Preface to Turkish Metaphysics

Introduction:

Upon reading the title, you might ask whether I am imitating Kant's ‘Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forth as a Science.’ Perhaps because I see philosophy as a journey and philosophers as fellow travellers, I converse with and draw inspiration from the works of the world's most distinguished minds.

Throughout my master's degree in ontological theories and my doctorate in the originality of Islamic philosophy, we held discussions centred on ‘Is metaphysics a philosophical theology? Or is it ontology? Or is it both?’ based on classical philosophers.

We value these discussions in terms of determining the harmony or contrast between philosophical theology and revealed theology, or in other words, the harmony between the essence of philosophy on the one hand and the speculation of kalam on the other.

We open up the data we have reached (albeit raw) for discussion on social media. This is a risk, but we first discuss all the texts we publish with our friends who are doing their master's and doctoral studies with us, and then present them in a scientific environment. We publish short articles in a style that is a little more relaxed and refers to everyday life, like the lines below, and then, if any, we take the criticisms and, paying attention to them, transform them into an academic text with footnotes and a bibliography.

After the final evaluation session/class (31 December 2025), I made the following statement: ‘Can familiarity with the Ural-Altaic language group point to the theoretical foundations of the Turkish World Ideal?’ We are closing this period with a discussion of this question.

We emphasise that it was the Turks who realised the virtuous (world) state (Turkish Cihan Mefkûresi), taking Farabi's vision of a virtuous society, Kashgari's vision of justice, and Kinali Zade's vision, which was taken to a higher level centuries later, to the next level. The Kanuni period also establishes this with law, and the key figure here is Ebu's-Suud, whom I have symbolised with a smiling face, saying ‘I am from Çorum.’

As the Çorum School of HITÜ, we view this process from the perspective of ‘Re-establishing Philosophy in Anatolia’, meaning "coming from Central Asia as Turks and remaining Turks, and through this migration, turning the Mediterranean into a Turkish lake, thereby creating a Turkish-Islamic civilisation in particular and a Mediterranean civilisation in general, as you now know. We note that the statement by the Anatolian Kazasker Kınalızâde Ali Efendi that the Ottoman state during the reign of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent realised Farabi's ‘medîne-i fazıla’ (the virtuous city) is the embodiment of the Turkish World Ideal.

The geopolitical position and cultural accumulation of the Near East/Anatolia become apparent when looking at these migration routes and explain why the Republic of Turkey was established with this region at its centre. Inspired by my teacher Cemal Kurnaz, this state is ‘the result of consciously constructing our national memory.’ My final assessments regarding Western metaphysics and our readings of Turkish/Islamic metaphysics within the plurality of Eastern philosophies are, for now, what I have shared.

Question: When you say Islamic/Turkish Metaphysics, are you implying an identification? Or is it Islamic Metaphysics in general and Turkish Metaphysics in particular? Also, what is the relevance of the Ural-Altaic language group in establishing Turkish Metaphysics? Isn't it an excessive interpretation to use this in the context of establishing ‘Turkish Metaphysics’?

Our Readings and Method:

Re-establishing Philosophy in Anatolia: An Introduction to Turkish Philosophy is the result of readings I began with my undergraduate students in the Turkish History of Thought course. We also discussed the forthcoming Thematisation of Turkish Philosophy with our postgraduate students, presented it to the academic community in the form of papers, and compiled these into a book.

This year, we are reading about the existence/universe conceptions of the Turkic tribes, i.e., the Turkic migrations that spread from the Ural-Altai region to various parts of the world, and their processes of forming an ethical political system in the context of socialisation and publicisation. I am collecting critical notes from everyone, and if all goes well, I will focus on these during the summer and try to compile them into a book.

At this point, Turkistan, our homeland, is now referred to as Atayurt. "It should be noted that in ancient times, the centres of the Kun, Gök-Turk, Uyghur and other states were located in the Orkun region, so Mongolia is considered the homeland of the Turks. Although this country also belongs to the Turks, research based on historical, linguistic and epic evidence has shown that the Turkic homeland is located between the Altai -Ural Mountains.

We note that ethnologist and historian Oswald Menghin, a member of the Vienna School, emphasises that the Ural-Altai peoples played crucial roles in world history in two areas: developing animal husbandry in the economic sphere and possessing an extraordinary ability to establish states in the social sphere.

The Oghuz Turks can perhaps be considered the only truly Turanian tribe within the Ural-Altai family of peoples. The people or tribal union from which the Seljuk and Ottoman dynasties would emerge were probably these. The Western Turks had partially abandoned Lake Balkhash and its surroundings, where they had settled. Forced by the Karluk tribes to migrate to the lower reaches of the Sir Darya, the Western Turks reached the region between the southern Ural Mountains and the Volga River. From there, around 913, they were forced to migrate by the Oghuz and Khazars. Their dispersal is of paramount importance. The Khazars were the descendants of the Hunns who settled in southern Russia in the 7th century. It is thought that the Cumans or Pechenegs were defeated in the late 11th century by the Byzantines and the Kipchaks, who were ‘brothers’ of the Kimeks in Siberia. During the same period, another small Turkic group, or rather the Bulgars, who had not yet been Slavicised, also settled near the Volga River.

By establishing rapport with the peoples of the Ural-Altaic language group, we mean the following: As is well known, the word ‘uns’ (rapport) is derived from ‘uns’ (forgetfulness), and we, following in the footsteps of our teacher Halil İnalcık, strive to remember what we have forgotten, like detective historians, and to shed light on the inner workings of past events. but, unlike judgemental historians, we avoid passing judgement on the events we examine and reaching a conclusion in every paragraph. Instead, we prioritise establishing a connection with the Ural-Altaic language group (the Japanese, Mongols, Koreans) using the ‘creative historian’ method.

