Teopolitical Readings III: The Political Theology Struggles of Turkish, Persian, and Arab Minds, Three Styles of Thinking on Political Theology

“If a person always praises his people to the skies in order to appear to love them, he has lost his impartiality, and in that case there is nothing to be done. I do not believe that such people are patriots.”

Hannah Arendt

The “Theopolitical Readings” I have been sharing with you for some time can actually be considered an “Introduction to Political Theology.” What is meant by this is a discussion of how theological concepts or ways of thinking relate to politics.

At Hitit University’s Faculty of Theology, inspired by the name of the Vienna School, my wife and companion Meryem and I have been conducting readings that she refers to as the “Çorum School.” In this context, we are reading classical texts for ‘Re-establishing Philosophy in Anatolia: An Introduction to Turkish Philosophy,’ paying attention to the cultural codes of the Turkistan-Turkey connection and the relationship between essence and identity.

We focus on reading the migration movements of the Turks in the context of socialisation and publicisation, and we try to understand their competition/struggle with the Chinese, Persian and Arab minds, while preserving their own differences, and the ‘process of existence of their identity and personality.’

Reading the texts produced by the Turks after their conversion to Islam within the context of the History of Islamic Philosophy and asking ‘What does this say to us today?’ does not mean that we are neglecting the period that preceded it. We examine the teachings carved into stone on the Orhun Monuments, which were later read in the context of different religious/divine (Jewish-Christian) messages, within the context of the pre-Islamic foundations of Turkish metaphysics.

Here, we draw attention to the fact that the term ‘Islam’ is expressed by the concept of ‘wisdom’ and, based on Ibn Rushd, we update it as the intellectual accumulation of humanity. We read the work of the philosopher, jurist and physician Abu'l-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd, entitled Faslu'l-makâl fi-ma beyn-el-hikmeti ve'ş-şeriati min-el-ittisal, every year in our final year. This is because he clearly explained the uninterrupted connection, continuity, and harmony between what we call the wisdom tradition (philosophy), which is the ancient and continuous intellectual heritage of humanity, and the path and method (sharia) that consists of its application in different times and places, using the term ittisal.

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We describe the divine message sent to the Prophet Muhammad as the final application of Ezel-i Hikmet within our intellectual framework, which we call ‘Islamic Reason.’ We emphasise that Islamic Reason, which brought about a great revolution in the economic and political conditions of the time, reverted to Arab Reason with the death of the Prophet Muhammad (sav); that is, the counter-revolution was carried out by the Umayyads to bring about a return to the Jahili (Ebevî Nizam/Patrimonial Structure) period, and that the new political theology now had its capital in Damascus (Dımaşk). In the context of the identification of Arab Reason with Islamic Reason, during the Umayyad period, Muslim Arabs encountered different tribes in different geographical areas.

The Abbasids (named after Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet Muhammad), who ended the rule of the Umayyads (the sons of Quraish), moved their capital to Baghdad. The third theopolitical structure was the Fatimids, named after the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad and the wife of Ali.

Founded in Tunisia, the capital of the state spread to Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Malta, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, with Cairo as its capital. In the context of political theology, the Umayyads and Abbasids were Sunni, while the Fatimids were Shiite-Ismaili.

The Daru'l-hikme, or House of Wisdom, established by the Fatimids in Cairo, and the Beytü'l-hikme, or House of Wisdom, established by the Sunni Abbasids in Baghdad, were libraries and cultural centres that served as centres for the theological struggle between the two modes of governance. Of course, this also contributed to the development of scientific thinking. As can be seen, from the perspective of political theology, Mecca and Medina have now become completely symbolic. Today, Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Salman's efforts to make Riyadh the centre of the Islamic world show that he considers this symbolic value only in the context of the Hajj pilgrimage/tourism.

