F-35, S-400, F-16V, Typhoon, JF-17... Finland and Sweden... What does Erdoğan want to do? Where is he taking Turkey?

Although each of the topics in the heading are intricate and seem to be both related and unrelated to each other, they are the keystone issues in the recent Turkish foreign policy and Turkey's relations with the Western world, especially NATO. On the basis of the accession process of Finland and Sweden, all of these topics have occupied and continue to occupy our agenda. For example, a question waiting to be answered: "If Sweden's membership is approved by the Turkish Parliament, will the US approve the sale of F-16s to Turkey in return?"

Why did Finland and Sweden want to join NATO?

Finland and Sweden maintained their neutrality in the Cold War equilibrium after the Second World War. However, both countries were closer to Western institutions than to the Soviets and became part of the EU in 1995. At the time, this was interpreted as Stockholm and Helsinki abandoning their policy of neutrality.

On the other hand, both countries continued to show a will to remain militarily non-aligned. The integration of their economies with Western countries did not result in their military and political alignment with Western countries. The end of the Cold War paved the way for these two countries to further integrate with the West. They felt that the Soviet threat was no longer a military threat and sought to bring their armed forces up to the standards of Western militaries through NATO's Partnership for Peace training opportunities. In this spirit, since the early 1990s, Finland and Sweden have participated in NATO missions and exercises and have increased their cooperation with NATO. Despite this close cooperation, both countries did not show the will and willingness to become NATO members, following the path of the 14 new members that joined NATO after the Cold War. 

However, Russia's attempts to annex parts of Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and finally Donbas from 2021 onwards, led the two countries to strengthen their cooperation with NATO. Finland and Sweden were particularly disturbed by Russia's proposal on December 17, 2021 for a new US-Russia treaty that would include restrictions on NATO's "further eastward expansion". The governments of both countries saw Russia's bold move as an unacceptable attempt to violate their sovereignty.

Finally, Russia's 'special operation', the attempted large-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, was the last straw for Finland and Sweden. The Finnish government immediately declared that it would take steps towards joining NATO. Then its neighbor Sweden made a similar declaration of intent. The strong historical ties between Finland and Sweden required both countries to have a common foreign policy on many issues. In a way, Finland forced Sweden to reassess its view of NATO and changed the equation in northern Europe. Sweden's Social Democrat-based government, which was in power at the time, found it necessary to start the process of reassessing its non-alignment policy.

Turkey has always supported Finland and Sweden's membership in NATO in principle

At the end of the day, Sweden and Finland notified the Alliance countries through official channels of their willingness to become NATO members. Both countries considered it essential that they be admitted as soon as possible and brought under the Alliance's collective security umbrella. They calculated that if the Alliance's membership process was somehow delayed after the application, the Kremlin might target them and thus they might be worn down in their journey towards membership. With this concern, both countries found it necessary to communicate through Alliance channels that they expected a 'quick accession process', citing the volatile security situation in Europe. 

In response, the NATO Secretary General gave them explicit assurances that the process would be swift and that they would not have any problems. In the meantime, the two countries also sought security assurances from allies like the US and the UK against Russia. During this period, no member had a negative stance on the membership of these two countries in NATO. For these two countries, whose armed forces and political structures were already largely integrated into NATO, membership of the alliance was seen as part of a procedural flow. 

The Turkish side also did not have a negative view on the membership of these two countries. In fact, according to Finnish President Sauli Niinistö, President Erdoğan told him that "if you apply for NATO membership, we will consider it positively". It was later claimed that the Swedish foreign minister received similar assurances from his Turkish counterpart at a meeting in Brussels in the spring of 2021. In principle, Ankara, which has always advocated NATO's enlargement and adopted an 'Open Door' policy, naturally wanted to see these two countries in the Alliance. 

Seeing that there were no allied reservations about pre-application membership was especially important for the Finnish leadership to 'win' against Russia and feel more secure against possible Russian hostility. Convinced that no one had any objections, Sweden and Finland submitted their formal letters of application to NATO on May 18, 2022 to take their place among NATO allies.