The fact that something is forgotten indicates that it was previously known. Therefore, people need to remember the truths they have forgotten. If they forget, they will be reminded. To put this in the context of divine messages, Allah says, ‘We will not punish anyone without first sending a messenger/prophet.’ (Isra, 17/15) and that 124,000 prophets have been sent throughout human history (Musnad 5/265-266; Ibn Hibbân, 2/77), when people forget fundamental truths and fall into heedlessness (nisyan), these are reminded to them through a new form/method/sharia, and intimacy with the Creator is re-established.

"That is why the general context of the verses related to remembrance in the Noble Qur'an is that of reminding, i.e., prophets, divine messages sent to prophets, revelation, the Torah, the Qur'an, etc. The fact that a large part of the Qur'an consists of stories is also within the context of remembrance, as it provides us with a summary of human history, touching on fundamental issues that are very important for humanity and that have been experienced in the past. The Holy Qur'an, which contains absolute truths that are always valid, as well as elements of guidance and encouragement, brings them to life and reminds us of them, even though they may have been lost in the depths of history, forgotten, or only preserved in the memory of humanity as traces.

Based on Professor İnalcık's observation that ‘creative historians’ reconstruct facts from past events, we are thinking about Turkish philosophy, Turkish Metaphysics and Turkish Philosophy.

This is why we consider it important to interpret migrations in terms of socialisation and publicisation. Despite their constant relocation, the Oghuz Turks managed to hold on to their homeland, and it is significant that they undertook a major migration westward in the 8th century, following the Silk Roads.

I believe I have briefly answered the question of what relevance the Ural-Altaic language group has. It is an effort to remember what we have forgotten and to establish our kinship with other sister tribes in the Ural-Altaic region, our point of departure, through languages and cultural interactions. At this point, with your permission, I would like to mention the topics we have been working on since our master's thesis.

Philosophy as Concept Discovery and the Art of Creation

We conduct our chronological readings, that is, the history of philosophy, systematically to establish the identity of thought: This is what we call Re-establishing Philosophy in Anatolia. We are researching the philosophical codes of our cultural continuity between Turkistan/Atayurt/Central Asia and Turkey/Anatolia/Homeland/Near East, following our migration routes, coming as Turks to the Near East, remaining Turks there, and creating a Mediterranean civilisation.

If philosophy is about understanding existence and becoming, about acquiring knowledge about Truth in order to establish a way of life, then it must have an ethical content; this is tahsilu's-saade, the attainment of happiness, the search for prosperity in this world and salvation in the hereafter. Based on al-Farabi's proposition that we have brought philosophy back to its original homeland, we focus on whether the ethical political (civil sciences) dimension of Resettlement in Anatolia corresponds to socialisation and publicisation.

In the context of the relationship between essence and accident, we attempt to interpret the relationship between the principalities/states/empires established by the Turkish Mind/Essence at different times and places as accidents. In its analysis with the concepts of essence-identity-truth

Essence refers to demonstrating its rationality in the mind in the context of the question ‘what is it?’. By truth, we mean its external proof, and by identity, we mean its distinctiveness from others. In order to think consciously, we are making a direct entry into the science of history and striving to bring cultural communication, information, and knowledge closer together. This will enable us to examine the processes of state formation (in the context of truth) as the arena where social relations, power, and identities/substances are produced. Because understanding what the state is today also involves placing the state within history, that is, imbuing it with a spiritual/metaphysical dimension.

Allow me to elaborate a little more on viewing the states established by the Turkish mind/essence in the public sphere as ariza/ilinek. The collapse/disappearance of a state does not mean the disappearance of the essence/Turkish mind; it continues its reality/truth elsewhere under another name/identity. Philosophically, this means seeing them as manifestations of the same essence/intention in different times and places with different identities. The sixteen stars on the Presidential standard actually show that the state is the concrete form of spirituality and essence throughout history. Identities are manifestations of the same essence and intention in different times and places.

In our reading method, we follow the line of Ziya Gökalp, Fuad Köprülü, and Halil İnalcık, who drew ‘Turkey's national thought atlas’ as our pioneers. Within general Turkish history, we prioritise the continuity of ‘Seljuk-Ottoman-Republic of Turkey’ specifically in the context of the Western (Oghuz) Turks.

From a philosophical perspective, it is possible to substantiate the ‘secret’ of how the mentality/nature that established states in different times and places continued with different identities, with the support of Erol Güngör. Remembering his teacher and our teacher Mümtaz Turhan with respect, we prioritise Gökalp's and Köprülü's interest in sociology from the perspective of sociology and social psychology, directing it towards Turkish history. This is because, based on the dominant sociological and philosophical concepts of their time, they sought to understand the depths of Turkishness in Inner Asia. In his first article in Türk Yurdu, ‘Hope and Determination,’ within a chain of thoughts extending from Islamic rulings to the Göktürk inscriptions, he expressed Bergson's view of ‘élan vital’

He called on Turkish youth to break free from the despair and despondency they had fallen into and to make a leap forward, instilling in them a philosophy of will. For life is the continuous unfolding of an inner creative impulse – Bergson's élan vital – which crystallises in action. We consider Nurettin Topçu one of our pioneers because he centred his philosophy on action/movement. We note his emphasis on Bergson, who worked on The Source of Morality and Religion through his distinction between Static Religion and Dynamic Religion. Because at the beginning of the 20th century, Bergson's concept of the creative impulse (élan vital) breathed new life into the spirit of the disillusioned European intellectual. Now, conversations in intellectual and artistic circles began and ended with the concept of the ‘life impulse’. Interpretations and explanations of Bergsonian philosophy dominated a wide field. Most people believed that a new day had dawned in philosophy and that many other activities had thus been illuminated.

