Can Macron's Strategic Autonomy Rope lead Europe out of the well it has dug itself?

While the Macron government, which has problems with the integration of people from the French colonies into France, seems to be far from offering a new road map to its people, who are demonstrating on the streets with violent protests based on 'fair living and sharing', it displays an attitude that does not compromise on its search for strategic autonomy in foreign policy. In spite of his internal fragility, Macron's rhetoric on Europe argues that the European Union should develop an attitude away from the US and even from world problems in foreign policy and security issues.

On his return from a visit to China in April 2023, Macron also touched upon Sino-US tensions in the context of Taiwan. "The worst thing would be for us Europeans to be caught between America's speed (to protect its interests) and China's overreaction (to protect its national interests), to think that we have to get involved," he said, in line with his position on Europe's strategic autonomy. Strategic autonomy is often used to refer to the European Union's ability to move away from the United States on foreign policy and security issues, to set its own agenda and to have more room for maneuver. The concept has been around since 2013 and was defined by the European Council on Foreign Affairs in 2016 as "the capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible". Many believe that for Europe to become an actor in global politics, it needs to become autonomous from the United States. But Europe has not yet grasped how this can be achieved. Macron is leading the discourse on strategic autonomy, but the locomotive is not yet ready to carry the European train in a direction independent of the US. 

Recently, NATO member states have set a goal of anchoring their defense spending at 2% or more of their Gross National Product. In fact, this is an American approach to force structure, which forces the Europeans to avoid a repeat of the strategic weakness they showed in the break-up of Yugoslavia. NATO force objectives require money. It relies on the United States, whose defense spending is 800 billion USD per year, and other members spending on defense in proportion to the size of their economies. The 9/11-induced NATO response to crises, such as the NATO Response Force, requires the development of a culture of pooled readiness and the adoption of the idea of responding to a crisis not only with American readiness, but also with NATO's joint force. The expectation is that NATO member states will increase their defense spending and take some of the burden from the US in burden sharing. No one doubts that Trump is the leader who is pushing Europe in this direction the most, at least in terms of rhetoric. Even Trump, who has pressed Europe to increase its defense spending at the risk of NATO's disintegration if necessary, has had little success in the face of Europe's passivity. Nevertheless, the Macron-led Europe has not backed down on its strategic autonomy rhetoric. How much strategic autonomy can the European Union seek when it is unable to even support Ukraine against the Russian invasion?

Perhaps the only silver lining of this discourse for NATO is Macron's calls to encourage Europeans to increase their defense spending. His 2017 speech in which he declared that "Our goal in terms of defense must be Europe's capacity for autonomous action, as a complement to NATO" was seen as an important step towards the establishment of strategic autonomy, even if it contrasts with the discourse that "NATO is brain dead!".

France has traditionally preferred, and still prefers, to take a very separate line from the United States in the field of defense and security in terms of the development of its own defense industry. In the tradition of Charles de Gaulle, politicians in France who focus on defense issues are united in their pursuit of strategic autonomy based on greater autonomy from the United States. According to de Gaulle, Europeans should remain America's allies, but not dependent on it. 

The same mentality is present today in the EU top leadership. In the context of Sino-American tensions, "multilateralism" is emphasized. There is a 'geopolitical' discourse in line with the concept of strategic autonomy. Nevertheless, a complete cohesion or unity of understanding within the EU seems unlikely under the current circumstances.

Proponents of strategic autonomy, united around Macron, insist that Europe, as a responsible partner, must develop its defense capabilities in a way that also meets Washington's expectations, for which Brussels needs a European defense strategy. On the other hand, Atlanticists, led by Eastern European countries, fear that strategic autonomy would lead Europe to gradually lose the American protection provided through NATO. Others criticize France for promoting the concept of strategic autonomy and using it as a lever to develop the French defense industry and increase its market share. 

Indeed, this concept has increasingly come to encompass many dimensions beyond defense and security, including economic, technological, commercial and industrial dimensions. It should not be denied that French politics is acting in this context.

Those who promote the concept of strategic autonomy, those who advocate the expansion of strategic autonomy, say that Europe is losing ground not only economically but also geopolitically. As a supporting argument, they emphasize that Europe's weight and perhaps its very existence in the world economy is gradually diminishing. 

There are undoubtedly objective reasons for such a strong emphasis on the search for strategic autonomy in recent years. The pandemic and the ongoing war in Ukraine, the double disaster, have laid bare Europe's weakness and vulnerability. Disruptions in the global supply chain, problems with Russia and other suppliers of electronic microchips, fertilizers, grains, medicines and, most visibly, gas, have put Europe's vulnerabilities and weaknesses on the world agenda. These apparent crises underscored Europe's economic dependence on states outside the continent, particularly in Asia. Europe was stunned by a Russia that turned off the gas valves and found it difficult to develop new alternatives. The interdependence with Russia showed that this country could use 'gas' as a weapon and use it as a hard power against Europe. The EU leadership sought to reduce its dependence by restructuring as much of its industrial base as possible and diversifying its gas import suppliers as much as possible. Here the European protectionism regime as a whole was tried to be applied.

Gas was not the only problem. Rising tensions and wars have awakened many Europeans to the fact that they live in an increasingly unstable and dangerous world. The war in Ukraine erupted on European soil, but it was Washington that quickly took the lead in responding. Other conflicts in Europe's neighborhood, such as Nagorno-Karabakh, did not penetrate far enough into the European periphery, hoping for a solution led by other powers. 

For some reason, 'dwarf Europe' cannot stand up, but the big rhetoric continues. It seems that Europe as a whole will not be able to develop a common will even to protect its own security. The (in)allocation of money for defense spending is the biggest indicator of this. Despite this apparent reluctance across Europe, Macron does not stop talking about the search for strategic autonomy. And why?

France's public debt officially stands at 111 percent of GDP, with a budget deficit of €165 billion. Fitch Ratings downgraded the country's debt rating at the end of April. To fix this, a number of reforms are needed, most notably a pension reform. The tensions on the French streets, which are essentially a reaction to economic policies, have become a threat to France's internal integrity.

Under these circumstances, the approach of Europe's strategic autonomy, as articulated by the French leadership, is more of an external definition than an internal one. This is a Macron who flatters French nationalists and aims to divert attention from the internal turmoil to the outside. Macron says he wants to see the European Union as a union pursuing its own interests rather than an alliance aligned with US interests. He emphasizes that Europe, as a part of the Atlantic system, needs to build a strategic autonomy based on its common economic size, that it would be beneficial for Europe to break away from the US or the Atlanticist line, and that too much dependence weakens Europe. Macron believes that this can be achieved through a line of strategic autonomy that will be determined by the interests of Europeans, without the EU going outside the Atlantic system, sometimes at the cost of taking decisions that contradict US interests. In a way, he is assuming the apparent leadership of this.

In fact, it is an expectation that the United States also wants and implies that Europe should increase its self-defense capabilities and demonstrate its capacity to project in its immediate neighborhood when deemed necessary. After the shock of Russia's aggression, the reinvestment in defense in various countries, including France and Germany, has delighted American arms dealers in the first place. Every decision to buy the F-35 is promoted as a success of American defense policy in Europe. European countries are arming themselves. Poland is leading the way in this regard. Despite these armament efforts and rising defense expenditures, there is no reason to expect that Europe will emerge in the near future as a real geopolitical player with the military power to uphold its values and international posture. There is no European army yet. There is only NATO in the flesh. To some extent, Europe is still caught between NATO and itself. Macron's rhetoric, far from crystallizing this situation, seems far from signaling anything new.