The Energy Agenda at the Ankara Summit: What Decisions and Steps Are Expected?

When NATO leaders meet in Ankara on 7–8 July, the items on the official agenda are largely clear: support for Ukraine, the implementation of the five per cent defence spending target, and increasing production capacity in the defence industry. However, beneath these headings, another agenda item that has been quietly taking shape over the past few years will also be on the table: energy security. NATO’s approach to energy has undergone a fundamental transformation in recent years, and the Ankara Summit will be the first major test of whether this transformation will translate into concrete decisions.

To understand this transformation, we need to look back to 2022. Following the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines, NATO began to view energy infrastructure not merely as an economic asset, but as a strategic target requiring direct protection. The steps taken since then – the establishment of the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, the formation of the NATO-EU Critical Infrastructure Resilience Task Force, and the launch of Operation Baltic Sentry in the Baltic Sea – demonstrate that the Alliance’s approach to energy security has now taken on an operational, rather than merely theoretical, dimension. The majority of the issues to be discussed at the Ankara Summit will build upon this body of work.

The timing of the Summit is also significant in this regard. The volatility in global energy markets caused by the tensions in the Gulf region, which have persisted since February, has once again highlighted the risk posed by Europe’s dependence on a few chokepoints and a limited number of routes for its energy supply. This experience provides a concrete backdrop that reinforces NATO’s narrative on energy security. Ankara’s hosting of the summit also carries significant symbolic value in this context: situated at the crossroads of the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Caucasus and the Middle East, Turkey is a natural focal point for discussions on energy security.

The Last Five Years of NATO’s Approach to Energy Security

NATO’s perspective on energy security has expanded gradually but resolutely. The Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell, established in February 2023, aimed to facilitate information sharing amongst allies, partners and the private sector. In May 2024, this structure was bolstered by a new Centre for Critical Undersea Infrastructure Security, established within Allied Maritime Command in the United Kingdom. In the same month, the Critical Undersea Infrastructure Network, bringing together individual allies and the private sector, became operational. In January 2025, the Baltic Sentry operation—launched at the request of allies in the Baltic Sea—evolved into a multi-dimensional military operation combining frigates, maritime patrol aircraft and unmanned surface vessels.

The common thread running through these steps is that energy and data infrastructure are now regarded as being in the same category as traditional military assets. Submarine cables carry approximately ten trillion dollars’ worth of financial transactions daily; two-thirds of the world’s oil and gas is extracted from the sea or transported by sea; and ninety-five per cent of global data traffic flows through submarine cables. These figures explain why NATO has made this area such a priority. Most of the issues expected to be discussed at the Ankara Summit will relate to the geographical expansion of this framework: can the model tested in the Baltic be applied in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean as well?

There are concrete incidents behind this institutional framework. The damage to the Balticconnector natural gas pipeline linking Estonia and Finland in October 2023, followed by disruptions to various data cables in the Baltic Sea in the subsequent months, prompted NATO to accelerate its efforts to protect critical infrastructure. The Baltic Sentry operation, launched at the Baltic Sea Allies Summit held following the damage to a cable between Estonia and Finland in January 2025, was the most tangible outcome of this process. As part of the operation, more than twenty unmanned surface vessels were deployed to the region, and the Allies’ national surveillance assets began to be integrated within a common framework.

Another key pillar of this institutional framework is the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Task Force established between NATO and the European Union. This joint structure aims to strengthen coordination between the Alliance and EU institutions in areas such as energy, transport, digital infrastructure and space. The Ankara Summit may raise the question of whether the scope of this task force’s activities should be expanded, and in particular how allies such as Turkey – which are not EU members but are of key importance in terms of energy infrastructure – can be integrated into this mechanism.

