The Geopolitics of the Atom: Turkey-South Korea SMR Cooperation and the Significance of Small Modular Reactors in the International System

Energy is both the raw material and the stage of modern international relations. States form alliances, experience conflicts and redefine their identities in the pursuit of energy. In this context, the strategic cooperation agreement signed between the Innovative Small Modular Reactor Development Agency (i-SMRDA), established recently with the support of the South Korean government, and the Turkish nuclear technology company Nuclean may, at first glance, appear to be a technical trade document. Under the agreement, the two parties intend to work together to develop SMR projects in Turkey and the region, jointly assess opportunities in this field, and support the integration of Turkish industry into the global i-SMR supply chain. However, to interpret this document merely as a cooperation protocol at the corporate level would be to overlook the strategic depth and layers of geopolitical significance inherent in the agreement. In reality, this cooperation represents a crucial juncture where Turkey’s multi-dimensional foreign policy choices are materialising within a context of energy security, technology transfer, regional influence competition, and the reshaping of the global nuclear order.

Small Modular Reactors: A New Technology or a New World Order?

Small modular reactors (SMRs) are a new generation of nuclear systems that differ structurally from traditional large-scale nuclear power plants; they have an electricity generation capacity of less than 300 megawatts, are constructed in a modular fashion, and allow for the on-site assembly of components manufactured in workshop conditions. Due to their compact size, enhanced passive safety features and the fact that they require lower initial capital investment compared to traditional large-scale plants, these reactors are increasingly gaining prominence on the agendas of both developed and developing countries. Indeed, the global SMR market is currently valued at approximately $6.54 billion as of 2025, and this figure is expected to reach approximately $10.69 billion by 2033, growing at an annual rate of 6.8 per cent. This growth is not merely a commercial indicator; it is a concrete reflection of the strategic interest in SMRs held by governments seeking to manage the energy transition in a sustainable manner.

Beyond their technological appeal, SMRs possess a highly distinctive quality in terms of international relations: they offer access to nuclear capacity without the massive infrastructure investments and decades-long construction processes required by large power plants. This feature makes SMR technology both attractive and accessible for developing and middle-income countries. Furthermore, the modular design and relatively short installation time of SMRs make them suitable for a wide range of applications, including the defence industry, electricity supply for residential areas, and industrial heat applications. Rising demand in the international reactor market has strengthened cooperation trends among national regulatory bodies; indeed, in September 2025, the UK and the US announced the Atlantic Partnership in the field of advanced nuclear energy. This picture clearly demonstrates that SMRs are not merely an energy technology; they are also a geopolitical tool forming the core of new strategic partnerships.

South Korea’s “Nuclear Export” Strategy and i-SMR Initiative

South Korea has been engaged in a consistent and uninterrupted accumulation of expertise in the field of nuclear technology, particularly since the mid-1990s; this disciplined investment policy has established it as one of the leading players in the global nuclear market. The country’s strongest asset in this field is the 1,400-megawatt advanced pressurised water reactor design known as the APR1400. The APR1400 was first exported in 2009 for the United Arab Emirates’ Barakah project; subsequently, in July 2024, KHNP was selected as the preferred bidder for the construction of two APR-1000 units at the Dukovany plant in the Czech Republic, valued at approximately 18.6 billion dollars, with the contract signed in June 2025. South Korea’s track record is built on a reputation founded on the three pillars of on-time delivery, budget discipline and technical reliability.

However, Seoul’s nuclear export agenda is not limited to large power plants alone. Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) is developing an innovative SMR (i-SMR) design with a capacity of 170 megawatts, with the aim of bringing this reactor into commercial operation by 2035. Equipped with fully passive safety systems, the i-SMR is designed to replace older-generation coal-fired power stations. Han Gon Kim, President of the i-SMRDA, emphasised that South Korea is one of the countries that has made continuous investments in nuclear technology over the past 30 years, stating that they aim for the i-SMR technology to receive standard design approval by 2028 and to be introduced to the global market in the 2030s.