· The Influence of Persian and Turkish Minds in Islamic History

With the Abbasids, first the Persians and then the Turks began to exert their influence in the Muslim world. Rather than clashing with the Muslim worldview presented by the Arab and Persian minds, the Turks pursued policies in harmony with them, thereby increasing their presence. To such an extent that the Shiite-Ja'fari doctrine became dominant in the region instead of the Shiite-Ismaili doctrine with the Safavid Turks. From a political theology perspective, Safavidism deserves special attention. Ismail Safavi, who adopted the Twelve Imam Shiism, defeated the Sunni Akkoyunlu Emir Elvend Mirza near Sharur (Nahçıvan) and proclaimed himself Shah in Tabriz in July 1501. He then launched intensive Shi'ism activities in the region. However, at the end of the 13th century, Safiyüddin İshak, the sixth-generation grandfather of Shah Ismail, had founded the Safavid order in Erdebil, which was Sunni. The fact that Shah Ismail, who transitioned from sheikh to shah, legitimised his struggles against the Ottoman and Shaybanid states through Sunni-Shiite theopolitics demonstrates the importance of political theology (siyasî ilâhîyat).

In any case (to put it in today's terms), the systems and political theologies put forward by the Turkish mind prevailed in the Muslim geography of Eurasia and the Middle East and continued to exert their influence until the Sykes-Picot Agreement (16 May 1916) was signed at the end of the First World War. From this date onwards, the Turkish Mind was replaced by the British (British) Mind.

Allow me to elaborate on this point: The longest-lasting Islamic state was the Ottoman Empire, which lasted 622 years, followed by the Mughal Empire in India, which lasted 330 years, and the Umayyad Caliphate in Cordoba, which lasted 277 years. The Safavid Empire, established by a Turkish tribe in Iran, collapsed 185 years before the Ottoman Empire. In short, the uninterrupted rule of the Turks in the ancient world began with Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (389-421/999-1030) and continued until 1918 with the Great Seljuks, the Khwarazmians, the Timurids, the Anatolian Seljuks, and the Ottoman Turks who conquered Byzantium.

The spread of Islam, especially the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, also marked the beginning of the Age of Discovery in Europe. The Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 disrupted direct trade with East Asia and made it necessary for Europeans to find a new trade route.

In the 14th and 15th centuries, Europeans developed a consumption habit for luxury goods such as rare spices imported from Asia. In this context, the Portuguese reached the Cape of Good Hope in 1488. Within a decade, they became quite influential in the Indian Ocean. In 1492, Christopher Columbus (1451-1506) set sail westward in search of an alternative route to India, resulting in the discovery and subsequent colonization of the Americas. In 1789, the Netherlands passed through the Cape of Good Hope and invaded the Indian subcontinent, while France, under the command of Napoleon, invaded Egypt (1798). Western countries gradually began to colonise North Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern countries; the continuous weakening and eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire accelerated this process.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement, which has been brought back to the agenda by the US ambassador to Ankara, envisaged the division of the Ottoman Empire's territories in the Middle East with the participation of France and later Russia. The agreement was revealed in 1917 by the new Soviet government that seized power in Russia. From this perspective, the Bolshevik Revolution should be examined in detail. I am very curious to know whether the defeated Germany in World War I and the powers that did not get what they wanted in this division had an indirect influence on the Bolshevik Revolution.

You might say, ‘Come on, that's a far-fetched/inconsistent question.’ Let me remind you that in 1696, the Russians captured Azov, entered the Black Sea, and were on the verge of capturing Istanbul. It is said that England and Holland, wanting to prevent France from advancing, pressured the Habsburgs and secured peace in Karlowitz. You already know how much territory the Ottomans lost with this so-called peace and that stagnation turned into decline. So let me ask you, who or what powers did not want Russia to enter the Mediterranean at that time?