Energy’s Share of the Five Per Cent Target

The five per cent target for defence and security spending, agreed at last year’s Hague Summit, is split into two parts: 3.5 per cent for conventional defence and 1.5 per cent for infrastructure and resilience. How this second component is to be put into practice will be decisive for energy security at the Ankara Summit. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s description of the summit as a “shift from planning to implementation” indicates that allies are now expected to translate their commitments into concrete projects. The scale of the budget to be allocated for the protection of energy infrastructure, and the specific projects to which this budget will be directed, will be among the most closely watched sections of the communiqué to be issued following the summit.

One of the specific issues expected to be discussed in this context is the extent to which member states’ energy infrastructure investments will be integrated into a common NATO framework. Until now, such investments have largely been carried out at national level or within the EU framework; it is likely that work will be undertaken in Ankara to establish a framework for aligning these investments with the Alliance’s collective defence planning. This could be a step that would both ensure member states’ energy investments align with strategic priorities and enable NATO to utilise its limited resources as effectively as possible.

A concrete manifestation of this discussion has already begun to emerge, with European allies and Canada set to increase their defence spending by a nominal 139 billion dollars by 2025. The fact that some members are set to reach the five per cent target as early as 2026 – well ahead of schedule – makes the question of whether a significant portion of these additional funds will be channelled towards critical infrastructure and energy resilience all the more pressing. Concrete steps taken in this direction at the Ankara Summit will provide the first indications of the extent to which energy security will feature in NATO budgets in the coming years.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Can the Baltic Model Be Transferred to the South?

One of the issues expected to be discussed most concretely at the summit is whether the critical infrastructure protection model developed in the Baltic Sea can be adapted to the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. The Baltic Sentry operation brings together a wide variety of assets—such as frigates, patrol aircraft and unmanned surface vessels—to deter threats to undersea cables and pipelines. Turkey’s mine countermeasures activities in the Black Sea and its existing maritime surveillance capabilities provide a strong foundation for implementing a similar model in this region. Turkey’s experience and infrastructure in the region enable it to take on a natural leading role in such an initiative.

A similar discussion may also be on the agenda for the Eastern Mediterranean. The growing strategic importance of the region’s energy infrastructure – pipelines, LNG terminals and power interconnectors – could bring the evaluation of a surveillance and protection mechanism to the fore here as well. Whilst it remains uncertain whether the summit’s official communiqué will include a concrete commitment on this matter, it is highly likely that the issue will be addressed at a technical level and within the framework of the Defence Industry Forum. Turkey is expected to be an influential voice in these discussions, given both its geographical location and its maritime security capabilities.

Among the concrete steps that could be envisaged are the development of a surveillance and early-warning mechanism amongst allies in the Black Sea, the phased deployment of unmanned maritime vehicles to the region, and the integration of Turkey’s existing mine countermeasures task force into this new mechanism. Rather than such steps being announced at the summit with an official operational name and timetable, it is more likely that they will be implemented gradually at a technical level over the coming months. Nevertheless, the inclusion of an intention in this direction—even if only in a single sentence—in the summit communiqué will be significant in terms of lending the process official status.

Critical Minerals: In the Shadow of the Defence Industry Forum

Critical minerals feature prominently on the agenda of the NATO Defence Industry Forum (NSDIF26), which will be held concurrently with the summit. The inclusion of a session titled ‘Critical Raw Materials for Defence’ in the forum’s official programme demonstrates that this issue is no longer treated as a technical detail, but as a high-level strategic matter. Given that the production of a single F-35 involves the use of over four hundred kilograms of rare-earth elements and specialised alloys, ensuring the defence industry’s access to these resources has become directly linked to the objective of increasing production capacity.

One of the concrete proposals expected to be discussed at the summit is the creation of a joint stockpile of critical minerals amongst allies. Canada’s offer to its allies of priority access to critical mineral stockpiles at the G7 Summit in June set a precedent for evaluating a similar mechanism at NATO level. Turkey’s reserves of boron, feldspar, bentonite and zeolite, along with the discovery of rare earth elements in Beylikova, Eskişehir, stand out as tangible assets that could make a valuable contribution to such a mechanism. Ankara’s efforts to increase production capacity in this area could gain further momentum following the summit, with the support of its allies.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s visit to the ASELSAN facilities in Ankara in April and the promotion of the Defence Industry Forum as the Alliance’s largest-ever industrial event demonstrate that the link between critical minerals and defence industry production capacity is now being addressed at the highest level. The “Critical Raw Materials for Defence” session expected at the Forum is likely to result in concrete proposals, such as the mapping of supply chains and the sharing of production capacity amongst allies. Turkey’s aim to scale up its pilot facility in Beylikova to an industrial scale could be highlighted as a concrete example in these discussions.

