A different perspective on the war between Iran and Israel/the US

Whilst the joint attacks and counter-attacks by Israel and the US against Iran continue, and Iran has, as expected, refused to back down, with the conflict dragging on; and whilst experts—and those who, despite lacking expertise, have something to say on every subject—debate what the future might hold across every news channel, let us take a step back and examine the complex relationship between Iran and the US, highlighting some critical turning points and the defining milestones whose effects have been lasting, so that we may understand how we arrived at this point and what the future might hold.

Several key events and factors that led to the prolonged severance of US-Iran relations are examined below:

1. The 1953 Coup

The first action taken by the US as a superpower in the Middle East was the overthrow of the nationalist Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, in August 1953, on the grounds of his communist aims. Today, many Iranians believe that opportunities to pursue a new, independent and autonomous foreign policy, to use national resources for national development, and to build democracy were lost solely due to the machinations of an occupying superpower. Although this accusation may be exaggerated, it is not entirely without foundation, as US intervention did hinder the trajectory of Iranian politics towards development. The events of 1953 created an emotional barrier for the Iranian people, leading them to harbour doubts about America’s intentions and conduct. Iranians believe that, had there been no US intervention, their country could have progressed along a nationalist path, liberating its own resources from foreign exploitation and freeing itself from the clutches of a despotic monarchy.

The 1953 coup has been portrayed as a joint initiative with the CIA to save Iran from international communism. In reality, however, this coup was a joint effort by the British and Americans to safeguard the international oil cartel. Whilst one of the US’s primary objectives in the current conflict may appear to be ‘regime change in Iran’, the fact that it is actually ‘serving the international oil cartel’ is a clear indication of history repeating itself.

The most significant legacy of the 1953 coup for the Iranian people is the deep-seated suspicion it instilled towards external powers, particularly the US. In the eyes of the Iranians, the primary imperialist power is no longer merely Britain; the US, which collaborates with it, has also become an enemy. Following the coup, the US’s transformation into the true patron of an unreliable and near-dictatorial monarchy has cast a shadow of doubt, suggesting that it intervenes even in democratic changes when its own economic and strategic interests are at stake. Recent developments, not only in Iran but in many other countries, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, demonstrate that the Iranian people’s view is not entirely unfounded.

The coup destroyed the National Front and the Tudeh Party, paving the way for the emergence of the religious movement. The 1953 coup helped to replace nationalism, socialism and liberalism with Islamic fundamentalism, and thus served as a cause that made the 1979 Islamic Revolution possible, even foreseeable and expected. Having survived a powerful threat to his rule, the Shah established a secret police organisation to maintain order, creating a strict and authoritarian state. He continued from where his father had been forced to leave off in 1941 and sought to consolidate the three main pillars of his regime by adding the palace patronage system to the military-bureaucratic dilemma. As the secular opposition was suppressed and its leaders and politicians imprisoned, the institutions of the religious establishment became the sole channel for the implementation of opposition policies.

By the 1960s, more militant clerics such as Khomeini began to come to the fore and mobilise religion’s effective infrastructural network against the regime; with the significant weakening of secular forces, the clerics, thanks to their privileged places of worship—the mosques—became the vanguard of the emerging anti-Shah opposition and, ultimately, the leaders of the revolution.

Prior to 1953, it might have been possible for Iranians to view the US as a fundamentally well-intentioned power, but this image was completely shattered following the coup.

The greatest mistake made by US and Israeli strategists who believe the Iranian people will overthrow the regime in the current conflict stems from a lack of analysis due to ignorance of history and social sociology. Far from overthrowing the regime in Iran, this conflict is, whether they like it or not, causing the Iranian people to consolidate around the regime. As the US continues its misguided policies, which began with the coup against Mossadegh, the prospect of the Iranian people becoming more democratic and achieving a secular government grows ever more difficult.

2. The Hostage Crisis

The hostage crisis, which led to the severing of relations and was perceived as an attempt to humiliate the US, stands out as the second major event. On Sunday, 4 November 1979, a group of Iranian students suddenly changed course, storming the imposing US Embassy and announcing the arrest of the bewildered diplomats; this event marked the beginning of a crisis that would last 444 days. Following this incident, relations between the two countries were severed. Whilst Iran was categorised as one of the ‘Axis of Evil’ countries for the US and deemed a dangerous nation providing global support for terrorist activities; the US, in turn, became an enemy nation for Iran, known by the epithet ‘The Great Satan’.

Khomeini’s endorsement of the embassy siege bolstered the resolve of the students, who now saw themselves not merely as the vanguard of a revolutionary struggle to liberate Iran, but of a grand revolutionary war destined to liberate the entire Third World. From the perspective of Iranians, whose country had been subjected to constant foreign intervention for almost the entire 20th century, it was believed that the US and its allies were plotting against the new regime. To Iranians, the embassy was seen as a ‘nest of spies’ and the physical embodiment of a superpower acting as the enforcer of a tyrannical monarchy. For the Americans, however, the hostages were ordinary individuals—their brothers and fellow citizens—held against their will.

