From the Caspian to Anatolia: The Transmission Route of the Absheron Natural Gas Field, the Future of the Southern Gas Corridor and Regional Energy Security

One Field, One Route, One Strategy: Understanding the Big Picture

Treating natural gas infrastructure as merely an engineering issue is one of the most common analytical pitfalls for social scientists working in this field. Pipeline routes are geographical documents in which geopolitical interests, alliance structures, trade balances and long-term strategic vision preferences crystallise, going beyond mere technical calculations. Evaluating the transmission route stretching from the Absheron natural gas field to Turkey from this perspective transforms the project from a mere pipeline investment into a concrete anatomy of how the Caspian Basin is integrated into the European energy system. The 33-billion-cubic-metre gas agreement signed on 1 June 2026 during Baku Energy Week by BOTAŞ, SOCAR, TotalEnergies and ADNOC/XRG is not merely a commercial agreement; it is a testament to how a 3,500-kilometre-long, well-established infrastructure corridor has expanded to take on new functions. This article aims to examine the route by which Absheron gas reaches Turkey within an integrated framework encompassing technical, geopolitical and strategic dimensions.

First, the basic coordinates must be clarified. Transporting the gas in question from source to destination requires an uninterrupted flow passing through four interconnected infrastructure rings. The first ring is the onshore connection stretching from the open waters of the Caspian Sea to the processing facilities near Baku. The second ring is the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), also known as the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline. The third ring is the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which traverses Turkey from end to end. Whilst the sections of these three rings serving the Turkish domestic market form the core of the project, the fourth ring—the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)—connects the system to Europe and completes Turkey’s gains in transit revenue and diplomatic influence. The technical capacity, historical development and geopolitical significance of each ring determine the strategic value of the whole.

Onshore Transmission: The Infrastructure Chain Stretching from Sangaçal to Türkgözü

According to the second-phase development plan for the Absheron field, the produced mixture of raw gas and condensate will be transported via a 143 km-long multiphase production pipeline from three subsea wells located at a depth of 500 metres in the Caspian Sea to the vicinity of the Sangachal Terminal, just south of Baku. According to the Environmental Impact Assessment report published by TotalEnergies in March 2026, the Central Processing Facility (CPF) to be constructed is designed with a daily processing capacity of 450 MMscfd (approximately 12.7 million cubic metres) of gas and 38,000 barrels of condensate. At the facility, gas and liquids will be separated; the gas will be brought to the purity and pressure levels required to meet the technical entry specifications of the South Caucasus Pipeline, the next link in the route. This process is a critical quality assurance stage that goes far beyond standard engineering procedures: any technical failure between drilling and processing constitutes the system’s most vulnerable point, as it could adversely affect the entire transmission chain.

The current route of Phase One production, meanwhile, provides a practical example of how Phase Two will be integrated into the existing infrastructure. Under the early production plan, which has been in operation since July 2023, gas from a single well is transported via the Neft Daşları (Oil Rocks) facilities to the same Sangaçal terminal, before being connected to the existing SCP infrastructure. This integration demonstrates that the second phase will largely utilise the existing infrastructure, highlighting the advantage of marginal costs. Indeed, the 1.6 billion cubic metres of production from the Abşeron first phase in 2025 was successfully transported via this route; this experience serves as a practical pre-test effectively proving the technical feasibility of the second phase. The second phase, set to commence in 2029, will add over 4 billion cubic metres of annual capacity to the system; approximately half of this figure—an average of 2.25 billion cubic metres per year—has been allocated to Turkey under the agreement.

South Caucasus Pipeline: New Loads for a Well-Established Infrastructure

The second – and perhaps the most strategically significant – link in the delivery of Absheron gas to Turkey is the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP/BTE). Stretching 692 km in total, this pipeline runs through the territories of Azerbaijan and Georgia, starting from the Sangachal Terminal, and has been in operation since 2006; this established infrastructure, which has been transporting Shah Deniz gas for decades, forms the Caucasus leg of the Southern Gas Corridor. Initially operated with an annual capacity of 7 billion cubic metres, the pipeline was expanded to 23 billion cubic metres through subsequent extension works; the system reached its current capacity with the addition of a new 48-inch pipeline constructed in parallel with TANAP. The two compressor stations (CSG-1 and CSG-2) constructed by the ENKA-Bechtel Joint Venture on the Georgian border constitute the critical infrastructure elements of this capacity increase.