Dynamic Religion-Static Religion

Bergson, a psychologist and philosopher, states that moral elements can be examined by analysing the individual's conscience and consciousness. When we think in the context of the principle of ‘Know Thyself,’ it means first seeking the truth within oneself/one's consciousness. He then examines society by comparing it to a living organism. He divides morality into two types: social morality, which is conservative, impersonal, and born of habit, and human morality, which is personal and born of excitement that transcends the old. The former is coercive and demands the individual's will, while the latter attracts the individual because it is loved and desired by the individual themselves. In the former, morality is based on obligation. This obligation expresses the pressure exerted by the elements of society on each other to preserve the form of the whole. The distinguishing feature of the second type of morality is that obligation is seen as the force of an impulse. Religions are examined in the context of this second type of morality. It states that obligation stems from a desire, and that it is (religious) excitement that leads the individual to this desire. Religion, in this sense, is to experience and imitate the excitement created by a personality taken as a model.

Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism are dynamic religions because they possess this characteristic, which refers to the pluralism we discussed in the context of Eastern philosophies and emphasises the ‘Open Society’. I have not researched whether K. Popper was inspired by this when writing his work The Open Society and Its Enemies, but attention should be paid to the distinction between Dynamic Religion and Open Society, and Static Religion and Closed Society/Community.

He views national religions (Greek religion, Turkish religion, Egyptian religion) that existed before the great (divine) religions as static religions. This is because they possess a morality based on obligations and aim to preserve the original community life. He states that their essence is formed by fairy tales and mythology.What al-Farabi meant by bringing philosophy back to its original homeland is that, while constructing a unique Islamic/Turkish metaphysics within the pluralistic structure of Eastern philosophies, the concept of mug-mugan/sophos/wisdom was transferred to Khorasan, Iran, Syria, and Egypt. and that Greek philosophy was also significantly inspired by this. It is necessary to investigate to what extent it is consistent to view Egyptian religion as static.The place of Shamanist teachings within Eastern philosophy also needs to be studied. But in general, we can make the following introduction: "While the gods of Western mythology are almost all creators of something, in the Altai/Turan belief system, there is a single creator, ‘Tengri,’ which constitutes a rare early example of a monistic understanding of God. Apart from Tengri, there are sacred figures such as Ülgen, Umay, Yuma, and Kayra Han, and these are not seen as gods, because every element in the universe has a spirit. The “spirit of the mountain” expresses the majesty of the mountains, the “spirit of the river” the grandeur of the rivers, and the “spirit of the homeland” the sanctity of the homeland. These are not gods, but spiritual beings who are the guardians of nature. However, due to the conversion of Turkish communities to different religions at various times, particularly during the Manichaean and Zoroastrian periods, these spirits transformed to correspond to the (many) gods of these religions, taking on the form of the new religion. This situation can be seen in the acceptance of Islam, with Tengri becoming Allah, and in the acceptance of Christianity, with Ata becoming the ‘Holy Father’.In summary, two moral concepts emerge from two fundamental tendencies in life, the first based on the tendency to protect, the other on the tendency to create. The former corresponds to a closed society and a static religion, while the latter corresponds to an open society. In the latter, the ethics of obligation that hold society together, the ideal of an open society, the moral aspiration that drives this ideal, and the dynamic religion that sustains this morality emerge. An open society is, in principle, a society that encompasses all humanity. This society is imagined from afar, from time to time, by exceptional minds and, through a series of creations, realises something of itself each time. Each of these creations, thanks to a more or less profound change in human beings, makes it possible to overcome difficulties that had been insurmountable until then. Therefore, in a particular society, at a particular moment, there is a static morality that truly exists. This morality is embedded in customs, ideas and institutions. Its obligatory nature can ultimately be reduced to nature's desire for communal life. On the other hand, there is a dynamic morality. This morality is a drive, a bond to life, the creator of nature that creates social necessity. The former is sub-intellectual because it is an obligation, a pressure. The latter is supra-intellectual because it is a desire. The result is that whether it is pressure or desire, fairy tale or love, the source of morality and religion is life.This concept, in Bergson's term, “élan vital”, expresses the life impulse, the “life force”, in the book of continuous Creative evolution, or more precisely, the state of continuous existence, understanding change and transformation. It expresses the relationship between the free and creative perspective/impulse present in all living beings and action, the creation of constantly new forms. How do we perceive truth/reality, and how can we free ourselves from the influence of the false experiences created by what we perceive sensually and what is presented to us as real? In other words, how can we discard these ‘sediments,’ and what is the function of intuition as a source of knowledge in this process? Action is part of life's creative impulse (élan vital); it is a constant effort to renew oneself against the rigid forms of existence, within flow and intuition.Following Our Predecessors as the Art of Concept Discovery and Production, What Have We Done, What Are We Doing?‘Re-establishing Philosophy in Anatolia: An Introduction to Turkish Philosophy’ reads the interaction of the Turkish mind with the Arab and Persian minds in the context of the relationship between essence and accident, forming a unique philosophy, the social dimensions of which and the final dimension of its public stages will constitute Turkish Metaphysics.The dimension that examines the process of reading Ahmed Yesevî in Turkistan and Yunus Emre in Anatolia, titled Thematising Turkish Philosophy, will soon be available. Our key philosopher here is al-Farabi; we emphasise reading his connection between language and logic, his explanation of God's process of creating the universe, within the context of the doctrine of emanation. We examine the question of why God created within the context of theology, and the ethical-political, i.e. public and social dimensions, within the context of civil sciences. We examine the concept of ‘Hikmetü'l-Meşrikiyye,’ which Ibn Sina systematised within the Meşşâî doctrine, and consider it a new world philosophy that thematises humanity's accumulated knowledge within the pluralism of Eastern philosophies, taking into account the Western tradition.‘Turkish Metaphysics’ emphasises that the conception of the universe is based on the ‘Unity of Being’ and that the doctrine systematised as wahdat al-wujud is the next stage of the Peripatetic-Ishraqi teachings. we do not find this reductionism in the form of irfan/tasavvuf teaching to be consistent. Because, as Ibn Sina said, theology is a part of philosophy-ula, and it is also called knowledge of God (marifetu'r-rubûbiyye). The principles of these sections of theoretical philosophy are obtained through signs from the bearers of the divine religion [the prophets], and their perfect attainment is achieved through proof by the faculty of reason.Whoever is given spiritual maturity through these two philosophies [theoretical and practical] and corrects their behaviour according to one of these two philosophies [practical philosophy], it is certain that they have been given the greatest good.We will try to explain the three dimensions of this by referring to our predecessors:How we explain the doctrine of the Unity of Being and Rational Theology, namely the Transcendent Being defined as Vacibu'l-vucud, the necessary being, the universe outside of it, the connection between God, who possesses the attributes of unity/justice/goodness/beauty, and the imperfections in the sublunary world, that is, the problem of evil/hush-kubuh. For this reason, every year in our undergraduate courses, we explain the doctrine of emanation in detail and examine it in the context of the problem of evil, active intellect, and the concept of prophecy.The second key term here is rational cosmology. It is important for philosophers to be well-versed in the positive sciences; everyone must offer an explanation according to the conception of the universe in their own era, in terms of the relationship between God and the universe. We pay attention to the extent to which thinkers, seen as mentors/guides/spiritual leaders, particularly Ghazali, who levelled serious criticism at philosophers, were aware of the positive sciences when establishing the connection between God and the universe, what their knowledge of medicine was, and whether they had technical degrees in ilmü'n-nefs (the science of the soul). This is because the third stage, Rational Psychology, is to ensure the relationship between the self and the soul and the healing of the soul.Considering this trinity, the background of the relationship between Gökalp and Köprülü, whom we see as pioneers, in their examination of Turkish history with the disciplines of philosophy and sociology may become clear.Concept Production: Opposite Idea

