and the Timeliness of the Proposal

The geography and historical memory inherited by Turkey from the Ottoman legacy place it within a holistic relationship with the crises in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Eastern Mediterranean. This legacy has at times been interpreted as a burden; however, when assessed from the correct perspective, it also signifies profound regional knowledge, a network of historical relations with the parties involved, and a unique capacity for building trust. Bahçeli’s proposal reflects a determination to transform this legacy into a contribution to the international order rather than dismissing it.

The timing of the proposal is also no coincidence. The Strait of Hormuz blockade is directly disrupting global energy markets; volatility in oil prices is threatening global supply chains; and whilst the ceasefire is scheduled to last only until 21 April, the collapse of negotiations is increasing the risk of renewed escalation with each passing day. To argue that calling for a new framework for peace under these conditions is ‘ill-timed’ is tantamount to arguing that one should wait until the fire has gone out before attempting to extinguish it. On the contrary, now is precisely the right and most necessary moment to make this proposal.

Turkey’s endorsement of this proposal is a strategic imperative not only from a foreign policy perspective but also in terms of national interests. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz is a development that directly affects Turkey’s energy security. The commercial relations maintained with Iran, the investment networks established with Gulf countries, and the burdens of refugees, terrorism and economic pressure that the region’s instability will impose on Turkey; all these factors make embracing this proposal not an idealistic but a realistic choice. In other words, Turkey must defend this proposal not only for the sake of world peace but also to safeguard the welfare of its own people.

VI. Ankara’s Hosting Role: A Strategic, Not a Symbolic, Choice

The fact that Bahçeli’s proposal specifically emphasises Turkey’s role as host demonstrates that the proposal is not merely a call for diplomatic sympathy. This emphasis declares Ankara’s intention to be a material and institutional partner in resolving the issue. Hosting is not merely a passive symbolic gesture in international relations; it signifies initiative in setting the negotiation agenda, the ability to establish direct contact with the parties, and a guarantee of the process’s continuity. It is clear how strategically Geneva or Oslo have utilised this function for decades.

Ankara is both ready and capable of assuming this role. Turkey’s ability to maintain relations with both Russia and the West, to remain in contact with both Iran and the US, and to engage with both Sunni Gulf states and the Shia axis represents a diplomatic reach that no other capital possesses. Failing to utilise this map would amount to a waste, akin to leaving Turkey’s natural resources buried underground or neglecting to cultivate the fields that farmers could sow.

In this context, the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not yet launched an official initiative regarding the proposal should not be subject to criticism; rather, it should be interpreted as a sign of a measured preparation process. What matters is that political will is placed behind this proposal. Bahçeli has clearly demonstrated this will. Turkish foreign policy possesses the capacity to embrace this vision; what remains is to translate this capacity into action.

VII. Conclusion: History Does Not Reward Those Who Wait

In 1945, as the UN was founded, the world was ablaze. In 1975, as signatures were being put to paper in Helsinki, the Cold War was rendering all institutions dysfunctional. In both cases, what was deemed ‘impossible’ was achieved; for at certain turning points in history, doing what is deemed impossible becomes a prerequisite for survival. Today, as the flames burn in Hormuz, delegations returning empty-handed from Islamabad prepare for a new round of talks, and scenarios of a Third World War are discussed not in diplomatic but in military terms, the world stands at precisely such a turning point.

Devlet Bahçeli’s proposal for a “World Peace Council” is not a brake applied at this turning point, but a steering manoeuvre. It is a choice made to determine the vehicle’s destination, a declaration of responsibility, and a call befitting Turkey’s historical role. The fact that every technical detail of the proposal has not yet been resolved does not render it worthless; on the contrary, it brings with it the responsibility to treat the proposal as a living process and to build upon it.

In this era where new mechanisms are needed to resolve the problems the global system has been unable to solve, Turkey possesses the capacity to be both the proposer and the host of such a mechanism. Bahçeli has recognised this opportunity and articulated it boldly. The real question is no longer whether this proposal is realistic, but whether Turkey will seize this historic opportunity that it deserves. History has rewarded those who take action, not those who wait; standing behind this proposal is such a step.