The Problem of the Opposition's Lack of Opposition

Dear friends, Turkey is going through a serious administrative crisis that accompanies the economic crisis. What is more serious than the phenomenon of "one man deciding everything", which everyone sees as a problem in this administrative crisis, is the disappearance of control in the state organisation. In my opinion, the real source of the administrative crisis should be sought here. It is necessary to foresee that where supervision, which is one of the functions of management, is absent and/or does not function effectively, management processes will also be incomplete. 

It is not correct to think that supervision is a concept valid only for the state organisation. Although not within the political organisation we call the state, there are many different structures that have an impact on the functioning of the state. The dimensions of these influences vary depending on the purpose of establishment of the organisational structure, its functions and its power of influence. 

Undoubtedly, the control that forces people and the organisational structures they manage to adhere to the law is judicial control. Because judicial control has results supported by a significant sanction. These results are a deterrent factor on all private and legal persons who must act in accordance with the law. For this to work effectively, the judiciary must be independent from politics and operate in accordance with the law. It cannot be expected that a judiciary that is not independent, acts on instructions, and makes decisions according to political considerations will be able to perform its duty of supervision.

In democracies, there are very effective audit procedures that are independent of the audit within the structure of the state itself, and that mobilise those mechanisms as well. This supervision is the supervision of the people, which stems from the principle of self-government of the people in democracies. The voting process alone does not constitute this control. The power of organised civil society to influence policy processes and the rate of organisation in society are directly proportional to the level of development of democracy in a country. Otherwise, it is necessary to accept that the public has no right to criticise and protest against the practices of the administration other than voting, and it is impossible to call this situation a democracy.  

In addition, there is also the control of political parties over the government. Since this control is not limited to legislative control, political parties, whether they are part of the legislature or not, must use their political control power over the government. Governments manage the process of formation of public policies in various fields in line with their own ideologies. At the final point, the legislative function produces the legal regulation that determines the principles of implementation of these policies. Political parties, on the other hand, try to show the society the negativities that these policies shaped by a certain ideology may cause in line with their own ideology. In other words, they try to mobilise social opposition. 

Therefore, political parties are expected to be in contact with all civil society organisations other than their own base. In addition, they should and are expected to be very sensitive to the flow of information both from their own base and from different segments of society. Having an organisational structure that can dynamically implement these different functions should be the goal of every political party. However, as political parties grow and gain power, other risks arise. Different lobbies may see the political party as a tool to protect their own interests. In fact, this is a result of social dynamics and does not make a political party a negative organisation. In addition, the efforts of illegal organisations to gain influence in political parties pose serious threats to both the political party and the political life of the country. 

Another threat to political parties is the oligarchic tendencies of party administrations over time. More than a hundred years ago, Robert Michels tried to explain why democratic governance in democratic societies, in different structures of civil society organisation such as political parties, cooperatives and trade unions, gradually degenerates into minority or one-man rule. In fact, Michels was drawing attention to a managerial problem. He was emphasising the fact that the power given to govern eventually detaches the leader from democratic attitudes. This situation was almost like a law in structures such as political parties, which should be democratic.

The exception to this theory, called the "Bronze Law of Oligarchy", can only be seen in societies with advanced levels of institutionalisation. By nature, human beings may desire to become more authoritarian as they gain power. Since democratic maturity cannot be expected from every human being, it should be essential that the system is designed in a way to limit such behaviour. For example, why is it that this tendency cannot gain strength in political parties in Germany, while the opposite is the case in Turkey? Bureaucratisation is an inevitable necessity as the level of complexity of organisations increases. Consequently, the level of institutionalisation of the organisation must increase and everything must be strictly bound by rules. 

In the organisation of political parties in Turkey, democratic principles are reflected in their discourse but not in their actions. Some parties may even consider a democratic attitude as a luxury even in discourse. However, in the case of parties that represent a democratic tradition and define themselves as social democratic, the situation is not easily explainable. As a result, all parties are managed by the leader and a group favoured by him without taking into account the sensitivities of the grassroots. The interesting thing is that even leaders who are recognised as democrats have a say in party administration in an extremely oppressive and undemocratic manner. To some extent, it is possible to explain this with the phenomenon that political parties have started to show oligarchic tendencies. 

