Turkey at the Centre of the Global Energy Crisis: Strategic Transformation and Claims to Regional Leadership Confirmed at Baku Energy Week

Baku at a Historic Turning Point: Global Disruption and Turkey’s Position

As Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, hosts the 31st Baku Energy Week in early June 2026, the global energy order is undergoing one of the most profound restructuring processes in modern history. Due to the practical closure of the Strait of Hormuz, approximately one-fifth of global oil trade and one-quarter of global LNG exports have been disrupted; chronic security threats in the Red Sea have added a second layer to this picture. At this critical juncture in the transformation of the global energy security architecture, Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar’s speech at the Ministerial Session themed ‘International Cooperation for a Resilient and Diversified Energy Future’, alongside his multilateral discussions, have clearly demonstrated Turkey’s unique position in this process. Bayraktar’s messages in Baku go far beyond mere diplomatic rhetoric; they represent the fruits of decades of accumulated experience and the announcement of a systematically built strategic capacity.

The analytical framework outlined by Bayraktar at the Baku forum comprises three key components: the necessity of redefining energy security, the imperative to integrate diversification with connectivity, and the structural role Turkey has assumed within this new architecture. The Minister emphasised that energy security can no longer be defined solely by access to resources; it requires a diversified supply structure, robust infrastructure, operational flexibility, high interconnection capacity and broader cooperation. The academic originality of this framework lies in its claim that, amidst the rapidly shifting balance of power among major powers, Turkey should assume the role of a market-shaping actor rather than merely pursuing a reactive policy. The statement that ‘Turkey, situated in a strategic position between East and West, will continue to play the role of a reliable partner, an energy hub and a key country in regional energy projects’ concretely illustrates how a geographical advantage can be transformed into strategic power through institutional and diplomatic capacity.

Tangible Outcomes of Decades of Transformation: Renewable Energy and Domestic Production

To fully grasp Turkey’s energy security strategy, the current situation must be viewed not merely as a snapshot in time, but as the cumulative outcome of a systematic transformation policy spanning decades. According to the data presented by Bayraktar at the Baku forum, Turkey’s total installed electricity capacity will have exceeded 125 gigawatts by March 2026; over 60 per cent of this capacity is derived from renewable sources. Solar energy is expected to become the single largest source in terms of installed capacity by the end of 2026, and the Minister emphasised that with this development, Turkey has entered the top five countries in Europe’s renewable energy capacity rankings. This picture serves as objective evidence that the renewable energy transition—argued to be a necessity rather than a choice in energy policy—has been effectively implemented. It is not merely the installed capacity figures but also the fact that, by April 2026, electricity generation from wind and solar sources is set to surpass that from natural gas for the first time on a global scale that demonstrates how this milestone directly concerns Turkey.

A fundamental shift is also evident in the development of domestic resources. The Sakarya Gas Field in the Black Sea represents one of the most critical turning points in Turkey’s energy history: despite the discovery having been made only a short time ago, daily production has reached 9.5 million cubic metres, with an annual production target of 7.5 billion cubic metres set for the end of 2026. With the commissioning of the second-phase floating production platform, Osman Gazi, daily production is planned to rise to 45 million cubic metres by 2028; this figure represents four and a half times the current production. The capacity to be derived from this field signals the crossing of a critical threshold—both economically and strategically—in reducing import dependency. Similarly, with the contribution of the Şırnak Gabar oil field, total oil production reached 132,000 barrels per day in 2025; this development has demonstrated how Turkey’s domestic production capacity can be rapidly scaled up through a scientific and technological system.

This picture is completed by the planned commissioning of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant by the end of 2026. As TESPAM President Oğuzhan Akyener aptly put it, ‘This process, which began with Akkuyu, signifies a long-term transformation supporting Turkey’s goal of moving beyond its identity as an energy importer to become a country with a say in high-value-added technology production; 2026 is not merely a year of commissioning, but the year Turkey is admitted into the club of nations possessing nuclear technology.' With the commissioning of all units, the Akkuyu NPP is expected to meet approximately ten per cent of Turkey’s total electricity demand; this development holds historical significance both in terms of permanently diversifying energy supply and structurally reducing the trade deficit reliant on imports. When all these figures are considered together, it is clear that Turkey is progressing in an extremely determined and systematic manner towards its goal of establishing a multi-source structure for its energy supply, without remaining dependent on a single or a few sources.