At this point, it is also important to note a critical development: in January 2025, KHNP and its parent company KEPCO resolved a long-standing intellectual property dispute with the US firm Westinghouse; however, under the terms of this agreement, KHNP is prohibited from bidding on new nuclear projects in North America, the EU (excluding the Czech Republic), the UK, Japan and Ukraine for 50 years, and is obliged to pay a licence fee of approximately $175 million for each reactor exported. This restrictive agreement is effectively cutting South Korea off from a large portion of Western markets and steering the country towards non-Western growth regions such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa and Turkey. Viewing the SMR partnership established with Turkey against this backdrop brings its strategic logic into much sharper focus.

Turkey’s Energy Security Dilemma and the Nuclear Option

Whilst Turkey possesses a dynamic and rapidly growing economy in terms of energy consumption, it views this situation not as a structural weakness but rather as the starting point for a determined transformation. The problem of consumption growth outpacing domestic production has driven Ankara to develop a comprehensive and multi-layered energy strategy; Turkey has begun to implement this strategy not merely in rhetoric but through concrete policy steps and international partnerships. The fact that the total energy import bill, including oil and natural gas, amounted to approximately 62.5 billion dollars in 2025 not only highlights the magnitude of the structural threshold that must be overcome but also demonstrates the scale of the political will mobilised to surmount it. Indeed, the 5.1 per cent year-on-year decline in energy imports in 2024 is a sign that this transformation policy has begun to yield its first tangible results.

The multi-faceted strategy adopted by the Turkish government consists of a coordinated set of actions designed to accelerate renewable energy investments, expand domestic production capacity and deepen the diversification of energy sources. At the long-term heart of this strategy lies nuclear energy. Turkey’s target of reaching 20,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity by 2050 is not a mere declaration of intent; it is a strategic vision being built step by step within the framework of a multi-pronged programme encompassing the Akkuyu, Sinop and Trakya projects. This vision is also resonating on the international stage: according to data from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Turkey has taken third place in the world, behind China and India, with four reactor units currently under construction; this position establishes it as a key player in the field of nuclear energy.

The implementation of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in partnership with ROSATOM reflects the pragmatic approach Turkey has adopted in its journey towards accessing nuclear technology. The completion of cold and hot tests for the first unit by 2024 confirms the project’s progress. Moreover, this process has not merely enhanced Turkey’s capacity; it has also laid the groundwork for the training of approximately 300 Turkish engineers in the nuclear field and the acceleration of the domestic nuclear energy supply chain. The process of gaining experience itself should be interpreted not as an indicator of external dependency, but rather as the foundation for future technological autonomy. Indeed, building upon this accumulated expertise, Ankara has launched an SMR partnership with South Korea and has kept negotiations regarding the second and third power plants with Western technology providers alive. This multi-partner structure is nothing other than the institutionalisation of strategic diversification and reflects Turkey’s conscious choice to reduce its dependence on a single country whilst expanding its freedom of negotiation.

November 2025 to June 2026: A Multi-Layered Cooperation Architecture

The Turkey-South Korea nuclear rapprochement is not limited to a single agreement; rather, it points to a multi-layered relationship architecture comprising multiple signing phases within a short timeframe. In November 2025, in the presence of President Erdoğan and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, a memorandum of understanding was signed between Turkey Nuclear Energy Inc. (TÜNAŞ) and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), covering a wide range of areas from the development of nuclear power plant projects to the sharing of technology and know-how, site assessment, project financing and human resource development. This high-level bilateral agreement sets out the strategic framework established by the state, whilst laying the groundwork for operational agreements at the corporate level to ensure the implementation of this framework in the field.