When we first worked on the doctrine of the Unity of Being and produced the concept of ‘Opposing Ideas’ in our master's thesis, people asked, ‘Is this really possible?’

Opposing ideas, in our view, were the struggles between different sects, factions, and political parties, which shared the same basic premises within the same paradigm and system of thought but differed in their middle terms and the results they produced. How did these become units that conflicted, marginalised, and excommunicated one another, when they should have been intellectual/political/doctrinal teachings/movements competing with each other as different manifestations of the same truth? We ask whether there was an effort to see the shortcomings of the other while presenting the opposing/contradictory thinkers and the resulting schools of thought with the same premises (conception of God) in their conflicting dimensions. We dwell on the question of how the dialectical/argumentative method can spark truth without falling into the true/false dichotomy.

If we grasp a different manifestation of truth, we highlight it and state that we find other views inconsistent. For example, it is said that approximately seventy thousand people died during the Battle of Siffin. Those who claim to be Sunni and seek to establish a system based on Shiism assert that one of the two sides is correct. While we pay attention to the political, economic, and doctrinal differences of those who saw the Prophet, we also note the leading figures of the school defined as ‘external.’ While these individuals are presented as pious people, we point out that they abandoned Ali due to the arbitration issue and that the use of phrases beginning with ‘even though’ may obscure those in ‘Harura.’ In other words, it is actually a reminder (ünsiyet) that the proposition that anyone who is qualified can be head of state, regardless of race, gender, or whether they are free or enslaved, is being concealed. In fact, they say that it would be better if the head of state were not from the Quraysh tribe, because they would be more just and could be removed from office if there were shortcomings in their practices. Now, we ask whether we should reconsider the patrimonial (patrilineal/pre-Islamic) system in the Arab world and the Shiite world's understanding of the imam in this context.

In my foundation of the Opposing Idea, my readings of Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Gadamer, and Foucault, as well as the influence of the history of science and philosophy of science courses I took while pursuing my master's degree in philosophy at METU, were significant. Muslim philosophers, who did not want to fall into the impasses of the dialectical method during the formation of Islam, tried to create an undeniable perspective by employing the burhan method, that is, the method of contradiction.

Rather than focusing on the bearer of knowledge about truth, they concentrated on the nature of knowledge itself, sparking the sparks of truth in the clash of ideas. I prioritised two figures in the context of the concept of opposing ideas: Ibn Taymiyyah in the Arab world and Sheikh Bedreddin in the Ottoman Empire. I will not dwell on the role of Ibn Taymiyyah's ideas in the Arab uprisings and their role in triggering the collapse of the Ottoman state.

Why did you choose these two figures to produce the concept of opposing ideas? Because sharing philosophical concerns and contributing to the production of solutions to existing problems is important to me. The late Karadayı Mehmet Efendi, as I said, was someone who valued the Naqshbandi tradition. I also received my faculty graduation thesis from the late Esad Çoşan. I worked on a part of Osmanzâde Hüseyin Vassaf Bey's encyclopaedic work entitled ‘Sefîne-i Evliyâ-yı Ebrâr, Şerh-i Esmâr-ı Esrâr’.

After 1980, the solutions proposed by Islamist movements to different problems in different times and places were poured into Turkey, and Sufi structures began to be seen as polytheistic, although they still exist. I read this to see what Ibn Taymiyyah had to say about it. Bedreddin is well known. He is one of our most talked-about thinkers.

I still ask myself what the Ottoman understanding of law would have been like, and how it would have differed, if the prince he supported had won. The reason I chose Bedreddin in the context of opposing ideas is actually related to the Unity of Being. That is, there is no basis for calling them polytheists. Neo-Salafis still use these oppositions in their economic policies, though.