The global context of this discussion should not be overlooked. China’s dominant position in the processing of rare earth elements – and its recent efforts to make this position more visible through export controls – has prompted Western allies to seek alternative supply chains. The steps taken by Washington under the Defence Production Act and the direct acquisition of public stakes in certain companies are among the concrete examples of this search. The establishment of such a strategic stockpiling mechanism at NATO level will ensure supply security for the defence industries in both Europe and North America, whilst also opening up a new area of cooperation for resource-rich allies.

Diversification of Energy Routes

The tensions in the Gulf region since February and the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have made the diversification of energy routes a natural part of the summit agenda. The vulnerability of this narrow strait, through which one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas trade passes, has once again highlighted the importance of alternative routes. The alternatives offered by Turkey – the Ceyhan terminal, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, and the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, which has been reactivated – are among the topics likely to feature frequently on the agenda both before and during the summit.

Whilst the official communiqué is not expected to mention a specific pipeline project directly, it is likely to emphasise the diversification of energy routes as a general principle of resilience. In this context, it is highly likely that the Zengezur Corridor – which has not yet become fully operational – and projects envisaging the transmission of renewable electricity from Azerbaijan to Europe via Turkey will be discussed in bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the summit. Accelerating such projects with the support of allies will both strengthen Turkey’s vision as an energy hub and make a tangible contribution to Europe’s security of supply.

An increase in the capacity of the Southern Gas Corridor may also form part of these discussions. The target of increasing TANAP’s capacity from sixteen billion cubic metres to thirty-one billion cubic metres represents a significant boost in the capacity to deliver Caspian gas to Europe. The institutional maturation of the Organised Wholesale Natural Gas Market within EPİAŞ also supports Turkey’s vision of being not only a physical route but also a transparent pricing platform. Following the summit, how such developments in market infrastructure are received by international investors will also be closely monitored.

Nuclear Energy and Small Modular Reactors

Although nuclear energy does not feature directly on NATO’s official agenda, it is expected to be discussed on the sidelines of the summit as a natural part of energy security debates. At a time when more than sixty new reactors are under construction worldwide and interest in small modular reactors (SMRs) is growing rapidly, increased cooperation among allies on nuclear technology and fuel supply chains is a likely topic of discussion. Turkey’s experience at Akkuyu and the institutional capacity it has developed through TENMAK and NDK provide a valuable basis for cooperation in this field.

The convergence of the growing electricity demand from data centres with interest in nuclear energy could give rise to a new area of cooperation among NATO members in the coming period. The need to protect nuclear facilities as critical infrastructure will require the physical and cyber security of these facilities to be addressed more systematically in the post-summit period. Turkey’s growing capacity in the field of nuclear energy enables it to be an active participant in these discussions.

The use of small modular reactors at defence installations and forward operating bases is also a topic being considered with increasing seriousness by military planners. These technologies, which reduce dependence on the fixed grid, can be brought online rapidly and require relatively fewer personnel, are attracting NATO’s interest in terms of both energy security and operational flexibility. Turkey’s early institutional preparedness in this field may enable it to play a role in such military-civilian dual-use models in the future.

Artificial Intelligence, Data Centres and Digital Resilience

Another aspect of the summit that has received less attention but is gaining increasing importance is the link between the energy demand generated by artificial intelligence technologies and digital resilience. The energy intensity of data centres makes these facilities a priority in terms of both energy planning and security. As NATO’s critical infrastructure agenda expands, it seems inevitable that data centres will be included within this framework. The fact that Turkey’s energy bureaucracy has already placed this issue on its agenda and is shaping its new energy roadmap in line with this increase in demand positions Ankara in a well-prepared stance in these discussions.

