A Criticism of Turkish Political Culture

The Origins of the Power-Opposition Relationship in Turkey:

In today's Turkey, it is necessary to look at the historical background elements of many areas of tension (such as religion-secularism, Turkish-Kurt, Alawite-Sunni, privatization-nationalization, state-capital-media relationship, freedom-despotism, democracy-autocracy) that take place in the social, economic and political life areas where individual-society-state relations are established.

In the Turkish state tradition, in the majority of those who hold the authority to govern in both Ottoman and Republican Turkey, a state-government unityis formed, which is integrated with a hegemonic official ideology to a certain extent, if not at first. This quest for unity often leads to the party that establishes the government within the rules of law and the current system to legitimize itself in the eyes of the people and to see itself as equivalent to the state.

This situation can carry the power-opposition relations in Turkey to a 'distorted' and to a 'frontal' dimension with both social and political dimensions in the historical process. Although the power-opposition relations, which are the basis of cultural/social and political polarizations, seem to stem from different reasons in each period, the way to understand the content and form they have taken is  to understand  the historical and social conditions and the institutionalization of power-opposition relations in Turkey.

Traditional Structure Associated with Established Political Culture:

Republic; Although it led to a radical change process in terms of mentality and institution, the  state-society relationship could not exceed the dreams of the founding fathers of the Republic. Therefore, the traditional state structure and functioning inherited from the Ottomans; it has not been willing to change its traditional view of society except for formal patterns. As a result, the stance of the society towards the state and the behavior pattern remained conservative in general terms, and the structure of society and the state structure have continued without any change since the Ottoman Empire. In fact, this situation should be seen in part as related to the established political culture of Turkey, which comes from the historical and social veins of Turkish political life, including the government and the opposition  .

The prevailing political culture in a country; in particular, it should be considered in terms of the political traditions that guide public institutions. In this respect, it can be easily argued that Turkey's political culture as a whole has a public spirit in the traditional sense.  In this political culture, which is dominated by the mythos  of the state and the tradition of bureaucratic management, all segments of society soon make it a tradition to identify themselves with those who have a say in the administration and to 'otherize' others. For this reason, the party and its supporters who take over the monopoly of power can easily become a 'state'. In a common discourse, 'yesterday is yesterday, today, today!' can also apply to the shifts between power and opposition.

As such, Turkey's political culture is  loaded with bows to show great intolerance for the slightest deviation  from political orthodoxy. Opposition voices or movements can easily be pushed out of society and politics with the accusation of 'sedition' or 'separatism'.  The reason for this is that the idea that there is a 'single truth' at the level of society and the state is widely dominated by the traditional power of society and the state. In Turkish political culture, which sanctifies its social unity, the spirit of the community is made indivisible as a result of a traditional understanding.

The Ruling Party Becoming a State:

At the root of this situation is the orthodox political culture that passed from the Turkish-Islamic empires to the Ottomans and then to the Republic  of Turkey. In the codes of this culture; the state is regarded as a means of ensuring the general harmony of society. In the same way, the party that comes to power sees itself as a state and plays for it. The state/ruling party unity leads to the disappearance of the government-state distinction, and the government acts with an understanding that tends to pursue the society in a guardianship manner with the style and attitude of "the only correct opinion is the opinion represented by the government, and the state is the government".

In this kind of political culture, it doesn't really matter if the state has an Islamist, Communist, Fascist, Conservative, Democratic, Socialist, etc. identity. The main thing is the state, and in this respect, whoever is the ruling party that governs the state at that moment is the state.

In democratic regimes, opposition is expected to be a more important political mechanism than power. However, in Turkish political culture, the way the opposition is institutionalized against power is problematic. In Turkish political culture, where the ruling party has become a state, the political opposition has been freed from making every aspect of the social structure (with its economic, social and cultural dimensions) a subject of fundamental debate and from transcending and guiding the government.

Reflections of the Ottoman Patrimonial Rule Tradition on the Present Day:

The Ottoman State, as a typical example of Weber's traditional authoritarian typification, the patrimonial rule tradition,  had a political mechanism that functioned on the basis of legality in which the sultan, who derives his legitimacy from tradition and religion, owns all the property on which the inhabitants of the country and the borders of the country are located. In fact, the most important aspect of the Ottoman state regime consisted of traditionality rather than religiosity. The understanding that the starting point of this traditionalism is the rules that have been set by God before and have been followed for hundreds of years, that the legitimacy of this state/established order inherited from the ancestors cannot be questioned, and that  this principle of legitimacy/traditionality sustains the state-eternal system, that is, the political regime, was taken as a basis in the Ottoman Empire.