When diplomacy and economic pressure failed to resolve the crisis, the Carter administration, seeking a solution, turned to a military rescue option known as Operation Eagle Claw. 118 soldiers were to fly to Iran using eight helicopters, refuel in the middle of the desert, and position themselves near Tehran. This was a daunting task even under the best conditions; however, the harsh desert conditions and a lack of coordination forced the commanders to call off the operation shortly after it had begun. Mechanical issues caused by a desert storm and a collision between a helicopter and a refuelling aircraft resulted in the deaths of eight US soldiers. As a superpower that had failed both to persuade Iran to release its diplomats and to carry out a significant rescue operation, the US had been humiliated in the most abject manner. Khomeini’s persistent slogan, “America can’t do a thing”, began to ring all too true. One of the reasons the US seeks to attack Iran today is the effort to put an end to this historic humiliation.

The hostage crisis fuelled hostility towards Iran among the American public. Iran paid a heavy price for this stance and was left to face Saddam Hussein’s aggression alone during the Iran-Iraq War, which began in 1980 and ended in 1988.

US President Reagan was forced to agree to a deal that contradicted his administration’s policy of banning arms sales to Iran in order to secure the release of the hostages. Consequently, the resolution of the hostage crisis failed to alter the entrenched negative patterns in US-Iran relations. Whilst Tehran continued to pursue a line of hostility and opposition towards the US, the Reagan administration adopted punitive policies based on pressure and isolation. To understand the difficulties of the ground operation envisaged in the current Iran-US/Israel conflict, it is necessary to analyse the 444-day hostage crisis thoroughly.

3. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s Refusal to Recognise Israel

Another factor was the newly established Iranian government’s declaration that Israel was an occupying regime and its refusal to recognise the country. In the early 1980s, Israelis still viewed Iraq as their greatest enemy. The Ba’ath regime, driven by a desire to dominate the Arab world, had adopted a very hardline anti-Israel stance and was preoccupied with attempting to mobilise the region against the Jewish state. Saddam’s regime and his obsession with nuclear weapons were viewed as a more immediate threat than Iran’s theocratic regime. From Israel’s perspective, it made more sense to support Iran in a war that would tie Saddam down and drain his coffers. The idea of forming a front aimed at establishing relations with non-Arab powers in Turkey and Iraq—countries situated on the outer periphery of the Middle East—had long been tempting to Israeli politicians. However, statements by Iranian leaders that Israel must be wiped off the map were met with a backlash both in Israel and in its strategic ally, the US, leading to a breakdown in relations. The Saddam regime in Iraq’s production and use of weapons of mass destruction brought Iran into the picture.

4. The Fall of the Shah’s Regime

The establishment of the Islamic Republic, coupled with the removal of the US’s most important ally in the region, was another contributing factor. Iran, which under the Shah had a government aligned with US policies, came to view the US not merely as an ally but as the ‘Great Satan’ following the establishment of the Islamic Republic, leading to the breakdown of relations. Particularly during the Iran-Iraq War, the US’s obsession with curbing Iran’s influence occasionally drove it into an alliance with a dictator such as Saddam Hussein. The US administration did everything in its power to support the Iraqi regime, which it viewed as a bulwark against the Iranian Revolution. By providing economic support and valuable military intelligence, Washington stood firmly by Iraq in its war against Iran. Even more bizarrely, the US turned a blind eye to Saddam’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian civilians and children. The Reagan administration did not merely turn a blind eye to Saddam’s subsequent actions—such as attacking neighbouring states and using weapons of mass destruction—which were later condemned by the two subsequent Bush administrations; it also provided covert support. Blinded by its suspicion of Iran, Washington disregarded its own theoretical principles and, in the context of its interests, bolstered the murderous Saddam.

From the US perspective, it was imperative to intervene against an Islamic regime that openly defied its power, posed a threat to the security of one of its allies—Israel—and had championed a radical Islamic ideology. Indeed, when the US placed Iran on its list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1984, this also created a legitimate basis for the hardline policies it would pursue against Iran.

The reality that has emerged today is that, the US must, in some way, overcome the Iranian obstacle. Beyond real political reasons, there are also psychological reasons stemming from the events that took place in Iran in 1979. However, overcoming the Iranian obstacle is not a situation that can be easily realised, even for the US. This is because achieving this would mean the US gaining a significant advantage over its rivals—particularly China—by controlling the Middle East’s oil and natural gas reserves, and effectively ruling the world alone; it is inconceivable that the world would stand idly by whilst Iran is left isolated against the US.

Let us now consider how the current war might come to an end. The war can only end through a ceasefire and an agreement resulting from a situation where neither side has been defeated. In this context, US President Trump’s statements and Iran’s refusal to accept them are an indication that neither side will accept defeat as a result of the war.

It is unclear who will emerge victorious, but the losers of this war have been humanity, international law and legitimacy. The world has become a far less secure place than it was before this war. For the world to become a safer place once again, this can only be achieved through the end of the US and Israeli administrations—which have trampled upon humanity, international law and legitimacy, the losers of this war—and the Iranian regime, which imposes a theocratic, oppressive rule upon its own people.

References

ABRAHAMIAN, Ervand: “A History of Modern Iran”, Translated by Dilek ŞENDİL, Türkiye İş Bankası Cultural Publications, February 2009.

ÖNDER, Ersoy, “An Analysis of Iran’s Nuclear Programme and Turkey”, IQ Publishing, October 2013.

TAKEYH, Ray: “Iran: The Land of Secret Revolutions”, Karakutu Publications, Istanbul, July 2009.