The LNG Revolution and the Strategic Value of Supply Flexibility

One of the most striking aspects of the structural transformation in Turkey’s energy security architecture is the shift from pipeline dependency to a multi-source and flexible import model. According to the Atlantic Council’s in-depth research report dated March 2026, Turkey has increased its regasification capacity by approximately fivefold since 2016, reaching an annual LNG regasification capacity of over 58 billion cubic metres; this figure indicates a flexibility capacity sufficient to meet the entire annual total natural gas demand. Exceeding this capacity provides Turkey with both an extremely strong negotiating position vis-à-vis pipeline suppliers and the opportunity to benefit from price arbitrage through spot trading in the global gas market. Indeed, the US has risen to become Turkey’s fourth-largest gas supplier with shipments exceeding 5.5 billion cubic metres in 2025; the long-term LNG agreements signed by BOTAŞ with Mercuria and Woodside ensure that this position is firmly established.

It is evident that this structural transformation is also highly decisive in terms of its geopolitical implications. Possessing LNG infrastructure is not merely an energy security safeguard; it is also the capacity to fundamentally transform the terms of existing pipeline contracts through the increased bargaining leverage provided by diversified supply sources. Russia’s annual total export contracts to Turkey via the Blue Stream and TurkStream pipelines will enter a renewal period in the late 2020s. However, Turkey’s LNG option not only provides a concrete alternative supplier but also renders Russia’s traditional energy weaponry—such as price pressure and supply restrictions—less effective. According to a comprehensive analysis by Modern Diplomacy, Russia’s share of Turkey’s gas imports has fallen from over sixty per cent two decades ago to approximately forty per cent by 2025, and this decline continues; this trend serves as an objective measure of the effectiveness of Turkey’s unique strategy.

From Diversification to Regional Integration: The Layers of Meaning in the BOTAŞ-SOCAR Agreement The BOTAŞ-SOCAR-TotalEnergies-ADNOC/XRG agreement signed during Baku Energy Week is the most concrete and multi-layered reflection of the diversification strategy. The total of 33 billion cubic metres of gas to be supplied to Turkey from the Absheron field over a 15-year period starting in 2029 offers three distinct strategic gains. Firstly, the additional 2.25 billion cubic metres of Azerbaijani gas per year further reduces dependence on a single supplier, thereby strengthening the supply portfolio. Secondly, the participation of leading international energy companies such as TotalEnergies and ADNOC in the consortium confirms that the agreement has evolved into a multilateral security mechanism involving European and Gulf capital, going far beyond a mere bilateral energy contract. Thirdly, there is a dimension that is particularly decisive from a strategic perspective: according to the SOCAR chairman’s statement, whilst approximately half of the production will be allocated to Turkey, the remaining half can be directed to Europe via the TANAP-TAP route, meaning that Turkey remains both a consumer and a transit hub simultaneously.

The significance of this agreement within the context of regional energy integration cannot be underestimated. Azerbaijan’s share in Turkey’s natural gas mix, which until just a few years ago hovered around the 13–14 per cent range, will increase structurally in the medium term as a result of this agreement. This process signals a deepening of the energy partnership established between Turkey and Azerbaijan on the principle of ‘mutual benefit’: whilst Baku gains additional export capacity and revenue, Ankara secures the opportunity to guarantee long-term supply. The principle emphasised by Bayraktar—that ‘producer, transporter and consumer countries should share the process in a balanced manner’—thus moves beyond an abstract normative proposal to take on a concrete institutional form in the Absheron Agreement. Given that Azerbaijan has consolidated its position as a reliable supplier—a role valued by the EU in its gas-to-electricity transition—and has expanded its exports, which reached 12 European countries by 2025, to include Austria and Germany, Turkey represents the backbone of this network, both in terms of infrastructure and diplomacy.

The ‘Electricity Version’ of TANAP: A Vision for Comprehensive Integration Beyond Gas

Undoubtedly, the most original and transformative outcome shared with the public by Bayraktar at the Baku forum is the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey-Bulgaria electricity interconnection project. Described as the ‘electricity version of TANAP’, this project entails transforming the Southern Gas Corridor—which currently transports Caspian gas to Europe via a pipeline network—into a multi-dimensional energy corridor capable of transmitting renewable electricity along the same geographical and institutional route. As Bayraktar put it, this project, which ‘will be heard of more frequently in the coming weeks and months’, directly contributes to Europe’s agenda of reducing its dependence on Russian energy by combining the renewable energy potential of the Caspian basin — particularly wind and solar resources — with Turkey’s balancing capacity.