Patrimonialism, which was gathered in the person of the sultan in the past, as a status in the dominant form of the distribution of power, maintains its dominant position in the Turkish political and administrative structure as a 'traditional institution' in a strange way today. Despite the fact that many 'formal' changes have been carried out since the Ottoman Empire, and even despite the fact that everything including the legal rules and laws of Western societies  has been adapted to the Turkish state system  , the understanding and style of 'strong state-weak society' has not undergone any change in the Turkish society and state structure. A  state elite that initially identified themselves with loyalty to the Sultan and to the state with the Tanzimat became a part of the strong state phenomenon, especially by the Union and Progress Party that seized power with the proclamation of the second Constitutional Monarchy. M. Kemal Atatürk and the leading figures of the Republican People's Party,  who moved to establish  the 'people's state' with the proclamation of  the Republic, continued the bureaucratic state tradition.  The idea of 'nizam-ı alem', which emphasizes the motivation to protect the state and the state,  is based on the understanding of keeping society in balance and giving continuous shape to society by the state rather than changing society. Around this basic idea, each member of the society has been able to find a place in a certain state position according to his ability and / or ability to show himself, and the balance in business life, which is the basis of the social order, has been achieved in this way. In this idea of 'nizam-ı âlem' where every 'position' in society was given by  the state, it was the case that the sultan and the bab-ı ali in the Ottoman Empire and the government in the Republic used this modern political power on behalf of the state. This structure, which is based on loyalty to the sultan rather than criteria such as impersonality, merit and driver's license in modern societies, has become equivalent to being from the ruling party and maintaining its loyalty to the government during the Republican period. In the words of former President Süleyman Demirel, one of the late politicians, this order,  although it could offer 'Çoban Sülü' the  opportunity to become President, did not allow the power-opposition or us-them separation from them to disappear for the broad masses.

Governing the State with Justice:

The political powers, which are seen as the locomotive of the Ottoman and Republican system, where the state is the main producer and consumer, and where things revolve around by the state, are the protectors and distributors of all wealth on behalf of the state. In this political, social and economic order, where those who do not do business with the state cannot 'win', the power-opposition positioning is at the center of everything. In Turkish political culture, being 'in power' and 'being from the ruling party' for the people is everything. In this political culture, where the discourse of 'he who holds honey licks his finger' is  valid, it is strange that the expectation that the state and the ruling party in practice will stand at the main distance from all citizens and govern with 'justice' has always existed.

The principle of government with justice is accepted and expected by the people in the name of traditionality (somewhat adorned with religious motives). However, in such a political culture where the ruling party has become a state, the necessity of the functioning of democracy and being able to win the votes that can carry the same party to power again in the next election invites a distorted structure related to the 'ulufe' that will be distributed to the party base, supporters and members only during the period of power. Although this fact is known to everyone and it is seen that the members of the ruling party benefit from its practical results,  the traditionalist understanding of the  state and the expectation of governing with justice still exist.

The proverb 'Daire-i Adalet', which is rooted in Kutadgu Bilig, expresses the understanding that "if there is no justice, there is no people, if there is no people, there is no money, if there is no money, there is no soldier, there is no state, and if there is no state, there is no justice."

Thus, although the sultanate, which represented patrimonial authority by traditional rules,  was abolished on November 1, 1922, since the political culture was not yet fully ready for change, those who were the heads of the ruling party continued to reign in a way until today.

Contrary to Western capitalist societies, since status in Turkish society was seen as the first determinant of income, the  leading citizens of the country were not merchants-manufacturers-artisans-farmers, etc., but those who held political power.

Conclusion:

The decisive characteristic of this political culture, in which politics directs the whole society, is that being in power has a more central role than being in the market, rather than the control that the state has established over economic life. Therefore, Turkish political culture has led to the acceptance of a mentality that prioritizes power trade and prioritizes being in power above everything else, among politicians, bureaucrats and the general public.

This structure has kept the attractiveness of being in power  in all layers of society at a high level in every period. In Turkish political culture, even ordinary people who have no interest in politics; He learns by experience that his daily affairs can only be solved by the political power. The perception that reputation on the state floor has become synonymous with being in favor of the ruling party is valid. It is for this reason that large families  have made it a traditional practice  to be 'in power' in every period by having their representatives in several parties instead of one, and to be able to carry out their affairs without the 'other'.

This pragmatist approach, in fact, was in opposition for a while, and in order to benefit from the blessings of power, it leads to the change of ranks in the context of power-opposition in the dimension of 'apostasy' and to the whiteness of what is called black today. In this political culture, where everything is permissible in order to be in power, every eroded value reduces the social and state structure and the future expectations of the people to the dimension of us-you, and this political truth is unfortunately ignored by the government and the opposition.

As such, the understanding of power, which means "eating" the blessings of the state and the country, has been normalized by all social layers. Being an opposition means "don't eat" and it is reduced to saying "eat" is possible for the disgruntled segments who could not benefit from the blessings as they wished during this time of government, if you support us. For a real change, shouldn't this current distortion in Turkish political culture change, and the people, with their government and opposition, demand a change in this direction from all political parties?