Why did Erdoğan suddenly interrupt the membership process to which he had said yes in principle?

However, just five days before the expected Finnish and Swedish statements, Erdoğan, in response to a journalist's question after a Friday prayer, said, "We do not look favorably on the NATO membership of Sweden and Finland, which are hostels for terrorists!" Erdoğan's statement was unexpected by many in Turkey as well. According to some, even the Turkish Foreign Ministry had no idea that Finland and Sweden would be told 'no' to NATO membership at this stage. Traditionally, Turkey has always been supportive and welcoming of NATO's enlargement. The expectation was high that Turkey, which did not even put its foot down on the enlargement of Eastern European countries, would look favorably on two northern European countries that are well outside the Anatolian geography. 

Nevertheless, while the issue was still hot, both countries found it necessary to apply to NATO, despite Erdoğan's "we don't look favorably" stance. After the application, President Erdoğan spoke to the leaders of Sweden, Finland and NATO on May 21: "No membership unless there is solidarity in the fight against terrorism!", conveying Turkey's firm stance to both countries at the highest level.

What were Turkey's reasons for saying 'no' to Finland and Sweden?

It was argued that there were at least four possible reasons why Erdogan decided to block Finland and Sweden's efforts to join NATO. First, Cutting Western Countries' 'Support' to the PKK Terrorist Organization

Ankara had expressed a clear expectation from the very beginning when it said 'No membership unless there is solidarity in the fight against terrorism'. Turkey was particularly uncomfortable with Sweden's 'soft' attitude towards groups like the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), which the European Union and the United States have also listed as terrorist organizations, as well as groups like FETÖ and its members. This was because Sweden harbored a large Kurdish population that sympathized with and openly supported the PKK. They regularly organized demonstrations in Swedish cities where PKK flags were openly displayed. The Swedish police and judiciary, on the other hand, could only watch these anti-Turkey demonstrations. The main reason for this was that Sweden's anti-terrorism laws were, until recently, quite inadequate against such demonstrations. In the face of Turkey's criticism, the Swedish government used the excuse of 'freedom of expression'. In this context, the PKK flag was seen as part of freedom of expression in Stockholm, while in Ankara it was seen as support for terrorism, allowing PKK propaganda and obstructing Turkey's fight against terrorism. Moreover, this tolerance towards the PKK also paved the way for the Kurdish population living in Sweden to openly provide financial support to the PKK, making Turkey's fight against the PKK more difficult. This was a situation that Turkey could not accept.

Secondly, it is a theme to be used in the Presidential Election Race in May 2023.

The rhetoric of vetoing both countries' membership in the alliance was politically beneficial to Erdogan. The number of analyzes in this direction had increased considerably before the Presidential and Parliamentary Elections held on May 14, 2023. The fight against PKK was a tool in Erdoğan's election campaign. Highlighting the security paradigm and placing the PKK at its center was enough for the majority of the Turkish people to 'oppose' the other side. As a matter of fact, the allegation that the Nation Alliance (CHP Chairman Kılıçdaroğlu and the leaders of other political parties with him) supported the PKK was a serious trump card for Erdoğan. Again, as part of the 'foreign powers' discourse, the discourse that Sweden and Finland are countries that support terrorism and therefore cannot become members of NATO, but that if the Nation Alliance wins, Kılıçdaroğlu will immediately approve their membership in NATO, politically puts Erdoğan in the hands. It must have been seen as a strengthening argument. In any case, such statements of Erdogan coincided with the 'PKK sensitivity' that existed in the majority of Turkish people. One of the pillars of the cooperation between Erdogan and his partner MHP was the common understanding in the fight against the PKK. For this reason, taking a stand against European countries that were thought to be too lax against terrorism had positive repercussions in favor of Erdoğan in the domestic public opinion.

