2025 YAŞ Decisions: Why Should the Turkish Armed Forces Be Apolitical?

Turkey has been a rising star in its region in recent years. It has an economy that is growing at a rate unmatched by most other countries in the region, a developing defence industry and, in parallel, a large and increasingly powerful army. No one can ignore this integrated potential.

This great capacity also brings with it a reality that allows Turkey to take advantage of the geopolitical opportunities that arise before it. The crises and wars erupting around Turkey, which is located at the common intersection/crossroads of Asia, Europe and Africa, offer Ankara geopolitical playing fields. For example, Russia's deadlock in Ukraine, Iran's internal tensions that have destabilised its balance and its conflict with Israel, resulting in the erosion of its regional influence and power, and Israel's transformation into an American-backed war machine capable of committing crimes against humanity while struggling with internal and external crises. and the exploitation of oil and natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean for the global economy, the stabilisation and reconstruction of Syria, are all issues in which Turkey has a role to play and something to say. A new page is being turned in which Turkey can evaluate these regional opportunities in all their dimensions in line with its fundamental rights and interests.

In this context, a strong army means a strong Turkey. The political power led by President Erdoğan attaches great importance to keeping Turkish-made defence products and the manpower of the Turkish Armed Forces under its own control, preventing any dissenting voices from emerging, and, in a sense, ensuring that no dirty tricks are played behind its back. The main reason for this is the heinous coup attempt on 15 July 2016, which caused a major rift between Turkish politics and the Turkish Armed Forces.

Since then, while the command and force structure of the Turkish Armed Forces has remained unchanged, significant structural reforms have been implemented in the employment of military personnel, and changes have been made in command structures. For example, the General Command of the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard Command have been transformed into units under the Ministry of Interior. The General Staff has been directly affiliated with the Ministry of Defence, while the Force Commanders have become independent commands directly affiliated with the Minister of Defence.

Meanwhile, the staff system, which is the foundation of the military hierarchy and the institutional culture of the Turkish Armed Forces and has its roots in the Ottoman period, the criteria and procedures for promotion to general/admiral, especially the waiting periods for these ranks, the principles of retirement, etc., have been changed almost entirely, effectively reformatting the personnel structure of the Turkish Armed Forces. With a new decision taken in July this year, the way has been paved for non-staff officers to become lieutenant generals and vice admirals, and, where necessary, the service of more generals/admirals can be extended and their experience maintained by allowing force commanders to remain in office until the age of 72 instead of 65, within the authority of the President.

Ultimately, the traditional military dynamics, which were believed to have been shaped by the decisions of the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) regarding the appointment of generals and admirals, have been replaced by a new YAŞ structure/mechanism in which the political authority has the final say in everything from promotions to appointments. In other words, as seen in the 2025 YAŞ decisions, a new era has begun in which political considerations are the primary determinant in the process of determining the TSK's senior command personnel. This new situation signals a paradigm shift in the military system.

In this context, with the new YAŞ decisions taken; the retirement of the current Chief of General Staff before the end of his term of office and the appointment of the current Commander of the Land Forces, who is alleged to have limited field experience, The appointment of a General who is less senior in rank (in terms of promotion date) than other Generals in the Army but who, as reflected in social media, does not hide his closer alignment with the political authority, as Force Commander, The repeated extension of the term of office of the Air Force and, in particular, the Navy Commander, The retirement of the Commander of the Combat Air Forces, who was widely expected to become the Commander of the Air Forces this year according to normal practices, without even allowing him to complete his rank waiting period, The early retirement of a senior Vice Admiral who was expected to become the Commander of the Naval Forces in the future, The promotion of a lieutenant general who is not a staff officer in the Land Forces Command to the rank of major general, Instead of viewing these issues as a contradiction with the institutional norms of the Turkish Armed Forces, we should interpret them as the opening of a new chapter that consolidates the political authority's power over the personnel structure of the Turkish Armed Forces.

However, as a result of the politically dominated structure of the YAŞ, when looking at the 2025 decisions, it is evident that ministers in the Cabinet with limited knowledge of military matters have played a more active role in military decision-making processes than ever before. It can be argued that this new situation has led to the politicisation rather than the civilianisation of the YAŞ decision-making mechanism.

It is thought-provoking that the Ministers of National Education, Justice, Treasury and Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Interior, along with the Minister of Defence, have become the main decision-makers in the YAŞ, while the military wing is represented by the Chief of General Staff and the three Force Commanders at a low level/power that cannot be compared to the old structure. The new paradigm, which underlines that technical balance and even military considerations no longer have much importance in the YAŞ decision-making mechanism and that whatever politics says is valid, leads to high-ranking military personnel serving in the TSK command structure inevitably being seen as political figures.

Some readers may say that ‘this is not the case politically,’ but this is the picture that emerges. In summary, in the new YAŞ decision-making mechanism, the current Chief of General Staff has signed decisions that do not even protect his own future. The practice of appointing retired Chiefs of General Staff as Defence Ministers is also on hold for the time being.

The current trend indicates that a decision will be made to appoint a civilian Defence Minister who is affiliated with the new Chief of General Staff. One of the taboos of the ‘old Turkey’ had previously been softened with the appointment of Akar and Güler, who have military backgrounds. Its collapse is imminent.

Some of us may choose to deny such a thing by resorting to the rule that ‘silence is denial,’ but we must look at what is going to happen. Whether we accept it or not, a new era has quietly begun, in which the military powers that were once said to have a strong voice in the YAŞ have been completely shelved.