· Reasons for the Sykes-Picot Agreement

As can be seen, just as there are differences between Muslim minds, such as Arab, Persian and Turkish minds, Western minds also vary, such as British, French, Italian and Russian minds. What does Russian mind have to do with it, you ask? In Europe, the Holy League (1684) against the Ottoman Empire, and that Russia joined two years later, becoming part of the European system of states. Of course, there was also the constant goal of gaining access to the Mediterranean. Today, the influence of the French, Italian, and Russian minds seems to have been broken, but the British mind has been replaced by the American mind after World War II.

In my opinion, the reason the Sykes-Picot Agreement has resurfaced is that it represents the current version of the struggle between American and British minds in our country. The statements made by the American Ambassador to Ankara, whose ancestors were also from Biladüşşam, demonstrate this. Everyone wants the energy production and supply centres in the region to be under their own security umbrella, and they see no problem in creating chaos for others if this is not the case. It is important that Turkey, with its recent efforts, prioritises security within the country, actively participates in energy security-focused efforts abroad, and continues to insist on the integrity of Turkey as a prerequisite.

· Introduction to Political Theology: What is Political Theology and How Does it Differ from Political Philosophy?

We take as our starting point the readings of al-Farabi, who interpreted the intellectual heritage of humanity in the context of the teachings brought by the Prophet Muhammad and returned philosophy to its original homeland. We view the migration of the Turks from East to West and the establishment of their states along the trade routes of the time as a process of socialisation and publicisation. emphasising that they established an ‘ethical-political’ system within the framework of the civil sciences (law, theology, ethics).

While reading in light of the ancient and modern intellectual heritage that the Turkish mind brought from its ancestral homeland and found in Anatolia, we focus on the centrality of political economy (economics) and the theological legitimisation of struggles. We prioritise this in our readings of political philosophy within Turkish metaphysics. In fact, what we are trying to do is ‘political theology.’

In this context, it is now time to talk about ‘political theology.’ As Leo Strauss said, ‘Must we distinguish political philosophy from political theology?’ Is it consistent to say that political theology refers to political teachings based on divine revelation, while political philosophy is limited to what is accessible to the human mind alone?

In the context of these questions, if we are to elaborate on the concept of ‘political theology,’ it is important to note that one of the founding dynamics behind political theology is related to the process of theology becoming a kind of legitimised origin for certain political and social institutions. This is because, in this particular process, the conceptualisation of political theology cannot be reduced to religion alone.

Political theology is thinking about ‘the nature of divine authority and its relationship with state power.’ In other words, political theology is a concept that can be used to express ‘the competition, agreements, and exchanges between religious and political life.’ In other words, political theology is concerned with power. It analyses, criticises and constructs the ways in which belief in God and political power are intertwined. In this context, political theology can also be thought of as ‘an essential intersection of political and religious understandings of sovereignty, subjectivity and collectivity.’

‘Political theology’ is important because, in the words of C. Schmitt, ‘All important concepts of modern state theory are secularised concepts of theology.’ Looking at the historical process, we observe that they have been transferred from theology to contemporary state political theories. For example, God, who is omnipotent, has become an omnipotent lawgiver. These concepts have been secularised due to their systematic structures, which must be understood in order to examine them sociologically. With these ideas, Schmitt echoes Hobbes, who said, ‘The authority that makes the law is not the truth.’

Turkey's sudden transition to a ‘presidential system’ amid a fiery environment and its attempts to make new openings to ensure internal security can be read in the context of the principle that ‘the sovereign is the one who decides on the state of emergency.’ Because "from Schmitt's point of view, what is possible in such a situation is that the constitution can only specify who is authorised to intervene. Sovereignty refers to unity and singularity. There is political unity, and it is indivisible. Since political unity has power, power cannot be divided.

· The Political Theology of the Turkish Mind is Based on the Difference Between Riyâset and Risâlet.