Third, Using it as Leverage in Negotiating F-16 with the USA

After Turkey was excluded from the F-35 program on the grounds of purchasing the Russian S-400 missile system, Ankara conveyed its request for a supply package for 40 F-16V warplanes to the USA on September 23, 2021. What was in the package? In line with Turkey's demands; In addition to the Block 70/72 Viper configuration (F-16Vs) and the Viper upgrade package for the existing 79 F-16 aircraft, the package also included the sale of 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 modern ammunition/bombs. The total value of this 'F-16' package was pronounced as 20 billion dollars. Washington; He was in favor of quickly making Finland and Sweden members of NATO. However, in those days, Washington did not yet seem to be at the point of saying 'Yes' to Turkey regarding the sale of F-16s for various reasons. For this reason, claims that Ankara sent a message to Washington in the context of Sweden and Finland, that if Turkey approves the F-16 package, it will also approve the membership of these two countries, have taken their place on the agenda. In addition, Erdoğan, who wants to prevent the USA from supporting PYD/YPG, a branch of the PKK in Syria, in addition to the F-16 package, temporarily used Sweden and Finland to "negotiate" with Biden. It was claimed that he blocked it.

Fourth, It Provides the Benefit of Strengthening the Ankara-Moscow Relationship

Ankara's veto on NATO expansion was, in a way, parallel to Moscow's expectations. For Erdoğan's close friend Vladimir Putin, Turkey's 'slowing down' approach to the membership of Finland and Sweden was considered an important political support for Putin and a lever that harmed the integrity of NATO, especially during the period of sanctions imposed by the Western world on Russia due to Ukraine. . Considering the complex structure inherent in Turkish-Russian relations, 'satisfying Putin and not leaving him alone' stood out as a factor that would strengthen Erdogan's hand when the time came. Moreover, having good relations with Russia was also a necessity for Turkey, which was in open conflict with the United States in the context of Syria. Such gestures by Erdoğan could serve as an important lever to obtain Putin's approval in possible operations against PYD/YPG elements in the regions under Russian control in northern Syria, at times when Ankara needed Moscow's approval. Again, in this period, as seen in the financing of the ongoing construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, as well as Russian natural gas, the Russian side might have favored Turkey's requests to postpone loan payments.

Sweden, Finland and Turkey Signed a Tripartite Agreement at the Madrid Summit on June 28, 2022

Despite all this, Turkey gave the green light to Finland and Sweden at NATO's Madrid Summit on June 28, 2022. After the tripartite summit, an agreement was signed between Türkiye, Sweden and Finland. Helsinki and Stockholm's agreement to meet Ankara's demands enabled the start of the NATO membership process. The two countries' promises to end the arms embargo against Turkey and to complete the necessary legal and administrative work on the extradition of PKK and FETO sympathizers to Turkey were considered important gains in Ankara lobbies.

The fact that Ankara's objections regarding the membership process, which were brought to the agenda with Erdoğan's exit on May 13, 2022, and the adoption by NATO of the memorandum of understanding signed after the negotiations, were also described as an 'applauded Erdoğan policy'. The issue of NATO membership of Sweden and Finland, how turning Turkey's security sensitivities into a leverage function that makes it possible to bring them to the international agenda is an important foreign policy achievement, and that it is a development that will protect Turkey's reputation, was presented to the Turkish public in a successful campaign. This success was used as part of the struggle in domestic politics during the May 2023 elections.

On the other hand, it became clear over time that the memorandum of understanding signed between the parties was not an end but a beginning. Numerous meetings were held between the signatories, and attempts were made to overcome most artificial political 'crises'. Progress has been made in the process.

As a matter of fact, the Joint Press Conference of the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg in Istanbul on November 3, 2022, reflected the progress achieved in the talks between Turkey, Finland and Sweden. Çavuşoğlu said in this meeting; “Finland and Sweden increased their cooperation with Turkey in the fight against terrorism and a permanent mechanism was created. Sweden is passing new laws thus preventing participation in terrorist organizations, including the PKK. It is also strengthening its instruments on financing terrorism. More extraditions and deportations began to occur, extraditions increased and restrictions were lifted. Finland and Sweden are fulfilling their commitments in their agreements with Turkey, they are strengthening their commitments and fulfilling their commitments in the fight against terrorism everywhere, on every issue. “They are ready to work with Turkey, so they will address all your security concerns.” He used the expression.