I believe that the doctrine of the Unity of Being formed the basis of Turkish Metaphysics during the Seljuk-Ottoman period of the Western Turks. It is known as wahdat al-wujud, but I do not call it that. I interpret the doctrine of the Unity of Being in the context of the Meşşaî philosophers' conception of God, the universe, and humanity: I prioritise their explanation of the views of Rational Theology and Rational Cosmology through the doctrine of emanation and their attempts to resolve the problem of evil within the context of Rational Psychology. I note that this was developed into a slightly different doctrine by Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi and made more systematic by Muhyiddin Ibn al-Arabi (d. 638/1240).

I note that the disciplines of philosophy-kalām and Sufism can be read in tandem through Abdurrahman Cami, which is important in terms of explaining the metaphysical system in the Ottoman Empire. Because, at the invitation of the Ottoman Sultan Orhan Gazi (1324-1362), Muhyiddin Ibn al-Arabi, who came to Iznik and became head of the Iznik Madrasa in 1337 with a salary of 30 akçe, and Sadrettin Konevi (d. 673/1274), whose ideas were followed by the scholar Davud b. Mahmoud b. Muhammad al-Kayseri. At this point, I remember my teacher Bayrakdar fondly because he had raised the possibility that the theory of emanation, embraced by Turkish philosophers such as Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Hakim Tirmizi, was likely a product of the Tengri and shaman-centred metaphysical and cosmological thought among the Turks. I particularly emphasise the similarities he highlights between the function of the shaman in the ancient Turkish religious understanding and the rank of ihsan (the level the philosopher will reach with the active intellect).

Concept Generation: Civil Disobedience (The Ethical Political Stances of Hasan Basri and Abu Hanifa)

I read Hannah Arendt while doing my master's degree. I came across her because of my interest in Socrates. But my intensive reading began on 28 February 1997. My dear friend Meryem was a teacher of vocational subjects at an Imam Hatip High School (IHL); she tried to follow the headscarf bans within the legal framework and was dismissed from her job. The Turkish people are interesting; they have an interesting style of resistance against bans. At that time, they resisted the ban on uncovering their heads, and now, recently, when IHL students visited the university, there were a few with their heads covered. With the notion of a ‘religious generation,’ IHLs have multiplied considerably, great opportunities have been granted, and IHL science high schools have been opened as a project. The number of theology faculties has exceeded one hundred, and communities/sects under the names of foundations and associations are creating all kinds of neighbourhood pressure, but officials explain that deism is becoming widespread among young people. I would simply say that they are ‘religion-weary’. I discussed in a statement that we, as members of the Religious Affairs Directorate (DİB), the Ministry of National Education (MEB), and theology faculty members, are responsible for this. Little attention was paid to academics who said that we must first look at ourselves when it comes to the diversification of young people's religious perceptions. Why should it be paid attention to? The then president of the DIB, a professor of religious history, explained deism on television and said, ‘After my explanation, I don't think any of our young people will give it any credence.’ The problem was solved.

Let us return to readings on civil disobedience; in the context of the law/legal relationship, when practices contrary to your fundamental principles are demanded, you can read about Socrates, H. David Thoreau, and M. Gandhi in the context of the question of how to behave non-violently without infringing on the personal rights of third parties.

But I wondered how effective it would be to discuss these in the Faculty of Theology, and looked at what Hasan Basri, who was influential in the formation of theological disciplines, had done. He resisted unjust practices of his time non-violently, trained qualified students, each of whom became a school of thought. We read his text, presented as the treatise on destiny, in the context of free will and the first political protest text. This is an effort to develop a new approach without succumbing to the confrontational language of the early period.

We began to establish the jurisprudential dimension of the Turkish Muslim conception, based on Abu Hanifa, without conflict with the Muslim conception presented by the Arab mind as filtered through the Persian mind. While the doctrinal dimension was developed with Maturidi, we emphasise Yesevi's method of rhetoric in conveying these issues to society.

In explaining these issues, as mentioned above, we prioritised Professor Inalcik's concept of creative historiography. We work like detectives of the past, striving to shed light on the inner workings of events. In the texts we produced, we refrained from judging past events and trying to reach a conclusion in every paragraph. This is because, according to İnalcık, ‘The historian's duty is to understand and explain why behaviours and institutions took a certain form in a particular society and period, without making value judgements.’

I submitted it as my associate professorship thesis, but it was not accepted. I said, ‘It's a modern reading. Hasan Basri is read as a jurist, Sufi, and hadith scholar, and theses are written about him. Why would it be a problem to read his ethical political stance in the context of passive opposition within a modern conceptual framework?’ It was of no use to say that I had not distorted any of the primary sources or conveyed any non-existent stance. I read Kindî and Fârâbî's conceptions of the universe and interpreted them in the context of modern philosophy and scientific paradigms, but they looked at it and said, ‘It won't work, let's just give it a pass,’ I suppose. The work on the formative period of Islamic political philosophy and civil disobedience has been published in its third edition, thankfully.

Conceptualisation: Understanding the Heart

My professorship thesis was on this conceptualisation. I became an associate professor in 2000, and in 2005, while affiliated with Gazi University, I submitted my file to the preliminary review committee, which deemed it suitable. Then new universities were established, and the new administration welcomed me with the Mehter march for five years and sent me off with the İzmir march. I was able to obtain my position in December 2009. This is my work on intuition as a source of senses, reason, and knowledge. Or, to put it in Kant's words, which we must remember by establishing familiarity, it is an effort to escape from ignorance by focusing on the pure faculty of understanding, which constitutes metaphysics (a priori), however you may accept it.