The strategic uniqueness of this project lies in positioning Turkey not merely as a single energy transporter, but as a multi-modal energy hub. When considered alongside Azerbaijan’s 1,155 km undersea cable project currently under development along the Georgia-Romania-Hungary route, this electricity interconnection could position Turkey both as a transit point for renewable electricity from the Caucasus to Europe and as the hub of a broader regional electricity network extending as far as Central Asia. Bayraktar’s prediction that ‘this project could eventually extend as far as Central Asia’ highlights that the final capacity ceiling for Turkey within the project has not yet been determined; on the contrary, the potential for growth remains significant. When we consider the EU’s target of increasing the share of renewable energy to at least 45 per cent by 2030, Turkey holds the advantage of positioning this corridor along an axis that aligns with the EU’s official investment priorities in terms of institutional support and financing.

Turkmen Gas and the Trans-Caspian Pipeline: A Geopolitical Solution to Decades of Obstacles

One of the most significant geopolitical signals from Bayraktar’s remarks at the Baku forum concerns Turkmen gas: ‘There were statements to the effect that the time has come for Turkmen gas to be transported via Azerbaijan to Turkey and Europe; perhaps in terms of timing, we are now at a point where everyone would say yes.’ This statement confirms that the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) project—which energy diplomats have kept on the agenda for over twenty years but which has been shelved repeatedly due to geopolitical obstacles—has now entered a phase where it is feasible. The proposed 300-kilometre undersea pipeline is intended to connect Turkmenistan’s Caspian resources directly to Azerbaijan’s existing pipeline network and, from there, to Turkey and Europe via the TANAP route. Given that Turkmenistan holds the world’s fourth-largest gas reserves, estimated at approximately 50 trillion cubic metres, and that nearly all of its current exports are destined for China, the commissioning of the TCP has the potential to fundamentally redraw the global gas trade map.

In this context, Turkey’s unique strategic position is particularly noteworthy. The supply of 1.3 billion cubic metres of Turkmen gas via a swap arrangement through Iran in March 2025 has opened a door that had been closed since 1998 for the first time in 27 years; this step demonstrates that a commercial relationship can indeed be established despite technical and legal challenges. As highlighted in GIS Reports’ March 2026 assessment, the TCP is now characterised as the ‘base case and an increasingly likely project’ as the Hormuz crisis deepens. The EU’s designation of the TCP as a Project of Common Interest and its opening of access to public funding have provided the project with an institutional framework of assurance. Minister Bayraktar’s expression of determination to work jointly on expanding the connection capacities with Bulgaria and Greece to increase the capacity of the TANAP and South Caucasus pipelines serves as a strong signal that the future—not merely the present—of the TCP is being planned. Turkey will play a decisive role in the transport of Turkmenistan gas to Europe, acting both as an essential transit route and an indispensable diplomatic facilitator.

Strategic Revaluation of Existing Infrastructure: TANAP and the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline

The aspect of Bayraktar’s speech in Baku that relates most directly to practical implementation is his analysis of the potential to enhance the value of existing infrastructure without requiring major investments. The Minister emphasised that TANAP still possesses significant untapped capacity and that the efficiency of existing pipelines can be improved with limited investment. This observation aligns with one of the fundamental principles of strategic planning: not proceeding with new capacity investments until existing infrastructure has reached full capacity. Closing the gap between TANAP’s current capacity of 16 billion cubic metres and the actual volume of gas transported will enhance both the availability of a route and the commercial appeal for additional gas from Abşeron and, in a later phase, gas from Turkmenistan. This approach enables Turkey to bring its strategic assets to the brink of full capacity first, thereby allowing them to be brought to the international negotiating table at a higher valuation.

A similar pragmatism is evident in the statement regarding the Iraq-Turkey Crude Oil Pipeline. The finding that this pipeline can be operated at full capacity with additional connections extending from Kirkuk to Basra adds concrete substance to the energy dimension of the strategic framework established by the 2024 Turkey-Iraq-Qatar-UAE four-party ‘Development Corridor’ agreement. When assessed alongside the growing pressure to find land-based route alternatives for Gulf energy exports following the Hormuz crisis, the operation of this pipeline at full capacity will position Turkey as the most reliable land bridge between the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean. Bayraktar’s call for ‘strong political will, determination and strong leadership’ constitutes a strategic diplomatic invitation within this framework: the resolve to steer regional actors towards accepting Turkey’s coordination in the management of shared infrastructure.

Energy Security, Sustainability and Competitiveness: Turkey’s Integrated Policy Framework

The tripartite balance framework outlined by Bayraktar in his Baku speech — energy security, climate sustainability and economic competitiveness — addresses one of the most sophisticated questions of modern energy governance. The tensions between these three objectives have long been debated in the international literature; it cannot be claimed that the vast majority of major powers have managed to strike this balance at an optimal level. Turkey’s approach offers a unique model in this context: maintaining natural gas diversification as the foundation of energy security in the short to medium term, whilst maximising the share of renewable energy in electrification. This dual strategy is consistent with both the 2053 net-zero emissions target and the market pressures created by the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) from 2026 onwards; consequently, it institutionalises environmental policy not as a separate burden but as an integral part of the competitiveness strategy.