In this context, the use of AI-supported surveillance technologies could also be expanded within the framework of NATO’s existing Critical Subsea Infrastructure Network. The work being carried out by Task Force X, within Allied Command Transformation, on unmanned and AI-supported maritime systems indicates that these technologies could also be rolled out in the field of energy infrastructure protection. Following the summit, the regions prioritised for such technological investments will serve as a key indicator of how energy and data infrastructure security will take shape in the coming years.

Each of these indicators will reveal whether NATO has truly made energy security a permanent part of its strategic agenda. In addition, another benchmark to monitor in the months following the summit will be the number of concrete projects and agreements announced at the Defence Industry Forum. Experience from past NATO summits shows that official communiqués typically contain cautious and general language, whilst real concrete progress is usually made through forums and bilateral meetings. Therefore, the true success of the Ankara Summit in terms of energy security will be measured not so much by the text of the communiqué, but by the concrete steps to be implemented in the coming months.

Turkey’s Contribution to the Summit

When we bring all these points together, it becomes clear that Turkey has come to the Ankara Summit not merely as the host country, but as an ally capable of making concrete contributions to virtually every aspect of the energy security discussions. Turkey’s experience in maritime security in the Black Sea, its energy infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean, the diversity of routes stretching from Ceyhan to Zengezur, the critical mineral potential at Beylikova, and its nuclear energy expertise, beginning with Akkuyu, position Turkey as a natural stakeholder in almost every aspect of these discussions.

This multifaceted potential for contribution may also manifest itself in the bilateral and multilateral agreements to be signed following the summit. Each of the following steps – such as drawing on Turkey’s experience in NATO’s efforts to extend its critical infrastructure protection model to southern regions, utilising Ankara’s resources within the critical mineral supply chain, or increasing allied support for energy route projects – could feature among the summit’s concrete outcomes. Turkey’s role in this process goes beyond that of host nation, holding the potential to strengthen the foundations of a long-term strategic partnership.

Post-Summit: What Might the Communiqué Contain?

How all these discussions will be reflected in the official declaration to be published following the summit will become clear in the coming days. Past summit experiences show that energy security is generally addressed under broad headings such as ‘resilience’ and ‘critical infrastructure’, whilst detailed and quantified commitments tend to materialise more in technical forums and bilateral agreements. A similar pattern is expected at the Ankara Summit: whilst the declaration text is likely to contain a strong political emphasis on energy security, concrete project and budgetary decisions are likely to take shape at the Defence Industry Forum and during bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the summit.

Nevertheless, there are several concrete indicators to watch: the scale of resources to be allocated to the protection of critical infrastructure; whether the Baltic model will be extended to other regions; whether the mechanism for stockpiling critical minerals will be formalised within an official framework; and the extent to which the diversification of energy routes will feature in the declaration. Each of these indicators will reveal whether NATO has truly made energy security a permanent part of its strategic agenda.

From Turkey’s perspective, whatever the outcome of the summit, Ankara’s position in energy security discussions has already been strengthened. Hosting the summit is significant not only in terms of protocol but also in that it once again demonstrates to the international community that Turkey is a natural part of these discussions, given its energy infrastructure, geographical location and institutional capacity. Turkey’s involvement in most of the concrete steps to be taken following the summit will be a natural consequence of its accumulated expertise in this field.

The official communiqué to be published in the coming days will clarify which of the topics discussed in this article have been transformed into concrete commitments and which into general principles. However, regardless of the communiqué’s final content, it is clear that NATO’s approach to energy security has undergone an irreversible evolution. This approach, which began in the Baltic and is expected to expand towards the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, will continue to be an integral part of the Alliance’s collective defence architecture in the coming years, and Turkey’s voice will be heard much more strongly than in the past as this architecture takes shape.