The 2025 YAŞ decisions are dominated by a new reality in which the Force Commanders have limited say, and political actors' influence on promotion lists is increasingly reflected, rather than established military customs. It can be said that the old slogan of ‘loyalty to the Turkish Army’ has been replaced, in its most naive form, by ‘loyalty to Ankara.’ Every replacement gives rise to new objections. This is normal, but apart from a few opinion pieces and television programmes, the latest YAŞ decisions, which did not attract much attention from the Turkish public, were quietly implemented. While the Chief of General Staff, whose name most Turks do not even know, is being replaced, even for us who have reached advanced ages, the YAŞ meetings are becoming routine and losing their former importance. When I was a military high school student, I knew almost everything about the 15 generals and admirals in office, including the Army Commanders. Now, as a retired Brigadier General, I do not know how many generals and admirals there are in the Turkish Armed Forces. I do not feel the need to know...

Undoubtedly, this new paradigm, which has become more pronounced with the 2025 YAŞ process, deserves criticism in many ways, but it serves to build the image of a Turkish Army that is more loyal to the political power. It must be believed that this is the case. Can loyalty really be built? I know for sure that it cannot, and like many of you, I have experienced this firsthand in my life. I believe that no one in the political arena can ignore Julius Caesar's last words, ‘Et tu, Brute? (You too, Brutus?)’

In any case, I see no wrong in the Turkish Armed Forces command structure transitioning to a structure that is integrated with political institutions rather than in conflict with them. I am one of those who believe this is necessary. However, my understanding that all soldiers in the Turkish Armed Forces, from privates to generals, especially generals and admirals, must be kept absolutely out of politics has never changed since I was a young lieutenant. My studies of political history have consistently proven the validity of this perspective. I can confidently say that the majority of my peers who served in the military alongside me during my generation share this view.

Meanwhile, the fact that the Turkish Army's involvement in politics has caused considerable harm, damaged the army, and ultimately led to partisan divisions within the army, which was one of the main reasons for the Balkan defeat, remains a hot topic in our recent history. The majority of the Turkish people share the awareness that we must avoid repeating the problem of the Turkish Army's politicisation, which led to the Balkan disaster. I believe that this awareness must be shared.

In this context, I believe that there is a need for a more technical YAŞ structure and decision-making mechanism that takes military motives into greater consideration for military personnel other than those at the level of General/Admiral, including their appointments, promotions, waiting periods for ranks, and retirement. I believe that YAŞ decisions regarding the assignment, promotion, rank waiting periods, and retirement of military personnel up to the level of Lieutenant General/Lieutenant Admiral should be kept as technical as possible, decisions should be made according to military dynamics and requirements, and the political authority should have as little say as possible in this regard. In short, I believe that politics should be kept out of the Turkish Armed Forces as much as possible. In this context, there is a need to implement a new normalisation process that goes beyond 15 July. There can be no harm in discussing these issues thoroughly. The intention and goal should be to build the most appropriate and balanced structure for the Turkish Armed Forces in the context of a strong army and a strong Turkey.

The classification of generals/admirals in the Turkish Armed Forces solely on the basis of their “loyalty” to the political regime, and in particular the perception among the public that those promoted to high ranks, starting with colonels who are promoted to generals/admirals, are “politically preferred or selected”, ‘military gossip’

This new situation in the TSK, in one sense, serves to give life to the perception that the TSK personnel structure is being shaped solely by the political authority, leading to such a result. The new paradigm regarding military personnel may be deemed necessary by the current political authority for various reasons, including 15 July. In one sense, this may also point to an understandable reality.

However, although the selection and assignment of senior TSK personnel based on political motives and dynamics raises risky and undesirable possibilities, I do not consider it necessary to discuss these here. However, with every political change of power in accordance with the democratic preferences of the people, the process we are currently experiencing may trigger the arbitrary replacement of some or all of the senior military personnel appointed by the previous government by the new political government. A thorough examination of the 2025 YAŞ decisions inevitably points to the possibility that this arbitrariness may occur in the future. The preferences of the old may be replaced by those of the new. In my opinion, the political power led by President Erdoğan must have made an assessment that the Turkish Army command personnel may face this or a similar outcome. However, I do not know the reasons why the YAŞ decisions were made or whether the necessary care was taken.

Nevertheless, I feel it is necessary to remind you that the new paradigm has opened the door to an undesirable political arbitrariness, namely the replacement of the majority of military personnel serving in the general/admiral ranks of the Turkish Armed Forces with the change of political power. This means that new injustices among military personnel are inevitable in the future, and the political cost will be borne by the military leadership in high positions. No one can ignore this possibility. Even the diligent, hardworking, and talented military personnel who have chosen a career in the military, who see rising through the ranks and serving their country with patriotism, competence, and integrity as the fundamental goal of their lives, can no longer be certain that they will not be negatively affected by future changes in power.

For this reason, I believe that the hierarchical structure of the Turkish Armed Forces' generals and admirals should not be shaped according to political dynamics under the pretext of the ‘15 July syndrome,’ that the building blocks of the Turkish Army should not be tampered with as much as possible, and that established military customs and practices should be protected with measures that do not pose a ‘threat’ to political power. and ultimately, the institutional culture of the Turkish Armed Forces should not be undermined for any reason whatsoever.

I believe that a Turkish Armed Forces personnel structure with high technical capacity but an apolitical stance would better serve Ankara's goal of a ‘strong Turkey,’ which it has been striving to achieve for years. I firmly believe that if this structure is built on the principles of merit and competence, it will be possible to transition to a military personnel structure that is both loyal to the state and apolitical.