With the death of the Prophet, the first tensions began during the period of Abu Bakr, and with the first coup against Uthman, the situation turned into a bloodbath. The civil wars of Camel and Siffin, the massacres of Karbala and Harra were conflicts between the Arab mind and the Islamic mind. The Umayyads and Abbasids centred their Sunni paradigm on the phrase ‘Imams are from the Quraysh,’ while the Fatimids, through the concept of ‘Ahl al-Bayt,’ continued the tensions and conflicts of the early period by establishing a separate Shiite-Ismaili state. Political theology was emphasised in the works of Darü'l-Hikme and Beyt'ül-Hikme. Thus, we reiterate that political-theological legitimacy was sought for economic and political struggles.

Let us elaborate a little on the theopolitical stance of the Turkish Mind mentioned above. Fatih Sultan Mehmed crowned the process in which the Turks remained largely outside the early theopolitical conflicts based on the saying ‘The Imams are from the Quraysh.’ In fact, the connection between Riyâset (material power/state administration) and Risâlet and spiritual authority had been severed with the debate under the shadow of the Banu Sa'ida. This is what I mean by the tension during the era of Abu Bakr.

The political theology underlying this can be seen in the work of the Damascus (Dimašk) qadi Necmeddin Abu Ishaq al-Tarsusi (d. 758/1357), Tuhfetü’t-türk fî mâ yecibu en yu‘mele fi’l-mülk. He devoted the first part of this to the validity of Turkish rule, citing the hadith, ‘I advise you to fear Allah and to obey even an Abyssinian slave if he is your ruler.’

Tarsûsî explained that it was not necessary for the sultan to be a mujtahid or a member of the Quraysh. From a theopolitical perspective, he argues that the Hanafi school of thought is more suitable for the Turks than the Shafi'i school. In defending his arguments, the author emphasises that the Hanafi school helps to strengthen the power of the ruler, the financial strength of the state, and the ruler's ability to act more effectively in wars. He then lists thirteen different situations that demonstrate the superiority of the Hanafi school.

Within the framework of Islamic thought, the Seljuk Bey began the process of political theology with great skill. Instead of clashing with Persian and Arab intellectuals, he remained within the Sunni paradigm by producing coordinated policies.

In the context of political theology, we know that Tughril Bey (d. 455/1063), who adopted Hanafi as the Muslim sect, employed bureaucrats with different political theologies. The effectiveness of Sunni/Shafi'i Nizam al-Mulk during that period is well known.

In this context, it is important to note that he appointed Amîdülmülk el-Kündürî (d. 456/1064), who held Mu‘tezilî ideas, as vizier. This is because Tughril Bey appointed Kündürî to resolve the chaotic environment created by the theopolitical tensions of the period, and Kündürî's promotion of Hanafi and Mu'tazilite scholars and their appointment to important positions was significant. It can be said that the sultan wanted to establish a balance between the nomadic Turkish soldiers and the settled Iranian subjects with this policy. Despite the rivalry between Kündürî and Nizâmülmülk, it can be said that a state system based on Sunni Islam as the legal system, with the military wing supported by the Turks and the bureaucratic wing by the Iranians, was established as a result of Nizâmülmülk's efforts.

To understand these political theological differences, when we consider the tension between Shafi'i and Hanafi schools of thought at the time, we can understand Tughrul Bey's reasons for pursuing different theological policies. The policies of the Seljuk beys were aimed at eliminating the chaotic situation created by the Gaznavid Sultan Mahmud's open opposition to Hanafi and Mu'tazili and his promotion of Shafi'i. Indeed, this is evident from his letter to the Caliph, in which he refers to himself as the ‘Great Sultan’ and states that he has ‘protected the people from the evils of the Ghaznavids.’

· What was the political theology of the Abbasid Caliph at that time?

While writing letters to the Ghaznavid Sultan Mas'ud, asking him not to leave Khorasan without putting an end to the ‘Turkmen corruption,’ the Caliph also wrote letters of advice to the Turkmen beys. So much so that the Abbasid caliphs tried to use the Berbers, Slavs, Sogdians, and Turks as a weapon against the Khorasanis by recruiting them with money and arming them, but they were unsuccessful.