The transportation of additional gas from the second phase of Absheron via the SCP raises a critical question regarding the pipeline’s current utilisation rate. As the majority of the SCP’s capacity is currently occupied by Shah Deniz gas, ensuring sufficient bandwidth for Absheron gas may require an increase in compressor capacity or even the addition of parallel capacity. On this matter, a significant observation is made in GIS Reports’ March 2026 assessment and in Intereconomics magazine’s 2025 analysis of European natural gas supply: TANAP’s current capacity of 16 billion cubic metres utilises only half of its broader design capacity of 31 billion cubic metres; whereas the SCP is currently operating at high utilisation rates. This technical constraint suggests that additional investment in upstream infrastructure may be required to enable the full-capacity flow of Absheron gas. Minister Bayraktar’s statement in Baku that ‘the capacity of existing pipelines can be increased with limited investment’ reflects a political will that is fully aware of this technical reality.

The geo-strategic importance of the SCP route extends far beyond its technical capacity. As the physical manifestation of the energy infrastructure linking Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey, this pipeline serves to support Georgia’s western orientation and to reinforce the South Caucasus’s energy independence from Russia. Ukraine’s commencement of imports of Azerbaijani gas via the Trans-Balkan route in July 2025 demonstrates that the SCP’s function has given rise to a historical paradox: the route developed by Gazprom to bypass Ukraine is now operating in reverse, pumping Azerbaijani gas into Ukraine. This example illustrates how energy infrastructure can undergo fundamental shifts in function over time, independent of the geopolitical objectives for which it was originally designed.

TANAP: A Technical Masterpiece and a Geopolitical Turning Point

The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline, which forms the most decisive link in Turkey’s energy corridor, deserves to be assessed simultaneously in terms of its technical parameters and geopolitical significance. With a total length of approximately 1,850 km, including a 19-kilometre crossing of the Sea of Marmara, TANAP holds the title of the longest and largest-diameter natural gas pipeline in Turkey, the Middle East and Europe, featuring 56-inch and 42-inch pipe diameters and a design pressure of 96 bar. Starting at the Türkgözü/Posof point on the Georgia-Turkey border, the pipeline passes through North-Eastern Anatolia to reach Central Anatolia; here, it connects to Turkey’s domestic distribution network via two critical exit points: the first in Eskişehir and the second in the Thrace region. The pipeline then transfers to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) at the Edirne-İpsala point on the Turkey-Greece border, opening up to Europe. Commissioned in 2018, the pipeline initially began operations with an annual capacity of 16 billion cubic metres.

TANAP’s capacity architecture holds critical significance for the technical feasibility of the Abşeron agreement. The pipeline’s design capacity is 31 billion cubic metres per year; this nominal figure is almost double the current operational capacity of 16 billion cubic metres. In other words, the pipeline was dimensioned to accommodate additional capacity even within its current physical infrastructure; however, due to insufficient demand and supply, this potential has not been fully utilised to date. This design choice demonstrates that the project was conceived from the outset within a forward-looking strategic vision. The additional 2.25 billion cubic metres of gas per year expected from Abşeron fits into this existing gap. Indeed, as stated in the technical documents of Yüksel Proje, the firm that designed TANAP, the pipeline was designed with a capacity of ‘16 billion cubic metres in the initial phase, gradually increasing to an annual capacity of 31 billion cubic metres’. As the core infrastructure investment for this capacity expansion has largely been completed, the integration of Absheron gas can be achieved at a relatively low marginal cost.