I focused on a methodological study of establishing the connection between physics and metaphysics and on the concept of the ‘thinking heart’. Hikmetü'l-meşrikiyye, establishing the connection between physics and metaphysics with the active intellect, understanding the universe in the context of the unity of being, an introduction to intuition as the ability to think without intermediaries. Of course, you understand my reason for doing this through Ghazali, who excommunicated philosophers; I conducted this study in the context of opposing ideas. What is the suggestion of the harshest critics? In Al-Munqidh, he excommunicates philosophers, and while favouring Sufis, his distancing himself from those who hold the doctrine of the unity of existence had affected me. While he says this in his works aimed at the common people, the question is why, in Mişkâtü’l-envâr, which is clearly written for the elite, he abandons this moderate stance, takes a higher perspective, and abandons the moderate structure. Later, I presented a paper in Iran on understanding the heart through Mevlâna, and I combined these ideas and included them in the second edition of Understanding the Heart in Islamic Epistemology. What do they mean when they say that active reason, by intensifying human intimacy, leads to a divine stage, and how can they speak more sharply than the philosophers they excommunicate?

While examining the ability of direct thinking (intuition), I read Bergson and Blondel through Nurettin Topçu. But the most important thing is my efforts to understand the doctrine of the Unity of Being. What particularly caught my attention here was the inconsistency of the attempt to compress my readings on metaphysics in Turkish history with Sufi discipline and cover them up. Perhaps one day I will examine the process of a mind like Nurettin Topçu's joining a Sufi order upon his return from France and the philosophical stance he subsequently presented in his works, as an example of this covering up. Because a couple of observations about al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, based entirely on al-Ghazali, make me wonder: if he had known Arabic or studied the fundamental works of the Peripatetic philosophers, what kind of texts would he have produced? Of course, I also find it difficult to understand the affection of a Muslim thinker, who knew that Bergson was Jewish, resisted Nazism, and died of pneumonia while waiting in the cold just to register that he was Jewish, for Hitler. I also ask myself whether his remarks about our Alevi brothers lack philosophical grounding or whether they reflect the influence of the order he joined. Perhaps one day I will write about it, if fate permits.

Returning to our topic, when humans ‘explain’ the physical realm/universe rationally through their senses and intellect, they “understand” the metaphysical, i.e. irrational/super-rational realm through the ‘Reasoning Heart’. Please note the subtle difference between the concepts of explanation and understanding. We read the ‘process of understanding’ of our Prophet before revelation as Hanif, that is, a person who resisted the fundamental structures of the existing system and lived according to the requirements of eternal wisdom, who was, so to speak, ‘trustworthy’ with the Truth among the people.

The acquired (i.e., gained through attitude and behaviour) status, upon the arrival of revelation, is elevated to a higher dimension of knowledge that establishes the connection between the physical and the metaphysical. The knowledge gained through the faculty of imagination comes through the Holy Spirit, via Gabriel; Our philosophers say that after the prophet, one can reach this through contemplation (i.e. potential, actual, acquired and active intellect), the individual can become a wise person/leader, and tedbirü'l-menzil and tedbirü'l-mudun, i.e. an ethical political system, can be established. Any Muslim who believes in theoretical principles (faith) and lives accordingly (Islam: tawhid-prayer-fasting, hajj-zakat) will reach the level of ihsan, meaning they will be as if they see it. This is tahsilu'-saade, the reflection of happiness on the arif/e, saadetü'l-kusva, the projection of ultimate happiness. I cannot help but wonder if someone who reads Ibn Sina's treatise Maqamat al-Arifin (especially if they claim to have a Sufi disposition) might be accused of apostasy.

I am unsure what to make of someone like Muhammad Abid Jabiri, who distinguishes between Eastern and Western philosophy, leaning on Ibn Rushd, and reading it as mystical and irrational. How is this different from S.H. Nasr and Henri Corbin, who read Hikmetü'l-Meşrikiyye within the Iranian context as a tradition of gnosis? Because Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ establish this rationally. Does Jabiri not know that Ibn Tufail, one of the leading figures of the Peripatetic tradition in Maghreb philosophy, thought like Ghazali and Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi?

What do you say about the explanations he makes, inspired by Ibn Sina, but similar to the interpretations in Ghazali's work Mishkat al-Anwar, for Discovering the Secrets of Eastern Philosophy (Esrârü’l-ḥikmeti’l-meşriḳıyye), which we teach every year in the language department?

Is it Maghrib philosophy or Mashriq philosophy? Because Ghazali, as one of the Seljuk scholars, is one of the pinnacles of Turkish thought; reading his critical remarks directed at al-Farabi and Ibn Sina as internal critiques of the Mashriq/Eastern geography, it is possible to find them consistent or inconsistent. When Ibn Tufeyl rejects Ibn Sina, is he presenting Maghrib philosophy as a holistic, original doctrine? By consistent or inconsistent, I mean that systems are built on their first premises; you can accept or reject the second proposition and its conclusion (interpretation: exegesis-interpretation).

How can someone who sees metaphysics/theology, the wisdom of wisdom and the art of arts, as the investigation of the first truth of existence, make inferences about God's knowledge, resurrection (in the afterlife) and the eternity of the universe? Moreover, when Ghazâlî states in his work Faysal that differences in interpretation/exegesis do not lead to heresy, understanding the answer to this question is possible by reading it within the ethical and political conditions of the period. Fârâbî and Ibn Sînâ, when establishing their systems, state that theoretical reason examines immutable, eternal objects, investigates the first cause of existence, and that sophia, or wisdom, is this. Finding the middle term is a union with the active intellect. It provides direct access to universals. They say that this is saadetü'l-kusva, or ultimate happiness, which provides the key to all knowledge activities. Ibn Sina's statement that ‘God is the subject of the science of speech, and the goal of metaphysics/theology’ is particularly important in this regard. The ultimate goal is to adopt attitudes and behaviours that will earn His approval. By rationally establishing the irrational (metaphysical) realm and presenting this unique teaching as mystical and esoteric in the sense of Hikmetü'l-meşrikiyye (Eastern Philosophy), is Jabiri establishing Arab Reason and Maghrib Philosophy? No, my friend, no. You cannot reduce the doctrine of the Unity of Being in Hikmetü'l-Meşrikiyye to Sufi/Irfan or mystical/esoteric interpretations.