When Tughril Bey arrived in Baghdad (1055), the position of chief judge passed to the Hanafi school of thought. Under the influence of Kündürî, whose religious sect was Mu'tazilism and whose school of law was Hanafi, the Hanafi scholar Abu Abdullah ed-Dameğani (d. 1085) was appointed to the position of ‘Qadi al-Qudat.’

It is important to note that Kündürî came to power at a time when the various political structures in Khorasan were being brought under control. Thanks to his contributions, the Seljuks succeeded in unifying the region. However, problems began to arise when his political and theological stance became extreme. In other words, the difficulties caused by Kündürî's political-theological stance, which involved oppression (Mihne) of the Batini/Rafizi, as well as the Shafi'i and Sufi masses, were prevented by Sultan Alparslan and Melikşah. After Alp Arslan came to power, he had his vizier Kündürî arrested, first imprisoned him, and then had him killed, which is interesting in terms of showing the consequences of extremism in political theology.

When Alp Arslan appointed Nizam al-Mulk, a Shafi'i and Ash'ari, as vizier, the situation normalised. The ulema who had been forced to flee their homelands returned and were rewarded by the Sultan and Nizam al-Mulk. In summary, from a political theology perspective, the events that began in 1053 continued until 1064, and the unpleasant events of the past were forgotten with the granting of opportunities to Shafi'i-Ash'ari scholars at the Nizamiye Madrasas.

At this point, it should be noted that the only sect within the Shiite groups with which the Seljuks had no problems was the Zaydi sect. This may be due to the possible closeness of Abu Hanifa's teacher, Imam Zayd.

After securing internal security, the Seljuks marched westward towards Baghdad. During the same period, they fought and defeated the rebellions led by Ibrahim Yinal, who was supported by the Fatimids (his father and mother were from different tribes), and the Shiite Turkish commander Arslan Besasirî. When I say that the entire process must be taken into account in the context of political-theological differences, this is what I mean.

After Kündürî, with the Mu'tazila losing its theological-political power, the struggle continued between the Seljuk sultans and the Abbasid caliphs through Sunni sects, which can be examined in detail in terms of political theology. This is because political authorities always placed importance on theological justification, so the struggle continued within the context of Sunni sectarian disputes.

From this perspective, it can be seen that the Ash‘ari understanding came to the fore against the powerful Hanbali Salafism in Baghdad, and the Maliki sect (5th/11th century) lost its influence. The Shafi'is have now become the sole representatives of Ash'arism. In this situation, it may be argued that the Seljuk administration centred in Nishapur, despite supporting the Hanafi sect during the reign of Tughril Bey, abandoned this position, especially during the reigns of Sultan Alparslan and Malikshah, when Nizam al-Mulk also influenced the decision to give priority to the Shafi'i sect.

This can be interpreted in the context of political theology as follows: Although the Abbasid caliph wanted to give weight to the Hanbali school, which had both practical and doctrinal characteristics, a policy of balance was pursued among the other three schools because the influence of the Malikis in Baghdad had declined. In addition, the institutionalisation of the views of Imam Maturidi (d. 333/944) during this period is important. The fact that Imam Maturidi's followers used the term Hanafi instead of Maturidi in the late institutionalisation also played a role.

What would you say from a political theology perspective about the Hanafi-Mu'tazili rapprochement and the pressure exerted on Shafi'i-Ash'ari scholars?

In the context of ‘political theology,’ while the Hanafis adopted Maturidism, the Shafi'is and Malikis adopted Ash'arism. The emergence of Ash'arism from within the Mu'tazila and as a counter-movement may have been a factor in this pressure. As is well known, Abu al-Hasan al-Ash‘arī (d. 936) was trained by Abu Ali al-Jubba‘ī, one of the famous Mu‘tazilite sheikhs of his time, and was influenced by his ideas. He later broke away and fought against them using their own methods. The situation becomes more complicated when we consider the observation that ‘Ash'ari accepted Sunni principles in the Hanbali form and, at one point, saw himself as a follower of Ahmad ibn Hanbal.’