TANAP’s partnership structure also reflects the project’s multilateral strategic nature: South Gas Corridor JSC holds a 51 per cent stake, SOCAR Turkey Energy 7 per cent, BOTAŞ 30 per cent and BP 12 per cent. This structure establishes a partnership model in which both Turkey’s state-owned company and Azerbaijani and Western capital are partners in the project, and consequently, each party has a strong stake in the continuity of supply. In terms of the gas transported via TANAP, this balance of interests functions as a mechanism that structurally hinders any single actor from politicising supply through crisis-driven decisions; this feature is the fundamental reason why the route serves as a significantly more predictable supply source than Russian gas, both for Turkey and for Europe.

TAP and the European Connection: The Route’s Global Dimension

When describing the route for the transmission of Absheron gas to Turkey, failing to consider the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP)—which represents the European dimension of the system—would constitute an analytical oversight. Commencing at the Turkey-Greece border, the TAP operates along an 878-kilometre route, passing through 550 km of Greece, 215 km of Albania and 105 km across the Adriatic Sea before reaching Italy. With a current capacity of 10 billion cubic metres per year, the pipeline has entered a phased expansion process from 2026 onwards; the ultimate capacity target is 20 billion cubic metres per year. Under the Absheron agreement, approximately half of the field’s annual production exceeding 4 billion cubic metres—which is not allocated to Turkey—can be supplied to the European market via this route; this demonstrates that Turkey will simultaneously maintain its dual role as both a domestic consumer and a transit country.

The strategic partnership memorandum signed between Azerbaijan and the EU in 2022 includes Azerbaijan’s commitment to double its gas exports to Europe by 2027, reaching an annual volume of 20 billion cubic metres. According to an analysis by Caspian Post dated January 2026, Azerbaijan exported a total of 25.2 billion cubic metres of gas in 2025; 12.8 billion cubic metres of this, or approximately half, reached Europe. As of January 2026, Austria and Germany have joined the group of buyers comprising Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia and North Macedonia. The most significant outcome of this scenario is as follows: Abşeron gas will feed into the existing export system—which is already operational and enjoys the political support of the EU—with new production capacity; in this sense, it involves integration into a proven infrastructure rather than bearing the risks of constructing a route from scratch.

The Future of the Southern Gas Corridor: Abşeron’s Systemic Contribution

To understand the route of Abşeron gas, it is necessary to grasp the system within which this route is situated — the Southern Gas Corridor — in its entirety. With a total length of approximately 3,500 km, the Southern Gas Corridor is an integrated pipeline system comprising the SCP, TANAP and TAP, connecting the Caspian region with the European market. By 2026, the system will be delivering approximately 26 billion cubic metres of Caspian gas annually to the Turkish and European markets. Whilst this figure significantly exceeds the initially projected capacity of 16 billion cubic metres, it still falls short of TANAP’s design capacity of 31 billion cubic metres. As calculated in a comprehensive analysis by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES), TANAP has the potential to be expanded to 31 billion cubic metres, whilst TAP has the potential to be expanded to 20 billion cubic metres; should this potential be realised, the Southern Gas Corridor could assume a structural role in Europe’s baseload supply, independent of Russian gas.

Abşeron’s role in this context is twofold. The first aspect is its contribution to production aimed at closing the capacity gap: as the Shah Deniz production plateau may enter a natural decline phase between 2025 and 2027, the commissioning of Abşeron will add a new production source to the system, thereby securing total export capacity and long-term sustainability. Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev’s emphasis that the Southern Gas Corridor is currently operating at full capacity and requires expansion serves to confirm precisely this need for production renewal. The second dimension is the value of geopolitical diversification: as the vast majority of the current Southern Gas Corridor gas comes via the Shah Deniz consortium, Abşeron introduces a second production and financing axis to the system through a new consortium structure (SOCAR-TotalEnergies-ADNOC), thereby freeing the system from dependence on a single field and consortium.

The most debated scenario for the expansion of the Southern Gas Corridor is the integration of Turkmenistan’s gas into the system via the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP). Turkmenistan holds the world’s fourth-largest gas reserves, amounting to approximately 50 trillion cubic metres; however, almost all of its exports are destined for China. Should the proposed 300 km subsea pipeline directly connect Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan’s SCP network, the Absheron route could utilise the same transmission chain for potential Turkmen gas as well. Minister Bayraktar’s signal in Baku that ‘the time has come for Turkmen gas to be transported via Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe’, coupled with GIS Reports’ determination that the TCP is now the ‘base case’, indicates that this expansion perspective could be realised in the near term.