The practical outcomes of this integrated approach are also clearly observable. The fact that over sixty per cent of Turkey’s total installed electricity generation capacity comes from renewable sources, and that the 2035 National Energy Plan includes a target of 120 gigawatts of installed capacity in solar and wind power, relates not only to the fulfilment of climate commitments but also to expanding Turkey’s energy export potential. An increase in domestic energy production will reduce external dependency, which in turn will contribute to a structural reduction in the current account deficit. Reducing structural dependence on energy imports is also a priority policy objective for the macroeconomic stability of the Turkish economy. Confining Turkey’s energy policy solely to a geopolitical debate and relegating the macroeconomic and climate dimensions to a secondary position makes it difficult to understand the strategy in its entirety.

Turkey’s Energy Hub Vision: Aligning Capacity with Ambition

Objections frequently raised by those questioning Turkey’s claim to be an energy hub focus on issues such as the adequacy of market liberalisation, the integrity of infrastructure capacity, and the sustainability of maintaining an independent position amidst major powers. Whilst these objections are academically valid, it is evident in light of current developments that Turkey is systematically addressing these capacity gaps. According to the Atlantic Council’s comprehensive analysis dated March 2026, Turkey possesses the potential to transform not merely into a consumer but into a regional energy power supplying gas to European markets by 2028. The structural constraints standing in the way of this potential becoming a reality are no longer technical, but primarily institutional and diplomatic in nature; the multilateral talks in Baku and the agreements signed there indicate that progress is being made in bridging this gap.

When examining the four pillars necessary for becoming a hub, as outlined in TASAM’s policy brief—market liberalisation, infrastructure expansion, supplier diversification and adaptation to the energy transition—it is evident that Turkey has made tangible and measurable progress in each area. Concrete steps are being taken in supplier diversification through the LNG transition and the Turkmen gas swap agreement; in infrastructure expansion through the Sakarya Gas Field, the Akkuyu NPP and electricity interconnection projects; and in adapting to the energy transition through over 125 gigawatts of installed capacity and a renewable energy share exceeding 60 per cent. Regarding market liberalisation, the transformation is progressing through Turkey’s vision of a gas trading hub centred around the Istanbul Financial Centre and the international trading role undertaken by BOTAŞ. When this entire picture is assessed collectively, it becomes clear that Bayraktar’s statement ‘Turkey is ready’ is more than mere rhetorical hyperbole; it is a reliable summary of concrete policy achievements.

Conclusion: Turkey’s Structural Role in the Global Energy Architecture

The statements made by Alparslan Bayraktar, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, at the 31st Baku Energy Week and the agreements signed there provide the strongest confirmation that Turkey is transforming from a mere transit country into an active designer of the system and a regional coordinator within the global energy architecture. This transformation is not merely a diplomatic or commercial choice; it is the embodiment of a combination of geographical location, decades of infrastructure investment, a multifaceted energy foreign policy, and a fundamental structural reform being implemented domestically. Over 125 gigawatts of installed capacity, a 58 billion cubic metre LNG regasification capacity, a long-term gas agreement for 33 billion cubic metres from Absheron, the rising domestic production from the Sakarya Gas Field, and the Trans-Caspian connection and the electricity version of TANAP set to take shape in the coming period: none of these elements can achieve a coherent whole when considered in isolation; however, when viewed as part of a systemic strategy, they clearly demonstrate why Turkey is an indispensable actor in global energy security discussions.

Recalling Daniel Yergin’s conceptualisation of energy security as the ‘trinity of security, diversity and flexibility’, it is evident that Turkey has concretely met these three criteria through the outcomes of the Baku forum. In terms of security, a multi-source and multi-modal supply portfolio; in terms of diversity, a broad range of sources extending from Russian gas to LNG, and from Azerbaijani gas to Turkmen gas; and in terms of flexibility, the capacity to directly influence decisive price and volume conditions in international markets. Every policy framework articulated by Bayraktar in Baku serves as evidence of the seriousness with which institutionally grounded decisions, underpinned by political stability, have embraced the objective of simultaneously meeting these three criteria. From an academic perspective, the model demonstrated by Turkey presents a new case study for the literature on energy security: it is a comprehensive ‘resilience economy’ model that demonstrates how structural vulnerabilities can be managed not through a routine policy response, but through a long-term vision of transformation.