· Conclusion:

When we examine the cultural continuity of the Seljuk-Ottoman-Republic of Turkey from the perspective of political theology, it is extremely important to preserve our current situation, namely the secular-democratic structure within the borders of the Misak-ı Milli, in a unitary manner. In particular, from the perspective of political theology, I believe that the establishment of the Presidency of Religious Affairs is a summary of this accumulation. When Turkish political thought recedes, it is well known how the political theologies put forward by Persian and Arab political thought have dragged the region into the current situation from the First World War to the present day. In light of this reality, it is necessary to once again respectfully acknowledge those who shaped the founding philosophy of the Turkish Republic.

The recommendation to return to the Ottoman millet system and the reintroduction of the Sykes-Picot Agreement would not bring political theological stability to the region but rather increase conflicts. What we must do is not to clash with Persian and Arab minds, as we did in the days when we were Muslims, but to produce coordinated policies. From this perspective, it is extremely important that the Republic of Turkey has a secular structure, approaches religions and sects with proportional equality, and maintains a distance from theopolitical determinations.

When we remember that the region stretching from the Taurus Mountains to Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine is Biladüşşam, where the ancestors of the US Ambassador to Ankara grew up, it is clear that they want us to make the mistake of falling into the ‘Glorious History Syndrome.’ Our cultural influence in the region is clear; we are aware that the Oğuz Turks came with Celaleddin Harzemşah during the Ottoman Empire, that they settled in the Euphrates valley at that time, and that their remnants still remain there. We know that in Cerablus there are the Begdilis, the Iliklis, in Raqqa the Döğers, in Rumkale the Saris, in Latakia the Bayındırs and the Bucaks, and in Mosul the Bayats.

It is necessary to defend the integrity of the states where these brothers live, to protect the rights of the Turks there without clashing with Persian and Arab minds, and to defend the independence of the Republic of Turkey within its current borders. Realpolitik is not about succumbing to the influence of the US Ambassador, but to act rationally within the context of realpolitik and protect our country's internal security and external reputation/position with sound judgment.

References:

Hannah Arendt, Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism: Essays 1930-1954, Ankara: Dipnot Publishing House, 2014, 62;

Ibn Rushd, Fasl’ul-Makal, trans. M. Uyanık-Aygün Akyol, Ankara: Elis Publishing House, 2019, p. 16 ff;

Rene Grousset, The Steppe Empire: Attila, Genghis Khan, Timur, trans. M. Reşat Uzmen, (Istanbul: Ötüken Publishing House, 8th edition, 2019), 25;

M.G.S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Consciousness and History in a World Civilisation, Istanbul, İz Publishing House, 1993, 2/414;

H. Bahadır Türk, ‘Rethinking the Relationship Between the Masses and the Leader Through Political Theology,’ Public Administration Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, June 2019:1-24;

Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, Ankara: Dost Publishing House, 2005, 41;

Tarsûsî, Tuhfetü’t-türk translated by Muhammed Usame Onuş, (Istanbul: Presidency of the Turkish Manuscripts, 2018), 18-19, 32, 36,

Ahmet Ocak, The Religious Politics of the Seljuks, 1040–1092, Istanbul: History and Nature Foundation, 2002. 92;

Abdullah Ömer Yavuz, ‘The Sectarian Policies of the Great Seljuk State during its Founding Period,’ Bilimname, (XXXIV, 2017/2) 512-524,

Ziya Gökalp, The Development of the Turkish State, ed. Sinan Ateş, (Ankara: Ülkü Ocakları Education and Culture Foundation Publication, 2019, 94