The Route’s Significance in the Context of Energy Security: From Dependence to Diversification

The Abşeron gas transmission route is not merely a technical solution; it is a concrete expression of Turkey’s strategy to transform its structural energy dependence. According to the Atlantic Council’s comprehensive analysis dated March 2026, Russia’s share of Turkey’s gas imports has fallen from 50 per cent in 2018 to approximately 40 per cent by 2025. According to data from the Azerbaijan Energy Market Regulation Authority cited by Report.az, Azerbaijan exported 9.8 billion cubic metres of gas to Turkey between January and October 2025; this figure is 3.5 per cent higher than the corresponding period in 2024. In the whole of 2024, Azerbaijan supplied 11.48 billion cubic metres of gas to Turkey; this figure represents an 11.9 per cent increase compared to 2023. The additional annual supply of 2.25 billion cubic metres from the second phase of the Absheron project will cement this trend and structurally increase Azerbaijan’s share in Turkey’s gas mix throughout the 15-year supply period commencing in 2029.

The significance of this transformation lies not merely in the percentage figures, but in its ability to fundamentally alter the dynamics of negotiations. The total capacity of gas transported by Russia via the Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines amounts to 47.5 billion cubic metres; a significant portion of these contracts will enter their renewal phase towards the end of the 2020s. The additional Azerbaijani supply provided by the Absheron gas, alongside the LNG option, will enhance BOTAŞ’s capacity to present a strong alternative supply option during renewal negotiations with Gazprom. Modern Diplomacy’s analysis dated October 2025 also highlights this dynamic: Turkey’s LNG infrastructure has provided BOTAŞ with a much stronger negotiating position vis-à-vis Russia and Iran, and the Abşeron agreement reinforces this position through pipeline-based diversification.

This perspective is also clearly articulated in Azernews’ in-depth analysis dated January 2026: ‘Turkey’s shift towards Azerbaijani gas reflects broader changes in its energy strategy. Ankara has been heavily reliant on Russian and Iranian gas for decades; however, geopolitical pressures, the expiry of existing supply contracts and the growing importance of energy security have made a reassessment of this situation inevitable.' Experts predict that the 2028–2029 period will mark a critical threshold in terms of transformations in global LNG volumes and contract structures; the Abşeron agreement, set to come into effect precisely during this period, will enable Turkey to manage this transformation from a favourable position in terms of debt repayment burdens and price volatility.

Conclusion: What a Route Reveals

The transmission route stretching from the Abşeron gas field to Turkey — comprising the on-site CPF and subsea pipeline, the South Caucasus Pipeline, TANAP and, where required, TAP — is a concrete case study of how geography, politics and capital can be transformed into an integrated energy strategy. With a physical length exceeding 3,500 km, this route is more than just a pipeline; it is the institutional expression of the Caspian region’s integration into the European energy system, Turkey’s simultaneous assumption of the roles of producer and hub nation beyond its transit identity, and Azerbaijan’s provision of a genuine alternative to the global gas trade dominated by Russia.

Recalling Daniel Yergin’s classic framework defining energy security as the ‘trinity of security, diversity and flexibility’, it is evident that the Abşeron route meets all three criteria simultaneously: In terms of security, decades of infrastructure experience and a robust state guarantee; in terms of diversity, a multi-stakeholder structure both in upstream production (the SOCAR, TotalEnergies, ADNOC trio) and in route options; and in terms of flexibility, the extra bandwidth offered by TANAP’s currently unused capacity. The agreement signed in Baku in June 2026 is the most concrete evidence that these three criteria have borne fruit. From the perspective of the discipline of international relations, the fundamental lesson to be drawn from this case is as follows: energy routes are not static documents once they are drawn up; they are living documents that expand, transform and, at times, serve the exact opposite of their original purpose in the face of geopolitical changes. The Absheron route is the most recent proof of this dynamism.