Kalın Sent the Expected Message from the USA: “Finland Can Become a Member!”

Despite this expectation, there was no end in sight to the membership journey. When January 2023 came, Turkey decided to suspend the tripartite negotiations indefinitely due to the incident of Danish far-right politician Rasmus Paludan burning the Quran in front of the Turkish Embassy building in Stockholm and the protests targeting President Erdoğan. It's almost back to May 13, 2022. The already cold winter winds in Stockholm and Helsinki had become completely unbearable. While all three capitals blamed each other, Brussels and Washington found it necessary to intervene again.

Afterwards, the statement that the negotiations would restart was made by Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu during the Ankara visit of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken on February 20, 2023. Thus, Biden showed that he had no problem hearing Erdogan's voice when necessary, despite his advanced age. Probably based on a decision taken at this meeting, a tripartite meeting was held with Sweden and Finland at the meeting in Brussels, where the then Presidential spokesman İbrahim Kalın attended on behalf of Turkey. Afterwards, Kalın flew to Washington and from there he sent the expected message to Ankara: "Finland can become a member!"

Thereupon, Erdogan, who met with Finnish President Sauli Niinisto in Ankara, announced that it was decided to start the approval process of Finland's NATO membership in the Parliament, and thus, in a short time, Finland became the 31st member of the Alliance without Sweden. During this period, comments were made that Erdoğan, while approving Finland's membership, intended to 'delay' Sweden a little longer. Evaluations were made that leaving Sweden's situation until after the elections in May 2023 would be a more accurate election strategy.

Erdoğan, who won the second round of the election on May 28, 2023, would now begin to signal that he was ready to approve Sweden. In this context, negotiations between Türkiye, Sweden and NATO continued. On July 10, Erdoğan met with Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the NATO Summit in Vilnius, and it was announced that an agreement was reached between the parties.

According to the agreement, it was decided that Turkey would take Sweden's NATO Accession Protocols to the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and Sweden, in return, would actively support Turkey's EU accession process, including the updating of the Customs Union and visa liberalization. Domestic media reported that Turkey got what it wanted.

Why did Turkey change its stance on Sweden's accession to NATO?

After a year of fierce opposition, Erdogan suddenly found it necessary to change his position for some reason. The July 10 agreement meant that Turkey was virtually guaranteeing Sweden's NATO membership. The agreement was undoubtedly helped by Washington's positive signal on the F-16 package in the run-up to the summit. In an interview with CNN, Biden, who pointed out that he wanted to put Turkey's F-16 modernization demand in the same pot with Sweden's NATO membership before the Vilnius Summit, which starts on July 11, said, "Turkey wants the modernization of its F-16 aircraft. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is also demanding it. Obviously, what I'm trying to put together here is a consortium where we strengthen NATO in terms of the military capacity of both Greece and Turkey, and we allow Sweden to participate." This was interpreted as the Biden administration agreeing to help break the deadlock in Congress over the sale of F-16 fighter jets and other military equipment to Turkey. 

Meanwhile, during this summit, Erdogan also signaled that he would take a stance that would 'keep Turkey away from Russia'. Erdoğan's power politics seemed to be on the eve of changing direction again. Erdoğan's pragmatism was back in action. 

At the end of the day, Erdoğan used the veto card against two countries willing to become members of the military alliance in order to extract various concessions, especially from the US, and to make his weight felt in the Western world. He seemed to have played his role very well at the table without revealing his hand. Now it looked as if progress had been made. Could Erdogan's desire to repair deteriorating relations with the West and move away from Putin's Russia step by step have played a role in this? In the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Erdoğan, who had demonstrated his potential to play the role of a key mediator between the warring parties, tried to take advantage of the 'politics of balance' he pursued in the first months of this dramatically unfolding war. His image as the only Western leader who could talk to Putin often worked.

