Ethiopia's Controversial Dam (GERD) is complete. What happens now?

The official opening of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), whose foundations were laid in 2011, was conducted by Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed on 9 September 2025. Thus, the tension that has been growing for years among the Nile Basin countries due to Ethiopia's planned Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in the upper Nile basin has entered a new phase with the dam's official opening on 9 September.

Will control of the water shift from the downstream to the upstream?

For Egypt and Sudan in the lower Nile basin, the ongoing water usage dispute with Ethiopia is perceived as an existential crisis and is also shifting the balance of power in the region. The completion of the GERD appears to have ended Egypt's decades-long privileged position over Nile waters and shifted control of the water to the upper basin.

Control of the Nile's waters was of great importance both in terms of Ethiopia's growing regional influence and gaining political power in domestic politics. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has continued to strengthen this strategy since taking office in 2018. The completed dam has the potential to serve all of Ethiopia's goals of electricity generation, economic growth and gaining broader geopolitical weight. Beyond being a major infrastructure achievement in terms of water and energy, the dam also has the potential to cause new tensions in Ethiopia's domestic and foreign policies.

Egypt's Vulnerability

For thousands of years, the Nile has been the lifeblood of civilisations in the region. Almost the entire population of Egypt lives along the Nile, and more than 90% of its fresh water resources come from there. Changes in the upper basin have an immediate impact on agriculture, infrastructure and water supply.

Egypt rejected the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), also known as the ‘Entebbe Agreement,’ in 2010. This was because the agreement weakened the fixed quotas granted by the 1929 and 1959 Nile Agreements and the veto right over projects in the upper basin. Ethiopia, however, argues that these agreements are a product of the colonial era and exclude it.

The 1959 Agreement allocates 55.5 billion m³ of water per year to Egypt. However, Egypt's current need is stated to be approximately 114 billion m³. To close this gap, Egypt has turned to recycling, purification and desalination projects. However, these are considered partial solutions to the water supply problem.

Egypt had long demanded a binding legal framework to ensure that a minimum amount of water would be released from the dam during dry years. This demand had become Cairo's red line in the negotiations. Ethiopia's stance was criticised on the grounds that it violated the ‘duty not to cause significant harm under international law’. The dam was completed while these discussions were ongoing.

Project characteristics

Launched in 2011, this project has become the cornerstone of Ethiopia's geopolitical strategy and a symbol of national unity. When all turbines are operational, it will reach a capacity of 5,150 MW, doubling the country's electricity production. In addition, electricity will be exported to Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Djibouti, strengthening regional economic integration.

The project has also become a source of national pride as a national project ‘financed by public donations and bonds’.

Negotiations have been unsuccessful. How will the dam be operated?

Negotiations conducted by the African Union, the EU and the US over the past 10 years have been unsuccessful. The most critical point of disagreement has been how the dam will be operated during droughts. During the negotiations, a draft prepared in Washington in 2020 included a minimum water release mechanism. This proposal, accepted by Egypt and Sudan, was rejected by Ethiopia. Ethiopia argued that the draft was ‘too restrictive.’ Cairo insisted that it represented a ‘fair balance.’ This failure led to subsequent talks being conducted in an atmosphere of mistrust. In 2023, Egypt declared that the negotiation process had reached an impasse, and in 2025, US President Donald Trump's statement that ‘the dam was largely built with US money’ was met with backlash in Ethiopia. This caused the US to lose credibility as a mediator.

It appears that countries with regional ties and economic influence, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, could be more effective in re-establishing the diplomatic channel for reliable third-party mediation.

Hydro-diplomacy channels must be opened

With the completion of the dam, opening and operating hydro-diplomacy channels has become a necessity. In this context, taking multilateral diplomatic steps and building trust will be crucial.

It is necessary to keep the door to diplomacy constantly open and to increase efforts towards coordination, real-time data sharing, and limiting unilateral actions during dry years.

This is because unilateral dam operation during dry periods will threaten agricultural production and drinking water security in Egypt and Sudan. Furthermore, a diplomatic vacuum will increase the risk of escalating regional tensions. With the completion of the dam creating a new situation, the only way forward for the parties is to take confidence-building steps through hydro-diplomacy. Otherwise, the Nile basin will increasingly become the scene of fierce geopolitical competition.