The cooperation agreement between i-SMRDA and Nuclean represents one of the building blocks of this second layer. Under the agreement, i-SMRDA and Nuclean have committed to working together to develop SMR projects in Turkey and the region, jointly assess opportunities in this field, and support the integration of Turkish industry into the global i-SMR supply chain; furthermore, the aim is to establish a sustainable project development ecosystem that will contribute to Turkey’s clean energy and nuclear energy objectives. Looking at the background of bilateral relations, it is noted that by 2025, the Turkey-South Korea bilateral trade volume has reached 11 billion dollars, and South Korean investments in Turkey have reached approximately 1.9 billion dollars. Cooperation initiatives in the nuclear sector are being built upon this economic foundation and are transforming mutual trust into institutional know-how.

Supply Chain Integration: A Challenge Beyond Technology Transfer

One of the elements that makes the agreement’s content strategically unique is the emphasis placed on the integration of Turkish industry into the global i-SMR supply chain. This approach diverges radically from the traditional logic of technology procurement. In standard technology transfer arrangements, the recipient country pays a licence fee, local firms occupy certain subcontracting roles, and the critical knowledge and components at the heart of the reactor remain in the exporting country. Supply chain integration, however, points to a far deeper and more complex partnership formula: Turkish companies will be involved in the design and production processes of reactor systems, will develop their capabilities to meet international quality assurance standards, and will ultimately acquire the expertise to produce components for export to markets outside Turkey.

Viewed from this perspective, the collaboration in question ceases to be merely an energy supply project for Turkey; it transforms into an industrial policy tool that will elevate the country up the value chain. Given that approximately 300 Turkish engineers have already been trained in the nuclear field through the Akkuyu project and that the development of the nuclear energy support industry is progressing rapidly, it is evident that integration into the i-SMR supply chain will build upon this existing foundation. If managed correctly, this process could move Turkey beyond being merely a consumer of nuclear energy and position it as a key industrial partner in regional SMR projects.

However, the realisation of this optimistic scenario is contingent upon overcoming numerous challenges. SMR technology has not yet reached commercial maturity; there is effectively no large-scale SMR facility in commercial operation anywhere in the world. For example, China plans to bring the world’s first commercially operational small modular reactor into service in the first half of 2026, following its commissioning in December 2025. On the Western front, it is well known that numerous SMR projects have faced significant delays, notably including the cancellation of NuScale’s Oregon project. This reality highlights that the projection for i-SMR to obtain design approval by 2028 and enter commercial operation by 2035 is based on an extremely ambitious timeline.

‘Multi-Vector’ Nuclear Foreign Policy: Turkey’s Strategic Positioning

Turkey’s diversification strategy in the nuclear sector is fully aligned with the general trend of its foreign policy. Whilst Ankara has established comprehensive nuclear ties with Russia through Akkuyu, it is pursuing cooperation with South Korea via KEPCO and KHNP, whilst continuing discussions with various technology providers for potential Sinop and Thrace projects. This structure is nothing other than the extension of the foreign policy principle of multi-vectorism into the energy sector. Turkey aims to preserve its strategic autonomy by avoiding total dependence on any single supplier; instead, it seeks to build multiple partnership relationships with multiple power centres.

The South Korean option appears particularly attractive in this context for several reasons. First and foremost, South Korea’s nuclear export policy is founded on international credibility, underpinned by a mature and standardised reactor technology (APR1400), competitive pricing, and a strong track record of budget discipline and timely delivery. These characteristics present a stark contrast to the financial uncertainty and construction delays demonstrated by Russia in the Akkuyu project, which have caused considerable disappointment. Furthermore, due to Western licensing restrictions, South Korea has a far greater need for markets such as Turkey; this, in turn, is boosting Ankara’s bargaining power at the negotiating table to an extent historically unprecedented.

On the other hand, the internal tensions inherent in this diversification policy cannot be denied. The Akkuyu model provides Turkey with nuclear capacity without the obligation to finance or construct it; however, the cost of this is a loss of sovereignty and structural dependency. In SMR partnerships, conversely, Turkey must finance projects and develop industrial capacity; in return, it gains access to technology and long-term industrial opportunities. The tension between these two models will profoundly shape Ankara’s future energy policy choices.