Erdogan also managed to obtain many concessions to increase his political capital, including the Swedish government's action against PKK sympathizers at home. Domestically, he was also able to use this to his advantage in the presidential election race. He also managed to get NATO to include the issue of terrorism on its agenda, taking into account Turkey's expectations and wishes. The establishment of a 'special counter-terrorism coordinator's desk', an issue that Ankara had previously raised but which was not accepted by the Alliance members, was also realized in this way. 

On the other hand, Erdoğan, who did not achieve what he expected from the EU in this process, still expresses his hopes for progress in the negotiations with the EU during Hungary's presidency these days.

Will Erdogan Get F-16s from the US in Return for Saying Yes to Sweden?

In his press statement after his one-day visit to Hungary, Erdoğan said that Biden had assured him that he would get the F-16s he wanted from the US. President Erdoğan said, "We sent Sweden's NATO membership and accession protocol to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In our meeting with Mr. Biden, he said, 'You take it out of the Assembly, and I will pass it through Congress in the same way. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and our Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan should work on this process simultaneously. If we work on this simultaneously, we will be able to pass this through the parliament much more easily. I believe that the positive developments we expect both in terms of the F-16 issue of the US and Canada's keeping its promises will accelerate the positive view of our parliament on the issue."

As a matter of fact, the Turkish Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee approved Sweden's NATO membership at its meeting on December 26. If approved by the General Assembly of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkey will be deemed to have ratified Sweden's NATO membership. I believe that Ankara will wait for the US to take a step on the F-16 issue for this final step. 

Meanwhile, in a telephone conversation with his US counterpart Antony Blinken two days ago (December 27), Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said that Turkey expects the United States to act in accordance with the NATO alliance and to keep its promises regarding the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Ankara. The call came at the request of the US a day after Sweden's bid for NATO membership was approved by the Turkish Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee. However, I believe that the US side has deliberately refrained from making any concrete statement that it would take any concrete steps.

Conclusion

In the post-Cold War era, Turkey has pursued a post-Cold War foreign policy in support of an open-door policy centered on NATO enlargement. In this context, Ankara initially showed a positive approach to the possible NATO membership of Sweden and Finland in line with this principle. 

On the other hand, Ankara, whose relations with Washington began to deteriorate after July 15, did not neglect to show a tendency to rapprochement with Moscow. As a result, at the cost of being excluded from the F-35 program, of which Turkey had been a partner from the beginning, the Erdogan administration was forced to procure the S-400 defense weapon system from Russia. This situation even led to the questioning of Turkey's position within the Alliance. In the same period, Operation Peace Spring, which was launched in October 2019 against the US-protected PYD/YPG terrorist organization in Syria and aimed at building a 30-kilometer security corridor in northern Syria, drew the reaction of the Western world and brought sanctions restricting on/off arms sales to Turkey. Turkey's alliance relations suffered serious blows.

Some argue that Turkey had long ago begun to change its relations with the Western world, and in particular its outlook towards NATO, as part of its strategic autonomy-building and multilateral foreign policy approach. These sanctions were a natural consequence of this changing paradigm. 

However, as far as I have been able to follow, the Erdogan government does not seek to break away from the Western world, but rather to be 'listened to'. For strategic autonomy you need to have a strategic power structure. You are expected to build this first. As of October 2023, Greece has 240 fighter jets. "The Turkish Air Force sees buying JF-17s as a 'remedy'". Germany, the key country in the Typhoon procurement, is being restrained. The American side is expected to relent even for 40 F-16s, let alone F-35s. Under these circumstances, which autonomy are we talking about? In any case, despite his high-pitched rhetoric and the fact that in some ways he appears to be a spoiler of relations with the Western world, Erdoğan has essentially maintained close contact with the West. He has pursued an indirect strategy when necessary and a backdoor policy, especially during the Trump era, but he has never been one to burn bridges. Having successfully demonstrated the school of pragmatism in domestic and foreign politics, Erdoğan knows how to 'compromise' with his interlocutors by giving the appearance that his demands are 'met' even if they are not, according to his own timing. Small gains are skillfully written in the 'profit' column despite big losses.