In short, our reason for centring the concept of Hikmetülmeşrikkiye is that we already state that Aristotle, who blended the accumulated knowledge of humanity with Eastern philosophies (Buddhist, Taoist, Confucian) and Greek philosophy, thematised Hellenistic philosophy as world philosophy. We state that what we mean by Hikmetü'l-meşrikkiyye is that Fârâbî, as Muallim-i Sânî, reinterpreted this in the context of the final divine message brought by the Prophet Muhammad (the Meşşâî doctrine) and that Ibn Sînâ took this to a higher level.

Its reduction to a Sufi or tarikat discipline in Anatolia through Mevlâna and Ibn Arabi is also inconsistent. We interpret the historical influence of the teaching, which you know later institutionalised as wahdat al-wujud, in the Turkistan region through Hallaj and Yesevi as the unity of existence. They felt a sense of familiarity (internalisation) because they saw in the ecstasy of the kaman in the Turkistan geography something similar to what Hallâc-ı Mansûr said as a result of the union of the physical and metaphysical. Yesevî also knows and appreciates this, but he explains it to the Turkic tribes in simple language, through poetry, using the teachings of fiqh/kalam. He explains the pre-Muhammad accumulation of the terms Mug-Mugan/Sophos according to the new language/method. Now, Pir-i Mugan is the Prophet Muhammad, Satuk Buğra Khan in the context of statehood, his teacher in an individual sense, and Hızır, who sees every visitor as a superior creature from the design of truth. In short, the unity of being is a rational metaphysics that has become a doctrine through Peripateticism as a super-philosophy in history.

Therefore, in our view, rather than the inconsistency of the process of confining Turkish Metaphysics to the discipline of Sufism—the continuation of vocal remembrance through Bektashism and certain Sunni structures, and its transformation into silent remembrance through Naqshbandism—philosophy, theology, and Sufism should be read in tandem. We believe that only in this way can we contribute to the formation of an ethical-political stance within the triad of rational theology, rational cosmology, and rational psychology.

Human: Familiarity and forgetfulness

In philosophy, humans are defined as zoon politikon, social-political beings. They are social creatures by nature. The term familiarity implies finding peace, companionship, love and internalisation, while forgetfulness implies forgetting, falling into heedlessness and alienation; therefore, thought occurs through familiarity. The scholar, the worshipper, the ascetic, the sage point to the intellectual dimension of this process. They work and strive, consistently use their rational faculties, and when they have the power, they try to resemble Him, becoming One with the Truth among the people.

In this sense, when we speak of Turkish Thought and Turkish Philosophy, we refer to the ideas produced by the Turkish peoples in their different dialects; with Turkish Philosophy, we mean the same essence (Turkish Mind), but evolved into different languages, religious conceptions, and cultural codes, and possessing different identities, produced by the Turkish peoples. We have made considerable progress in our long-term project, with the help of our comrades. As the texts are within the context of the courses History of Islamic Philosophy, Islamic Ethics and Philosophy, and History of Turkish Thought at the Faculty of Theology, they are generally didactic and filled with long quotations, but if fate permits, Turkish Metaphysics will be the final link in this chain, and we will try, if possible, not to make it didactic.

If you take the term Islam to mean the final divine message put into practice by the Prophet Muhammad, the second part of the question is consistent, but if, as Ibn Rushd says in his work Faslu'l-Makal fima beyne'l-hikmeti ve şeria, it means the principles sent by God to humans from the first human, the Prophet, i.e. whether it is a name or an attribute, to provide prosperity and peace in this world and ultimate happiness in the hereafter, then the answer is yes. (whether the first human, the prophet, i.e. whether the name or the attribute) onwards, the principles (ed-Din) sent by God to humans to provide prosperity and peace in this world and ultimate happiness in the hereafter are wisdom; and the different times, places, languages, and peoples to which these were sent are read as eş-şeria, and if all divine messages are read as dynamic religions that propose an open society, then yes, I said, there is an identity in the sense of reading the Turks' metaphysical conception.

I consider the work of the late Mübahat Türker Küyel, Is Bilge Khan a “philosopher-Archon”? (Ankara: Separate publication from the 11th Turkish History Congress, 1994), to be very important in this regard. We prioritise the view that Abu Nasr Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Tarhan bin Uzluğ al-Farabi al-Turki (d. 872), who read the principles sent with the Prophet Muhammad through Hellenistic philosophy, the final crystallisation of humanity's previous accumulation, and who formed a new doctrine (Peripateticism), was a ‘founding philosopher’. We prioritise the view that he sees metaphysics as a universal science of being and that it transcends the boundaries of philosophical theology, of which it is a part. It is important in that it emphasises the irreducibility of this metaphysics (in the sense of the divine message sent with the Prophet Muhammad) to the Islamic religion. Indeed, at the level of content, metaphysics extends beyond the Muslim faith to a broader thematic spectrum; epistemologically, the demonstrative method of metaphysics (and philosophy in general) is superior not only to the rhetorical and poetic character of prophetic discourse but also to the dialectical procedures of Islamic theology (kalam).

Metaphysics

In the context of the epistemological reshaping of metaphysics, Ibn Sina first states that the subject of this science conforms to all the different characteristics that Aristotle assigned to it in Metaphysics. Therefore, metaphysics is a study of the First Causes and God. Because the First Causes and God constitute its primary ‘purpose’. But it is also a study of ‘what exists’. Therefore, ‘existence concerning what exists’ also constitutes its subject matter. Finally, metaphysics is a study of immaterial and immobile things, and both the First Causes and God are such realities in terms of ‘existence about existence.’ This harmony of Aristotle's different perspectives was achieved in order to conform to the epistemological rules of the Second Analytics, which presents the subject as the fundamental element of every science. Ibn Sina was the first thinker in the history of philosophy to make a separate and integrated contribution to the subject of metaphysics. His influence on later Arabic and Latin philosophy was immense. Indeed, as long as the question of what kind of science metaphysics is is understood, it can be both ontology and philosophical theology. Other aspects of the scientific metaphysical reform proposed by Ibn Sina are also a result of applying the epistemological requirements of the Second Analytic to this discipline. In this way, Ibn Sina gives metaphysics a coherent and consistent structure based on the main elements that the Second Analytic expresses as fundamental for every science.