Regional Dimension: An SMR Opportunity for Turkey’s “Near Abroad”

A notable phrase in the agreement text refers to the fact that the cooperation encompasses not only Turkey but also the “region”. This emphasis removes the partnership from being merely a matter of bilateral relations and endows it with the ambition of establishing a regional energy architecture. Given Turkey’s geographical location, this ambition is highly significant. Turkey shares borders or maintains close geographical ties with many countries in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Balkans where the electricity infrastructure is inadequate but energy demand is growing rapidly. With a capacity of 4,800 megawatts from reactors currently under construction, Turkey ranks third in the world, a position that offers the country the opportunity to establish itself as a regional nuclear hub.

If Turkey becomes an active industrial partner in the i-SMR supply chain, it could act as a bridge not only for its own domestic market but also for the export of this technology to neighbouring countries. Should this scenario materialise, Turkey would rise from being merely an energy consumer to assuming the role of both a producer and a regional distributor within the nuclear technology ecosystem. Calculating the geopolitical value of this role transformation is extremely difficult, but it would represent an immense strategic gain.

Risks, Constraints and a Realistic Assessment

Alongside all these optimistic scenarios, it is inevitable to discuss certain structural constraints from an analytical perspective. The first and most fundamental issue is that i-SMR technology is still in the development phase. The main constraints facing the SMR market include high initial capital requirements, lengthy licensing and regulatory approval processes, and limited operational experience at commercial scale; in addition, concerns regarding nuclear waste management, public acceptance and long-term fuel supply are among the factors that could limit market growth. Whilst these constraints pose a serious challenge even for countries exporting mature technology, the challenges are far greater for a partner that has not yet demonstrated its reactor at commercial scale.

The second issue is licensing and regulatory infrastructure. South Korea’s i-SMR aims to secure standard design approval by 2028, which is an extremely ambitious programme on a technical level, and the extent to which this target can be achieved remains uncertain. Turkey’s own nuclear regulatory framework is also still under development, and its capacity to grant comprehensive licences for foreign designs remains limited. When these two uncertainties interact, potential delays in the project emerge as an inevitable risk.

The third, and perhaps the most profound, issue is the matter of financing. Although SMR technology offers certain initial cost advantages, nuclear facilities remain projects requiring massive capital investment. The high initial investment costs of nuclear projects and construction periods averaging seven to ten years present significant challenges. The macroeconomic conditions currently facing Turkey, characterised by high inflation and exchange rate volatility, make the financing of long-term nuclear investments extremely difficult.

In Conclusion: Turkey’s New Position in the Geopolitics of the Atom

The agreement between i-SMRDA and Nuclean is merely one piece of the larger picture; however, this piece contains highly significant clues regarding Turkey’s nuclear future and its international positioning. The agreement in question can be interpreted on at least three levels: At the first level, it represents a concrete step by a Turkey seeking energy security and diversification. At the second level, it is a product of South Korea’s strategy to forge alliances with non-Western partners as it seeks to reposition itself in the global nuclear market. At the third and deepest level, it is a systemic reflection of the growing significance of SMR technology in energy diplomacy and power politics.

As Energy Minister Bayraktar has emphasised, the global target of tripling nuclear capacity by 2050, as set out at the United Nations Climate Summit, creates a need for both large power plants such as Akkuyu and small modular reactors. Within this framework, Turkey is building a mixed portfolio encompassing both large and small reactors whilst maintaining simultaneous relationships with numerous international partners.

Success in this process will depend not only on selecting the right technology, but also on supporting the chosen technology with the right institutional capacity, adequate financing and a consistent regulatory framework. Reactor construction does not automatically resolve energy security; what is critical is the quality of the knowledge, capacity and foundation of sovereignty built alongside the reactor. Turkey will only be considered to have passed this test successfully when it is in a position not merely to generate electricity, but to assimilate this technology through its own domestic industry and human capital and export it. The geopolitics of the atom necessitates a mental and institutional transformation that goes far beyond mere power generation.