I believe that this is how Sweden and Finland's membership process was managed. At the beginning, Sweden in particular was told 'No membership unless there is solidarity in the fight against terrorism! Sweden did something for Erdogan, even if it did not give him most of the terrorists Ankara wanted to hand over. Erdogan must have deemed Stockholm's adoption of a new law on terrorism sufficient, as he chose not to put the extradition of terrorists on the agenda anymore. Like Finland, Sweden's accession is only a matter of time. It is seen as a procedural matter.

Nevertheless, I think that Erdoğan will not give the expected approval to Sweden without a guarantee from Biden on the F-16 package and that he will not want to lose his final trump card. So, couldn't the F-16 issue have been settled before it became a problem between the US and Turkey? 

I think it could have been connected. Let's remember a year or two ago. Initially, the US side had a positive approach to the 40-aircraft F-16 procurement package initiated by Turkey on September 23, 2021. With the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Turkey took on the role of an active mediator between the two sides with the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in March 2022. The communication channel that Erdoğan had built with Putin was seen as a valuable tool for the West to maintain a dialog with Putin through Erdoğan. As of October 2019, the arms sanctions imposed by Western countries were being shelved one by one. 

In this environment, the F-16 issue was a subject of talks at the Defense Ministry level. However, Erdoğan preferred to 'disrupt' this course by making two exits. 

The first one was that he would say no to the possible accession process of Sweden and Finland on May 13, 2022. 

The second was on Greece. In fact, relations between the two countries were expected to "improve" after the meeting between Erdoğan and Mitsotakis in Istanbul in early March. However, after Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis said "Don't give F-16s to Turkey" in the US Senate, Erdoğan said on May 23, 2022, "There is no more Mitsotakis for me...We are enough for us, we are enough for ourselves. I guess the US will not make a decision about the F-16s based on Mitsotakis' mouth." 

However, contrary to Erdoğan's implication, the US side would make it clear in the debates in Congress and the Senate that it was willing to take Mitsotakis at his word. Now the Greek lobby was also involved. The Biden administration had a good channel to use the F-16 trump card against Erdoğan.

With the S-400, F-35, F-16V, Typhoon, JF-17 and F-16V, the Turkish Air Force is paying the price for Ankara's high politics with Western capitals. With 230-240 F-16s in the inventory, all of which are awaiting modernization, I think it is highly unlikely that we will get anywhere, build strategic autonomy, pursue a multilateral foreign policy, stand up to the Western world, etc. 

Let alone everything else, there has been no official announcement yet that the US administration has taken or will take steps on the sale of F-16s. Maybe after the 'Christmas Break' Christmas holidays, something positive may come from Washington. This is how far we have come from a 100-aircraft F-35 program partnership!

References

Kathleen McNamara, “What’s Behind Turkey’s Reversal on Sweden’s NATO Bid? A Foreign Policy Professor Answers”, Georgetown University, July 12, 2023, https://www.georgetown.edu/news/whats-behind-turkeys-reversal-on-swedens-nato-bid-a-foreign-policy-professor-answers/

Hüseyin Fazla, “F-16 Satışında İlerleme Sağlayamayan Erdoğan Hükümeti; Finlandiya’nın NATO Üyeliğine Neden Onay Verdi?” STRASAM, 8 Nisan 2023, https://strasam.org/savunma/havacilik-ve-uzay-sanayii/f-16-satisinda-ilerleme-saglayamayan-erdogan-hukumeti-finlandiyanin-nato-uyeligine-neden-onay-verdi-1852

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Euronews Haber, “Biden'dan Türkiye'nin F-16 talebine dolaylı olarak İsveç'in NATO üyeliği yanıtı”, 10 Temmuz 2023, https://tr.euronews.com/2023/07/10/bidendan-turkiyenin-f-16-talebine-dolayli-olarak-isvecin-nato-uyeligi-yaniti

VOA Türkçe, “Erdoğan, ABD’den istenen F-16’lar konusunda Biden’ın kendisine teminat verdiğini söyledi”, 19 Aralık 2023,  https://www.voaturkce.com/a/erdogan-abd-istenen-f16-konusunda-biden-kendisine-teminat-verdigini-soyledi/7404211.html

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