Uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz: The US-Iran Agreement and the New Geopolitics of Energy

15 June 2026. The world held its breath as Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif announced that “military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon, had been brought to an immediate and permanent end”. However, the statements that followed showed that we were right to hold our breath. Whilst Trump declared that “the Strait of Hormuz will be opened freely and permanently”, the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that “we must be paid for our services”. Whilst Israel declared that “the agreement does not bind us”, artillery fire continued in southern Beirut. The fact that the text, scheduled to be signed in Switzerland on 19 June, has not yet been published, reveals that this uncertainty is not coincidental but structural.

The Strait of Hormuz: The Chokepoint of the Global Energy System

In the first half of 2025, approximately 20.9 million barrels of oil were transported through the Strait of Hormuz daily; this amount accounts for roughly one-fifth of global oil consumption. It is projected that should the Strait be effectively closed, oil prices could rise by between 10 and 30 per cent. Behind these figures lies not only crude oil but also the bulk of Qatar’s LNG and the entirety of the Persian Gulf’s energy exports. In short, the Strait of Hormuz is the most critical and hardest-to-replace chokepoint in the global energy system.

Following the attacks launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 27 February, the halt in shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz—through which approximately 20 per cent of global oil trade passes—triggered a serious supply crisis in the global oil market. The economic and geopolitical cost of this crisis has been one of the factors significantly accelerating the negotiation process. In other words, from the moment the war began, the Strait of Hormuz ceased to be merely a geographical passage and effectively became the centre of diplomatic negotiations.

When examining how the draft agreement interprets this fundamental reality, a contradictory picture emerges. Whilst Trump claims to have approved the “free opening” of the strait and asserts that this will be “permanent”, the Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson emphasises the right to sovereignty over the transit regime by stating, “We must collect payment for the services provided in the Strait of Hormuz.” According to the 14-point draft text circulating in the Iranian press, however, the right to collect fees in the Strait belongs solely to Iran and Oman, and third parties have no decision-making authority in this matter. Between these two stances lies not merely a difference in perception, but a fundamental divergence regarding the interpretation of sovereignty. Whilst the technical solution to the issue is not complex, the political cost is high; for Iran has become accustomed to viewing this transit point as both an economic and symbolic asset following years of isolation.

Lifting of Sanctions: A Structural Break in the Global Oil Market

The second critical energy dimension of the agreement is the lifting of oil sanctions against Iran. Iran generally accounts for approximately 3 per cent of global supply and produces around 3.3 million barrels per day. However, this figure reflects the sectoral pressure caused by long-term sanctions. A senior Iranian official revealed that the draft memorandum of understanding prepared with the US includes comprehensive provisions regarding the lifting of oil sanctions, the curtailment of the nuclear programme, the release of frozen assets, and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Following the parties’ agreement, it is planned that the final agreement details will be negotiated within 60 days.

This process signals a structural shift in the global oil market. It had been indicated that, following the reopening of the Strait, Iran could be granted a temporary exemption from sanctions and permitted to export oil for 60 days; any further easing of restrictions beyond this period will depend on the fulfilment of the agreement’s terms. So what will be the practical market impact of this arrangement? Considering Iran’s oil stocks stored in tankers and its potential for capacity expansion, it can be assessed that the lifting of sanctions will significantly deepen the global supply surplus in the short term. This situation will also bring quota balances within OPEC+ back to the negotiating table; Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Iraq will be forced to adopt a more competitive stance to protect their export shares.

However, the key point here is that the process of lifting sanctions will not follow a linear or stable path. It is understood that the draft text does not envisage a comprehensive sanctions exemption until a final agreement is reached. The 60-day period during which nuclear negotiations, upper limits on uranium enrichment and regional security commitments are discussed will represent a period of uncertainty for the markets. Oil prices will remain volatile in this uncertain environment; both pessimistic and optimistic scenarios will be reflected in prices at each new stage of the agreement.

Frozen Assets and the Reopening of Energy Investments

The issue of releasing Iran’s $25 billion in frozen assets abroad is far more than a mere financial matter; it is a strategic energy investment issue. Having been subject to sanctions and isolation for many years, Iran’s oil sector faces significant technological and infrastructure obsolescence. Reserve development capacity has stagnated; the foreign investment and advanced technology required for production growth have not been transferred. The release of frozen assets and the lifting of sanctions will determine not only current export revenues but also Iran’s capacity to rebuild its energy infrastructure in the medium term.