In Ibn Sina's Persian summary (Danişnâme-i Alâî) and probably also in the incomplete Eastern Philosophy (al-Hikmatu'l-mashriqiyya), the order is reversed, and metaphysics forms the beginning rather than the end of theoretical philosophy. Indeed, as Ibn Sina himself states, this is “a far more original method.” These two seemingly contradictory methods of organisation are actually compatible with each other and underline the priority of metaphysics within theoretical philosophy and its complementary aspects. In this sense, Metaphysics, as the pinnacle of philosophical learning, occupies the last place in the order of learning, but because of the highest degree of the things it deals with (the Supreme Being), it occupies the first place in the order of reality.

Metaphysics functions as the ‘queen of sciences’, determining the principles accepted by all other sciences and hierarchically linking and organising their systems. Metaphysics is fundamental insofar as it is the universal science of being (ontology) and existence. The scientific principles evaluated by metaphysics are related, on the one hand, to the logical laws (axioms) common to all sciences and, on the other hand, to the universal concepts that each science uses to examine them (such as the fundamental concepts of ‘being’, ‘thing’, “necessary”, ‘one’). On the other hand, metaphysics also explains the principles appropriate to each specific science, that is, their specific assumptions or hypotheses. Thus, metaphysics also explains the existence and mode of existence of the subjects of other sciences (e.g., the existence of universals and categories in logic, matter and form in natural philosophy, and discrete and continuous quantity in mathematics). (Amos Bertolacci, Arabic and Islamic Metaphysics – (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) https://onculanalitikfelsefe.com/arap-ve-islam-metafizigi-amos-bertolacci-stanford-encyclopedia-of-philosophy/ (6 December 2020).

Turkish Metaphysics

While tracing Turkish Metaphysics through Bilge Khan, we draw attention to the term ‘Tarhan’ in the name of Fârâbî, who interpreted the wisdom accumulated by humanity as a whole, brought by the Prophet Muhammad, as a new system.

Tarhun or Tarhan, which appears as a title used for princes and nobles in the tarhanlık yarlık (royal decrees) of the Turkistan khanates, exists both east and west of the Jaxartes River and means a ruler under the command of the Khan. It is well known that the Orkhon inscriptions mention three types of zadegan: “Şatpit”, “Tarhan” and “Buyruk”. 'Tarhan's are a class of acquired nobility who retain their rights for up to nine generations, while 'Buyruk's are the high officials of the state, i.e. the viziers. The “Şatpit” were the leaders and elders of the Oğuz tribes. Ülken states that this situation in Turkish law/custom was not a caste or class system, but rather a difference in rank and degree, and that the ancient Turks had a form of democracy very close to what is understood today.To summarise, when we refer to Turkish Metaphysics, we examine how al-Farabi and Ibn Sina established the connection between God, the Universe and Man. We draw attention to the doctrine of emanation, the theory of intellects and, in particular, how the connection between the universal and the particular is established through the concept of the active intellect. We examine the conception of God presented when reading the doctrine of emanation in the context of the problem of evil. When reading the doctrine of emanation in the context of the concept of prophecy, we refer to the discussion of wise rulers who will realise the ideal of establishing an ethical/political system until the Day of Judgement.We note that Ibn Sina's conception of hikmetü'l-meşrikiyye constitutes a unique super-philosophy within the multitude of Eastern philosophies (the affinity with the Ural-Altaic language group is significant in this regard). As Izutsu states, it is to evaluate the manifestations of various schools and teachings belonging to the Eastern tradition of thought (Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism) in the context of truth and to read the data thematised in the form of Western, i.e., Hellenistic philosophy, as Islam, i.e., the final link in the divine message. In the context of the doctrine of the unity of being, we note that Izutsu addresses the concept of Vucud as the greatest metaphysical problem, inherited from Hellenistic philosophy, with al-Farabi, and that Ibn Sina, by stating that vücûd is an attribute, gives the issue an extraordinary content. The point on which we disagree with Izutsu is his attempt to reduce this deductive inference to mysticism and rational thought as a mixture that developed in Iran and to irfan as a type of metaphysics. (Toshihiko Izutsu, The Concept of Being in Islam, (trans.: İbrahim Kalın, (Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1995: Preface: 10-11, 14, 17)The essence of the statement:We emphasise that this is a rational metaphysics and cannot be reduced to a Sufi/mystical and/or irfani tradition. This is because such reductionism transforms it into an esoteric teaching, both in Anatolia and in the geography of Iran. Hikmetü'l-meşrikkiye is a way of thinking that reads the data of Eastern philosophies in the geography where they are located and the data of Western philosophy and reads them as ‘higher philosophy’. Here, it is a matter of active intellect and ittisal, whereas in the irfan/mystical tradition, it is a matter of ittihat. The former involves a process of understanding and imagination that passes through the stages of scholar-worshipper-ascetic-knower, with an emphasis on the divine dimension of the active intellect, while the latter refers to a process of mystical insight that will suddenly occur through dreams and inspiration, mystified by the terms fana/ifna. By ittisal, we mean the union of the active intellect, which comparatively reads the historical dimension of humanity's accumulated wisdom and interprets it in the context of the final divine message, that is, the harmony between ahbari rulings and insani rulings. You may ask whether this resembles the ‘state’ of fana/ifna, but the similarity does not make them identical. This is the harmony between the irrational (super-rational) realm and the rational realm through deductive knowledge, that is, consistent reasoning.