The basic approach of opposition parties in political life is based on the assumption that their ideology will be more effective in solving social problems. For this purpose, opposition parties have to fulfil functions such as organising, directing and mobilising social opposition. In the case of Turkey, it is necessary to go one step further. When the political power does not recognise the Constitution and the laws, which are the basic social consensus texts of the country, the opposition cannot act with the thought of "let there be no unpleasantness". The unpleasantness that must arise must arise as a requirement of the dialectical processes in society, justice and law. If attitudes and behaviours that are clearly contrary to the Constitution have become patronised by the political power all over the country, how will control be ensured in this situation? What should be the sanction against administrators who feel themselves bound not to the Constitution but to the administrator authorised by the Constitution? Can the opposition be a defender of unconstitutionality? In an environment where there is no other warning mechanism to warn the government, if the people's protests are labelled as "terrorism", can it be denied that we are facing a situation of total lawlessness? In such an environment, what difference does it make if the opposition talks about justice? Does the opposition's discourse on justice make it just?

In fact, the answers to the above questions are very clear from the point of view of political science, but in terms of the opposition, which legitimises the recklessness of the government against the laws that are not actually implemented and turns itself into an instrument of legitimisation for the government, it is of a nature to question the attitudes of the party administrations. This is clearly a situation of opposition's lack of opposition. Just as it is a fact in political science that the government lacks the power to rule, a structure in which the opposition lacks the power and understanding of opposition is equally factually possible. The Constitution covers all private and legal persons in the country. Neither the government nor the opposition is exempt from it. From this point of view, there is a serious lack of opposition in Turkey.

The opposition's lack of opposition cannot be explained only by the influence of foreign powers. Many factors such as the attitude of the grassroots within the party, the media's efforts to design the opposition, and the pressures of interest groups can be decisive. Of course, the class dimension of the issue cannot be ignored. Here, the existence of a patriotic opposition should be a priority not only on the basis of discourse but also on the basis of action. In fact, it is the fundamental inconsistency between rhetoric and action that makes the opposition's lack of opposition possible.  

In light of all that I have said, I criticise Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu for confining Turkey's main opposition party to the phenomenon of "opposition's lack of opposition". I would now like to list the reasons for this;

1. He saw the party base as the mechanism for implementing his own decisions and showed the despotism of telling the CHP base that "they will vote with their feet". 

2. He tried to impose his personal evaluations as the party's policy, and adopted an opposition discourse that was stuck in the names of individuals instead of displaying a general attitude. 

3. In the 2015 elections, he blatantly fell into Erdoğan's open trap and destroyed the social opposition. 

4. After each electoral defeat, he found new names to blame, never taking personal responsibility. 

5. In particular, he has almost emasculated the social opposition and was able to digest the 2017 referendum, which was an unlawful act that can be described as a coup against the Constitution. 

6. He tried to bring the CHP base together with ideological structures with which they would never come together, and even forced them to vote for these structures in the elections. (Although I see the consensus text of the six parties as a valuable text, I am one of those who argue that this consensus should only be a limited unity aiming to return to the parliamentary system).

7. He openly insulted the entire CHP mass by saying "I would leave the seat if there was the right man" in a style that can be perceived as "you are all dirty" to the party base. (As a CHP member, I return this word to a person who has no other characteristic other than his honesty).

8. Despite all the wear and tear of the government, he tried to sell the electoral defeat as a "success" to the intellectual and opposition masses who had fallen into a spiral of despair. 

Although there is much more to be said, I have listed the ones I deem important. According to a widely voiced approach, I am one of those who believe that Kılıçdaroğlu has successfully played the role assigned to him by the imperialist powers together with the government within the scope of the BOP (Greater Middle East Project), which is known as the US's effort to reshape the Middle East. The appreciation of a person's honesty as the sole characteristic should be seen as a shame of our society. As a CHP member, I have made these criticisms with peace of mind because I have no expectations. In this sense, I believe that Kılıçdaroğlu has harmed the Republic of Turkey to the same extent as I believe that Erdoğan has harmed the Republic of Turkey. I will never forgive those who have brought my beautiful country to this situation, as well as those who condemn it to the opposition's lack of opposition. Sincerely...