At this point, the stance of international energy companies will serve as a critical indicator. Market assessments of the extent to which the agreement is reliable and sustainable will shape Western energy companies’ decisions on whether to enter or avoid the Iranian market. Trump’s warning that he would “resume military strikes if a final nuclear deal cannot be reached” and the two-stage negotiation structure of the process further deepen this uncertainty. Indeed, the opposition to the agreement from hardline groups within Iran demonstrates that the process is not independent of internal political dynamics.

The Nuclear Dimension: Energy or Weapons?

Trump stated that they are still negotiating the issue of Iran suspending its uranium enrichment activities for 20 years and that he could accept a 15-year period; a draft text in the Iranian press noted that demands regarding Iran’s nuclear activities are limited solely to enriched uranium, and that Iran’s commitments would be restricted to the obligation not to produce nuclear weapons.

This divergence also highlights the deep connection between the nuclear issue and energy geopolitics. Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity concerns both a potential path to nuclear armament and its civil nuclear energy programme. Tehran argues that it requires nuclear capacity for domestic consumption in order to diversify its energy security. Whilst the validity of this argument is debatable, the right to possess a diversified energy mix is a recognised element of sovereignty under international law. The fundamental tension in the negotiations lies precisely here: the enrichment threshold is a double-edged issue that encompasses both the risk of nuclear armament and civil energy autonomy.

Turkey’s Strategic Position: Both a Threat and an Opportunity

How should this situation be interpreted from Turkey’s perspective? Firstly, it must be noted that the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has had a relatively limited direct impact on Turkey’s oil supply; this is because Turkey’s crude oil imports are primarily sourced from pipeline-accessible suppliers such as Iraq, Russia and Azerbaijan. However, the indirect impact has been felt in Turkey through fuel prices and volatility in the global energy market.

Should the agreement be implemented, strategic opportunities will also arise for Turkey. Iran’s reintegration into the international energy market could offer Turkey significant locational advantages in terms of transit trade, pipeline connections and the financing of energy trade. As a long-standing natural gas importer, Turkey’s past energy relations with Iran and its geographical position between the Middle East and Europe could position Ankara as a strategic mediator in the process of integrating Iranian energy into Western markets.

On the other hand, the risks inherent in the process should not be overlooked. The current uncertainties surrounding the agreement, particularly the ambiguity regarding the timeline for the lifting of sanctions and the Israel factor, could lay the groundwork for continued regional instability. To avoid being adversely affected by this volatility, Turkey must continue to strengthen its energy supply diversification strategy, increase alternative pipeline capacities and develop storage infrastructure under the BOTAŞ umbrella.

Conclusion: The Complete Uncertainty of the Partial Agreement

The US-Iran agreement should be assessed as a partial existence that, when correctly interpreted, signals a slight ‘normalisation’ of the global energy order, yet structural issues remain unresolved. Critical issues such as the status of the Strait of Hormuz, the pace of sanctions lifting, the conditions for the release of frozen assets, and the Israeli factor remain shrouded in uncertainty. These uncertainties are not merely technical issues for energy markets; they are deep-seated political tensions concerning sovereignty, security and the distribution of strategic power.

In the literature on international relations, the concept of ‘geopoliticalised energy’ has become so widespread that it is now almost a cliché. However, the US-Iran process demonstrates that energy has gone beyond being merely a tool of geopolitics; it has become the very substance of strategic negotiation itself. The discussion is not merely about oil prices via the Strait of Hormuz; it also involves negotiations on regional hegemony, nuclear deterrence and interpretations of sovereignty. Any analysis that overlooks this reality will be content merely to see the surface of the agreement on the table.

The 19 June Swiss agreement may serve as a starting point; however, it is understood that the actual agreement will take shape during the second 60-day phase. Those 60 days will be decisive both for global energy markets and for the regional security balance. All actors, including Turkey, must closely monitor not so much the text of the agreement as its implementation and the course of the subsequent negotiations.