Problems Caused by War Underground in the Light of Mariopol and Gaza Cases

During the Ukraine-Russia war, a Ukrainian unit retreated to the underground tunnels in Mariopol and defended itself there, and the effective use of tunnels by HAMAS in Gaza has increased interest in the issue of underground warfare.

As a result, some articles have been written on the subject in various countries. However, when we look at the articles and discussions, it is seen that the issue of underground warfare is either exaggerated or underestimated.

Tunnels and other underground facilities are indeed very important in warfare, especially in urban warfare. In other words, underground fortifications are not a subject to be taken lightly. However, this does not mean that tunnels are the most important threat in today's warfare. This is because tunnels offer great advantages to the side using them, but they rarely change the overall balance of power.

Tunnels can significantly influence the course of a conflict but rarely change its outcome. Tunnels alone cannot bring victory. In fact, as at Mariopol, some tunnels can even lead to troops being trapped and captured.

This shows that tunnels alone are not valuable. Moreover, not all tunnels are of the same value. Tunnels are of different value depending on their location, length, depth, whether they have access outside the conflict zone, whether logistical supplies are stored or accessible.

For example, the tunnels in Mariopol stopped the Russians for a while, but in the end the Ukrainian soldiers had to surrender. This was because a large number of civilians and soldiers were lured into the tunnels, but not enough logistical supplies were stocked for them. Moreover, the tunnels have no exit to other regions.

Another example is the tunnels in Gaza, which are difficult to control and encircle because they are under the city, have many secret entrances and exits and are spread over a very large area. HAMAS has been able to survive in these tunnels for a long time because of the possibility of supplying from inside and outside the conflict zone thanks to their secret exits. In fact, the tunnels have become the mainstay of HAMAS's defence.

As seen in the two examples we have given, the tunnels provide an advantage to the weak defending side to a large extent. It is an important problem for the attacking side. Because underground warfare creates anxiety for the attacking side in terms of the fear of the unknown, the inability to understand underground threats and the unpredictability of the use of tunnels.

Tunnels also require the attacking side to deploy a significant number of troops for clearance. These should be specially trained units such as commandos and special forces. Or specially trained elements of the security forces should be used. However, this cannot guarantee success. This is because the existence of tunnels creates a wide range of problems.

Tunnels make it difficult for the side trying to seize an area to protect its operations and forces. Tunnels restrict the attacking side's intelligence gathering. The defending side, on the other hand, stores its logistical needs in the tunnels and can exit the tunnels at the most convenient time and place to conduct raids or ambushes. Small groups emerging from the tunnels can kidnap enemy soldiers and hide them in the tunnels.

As Clausewitz said, war is full of unknowns. This uncertainty is described as the fog of war. Under the ground, the fog of war is thicker. The attacking side cannot provide security by holding the identified exits of the tunnels. In particular, tunnels under residential areas prevent the attacking force from fully controlling the area even if the residential area is captured.

Tunnels can exit from every house, street, wooded area or between the ruins of buildings. The side defending the tunnel, as in Gaza, can emerge from them at any time and launch attacks. Therefore, the side that captures the city will never be able to secure the flanks and rear.

In this situation, clearing the tunnels may seem imperative. However, for the attacking side, entering the tunnels can significantly hinder the completion of the main mission. An unexpected discovery of a tunnel in an unrelated mission creates uncertainty and has a disturbing effect on the forces. Thus, it can delay the actual mission.

Success depends heavily on training and equipment. Basic underground training must be given to all soldiers who will enter tunnels, from residential areas to jungle and mountainous terrain. Troops tasked with clearing tunnels must be trained and equipped to manoeuvre and fight over short distances. This training must take into account poor visibility.

Underground warfare requires a lot of specialised equipment. This is because there are many restrictions on underground operations, including communication. For this reason, the operations to be carried out progress very slowly. This situation creates a tension on the personnel participating in the operation as well as on the elements following the operation outside.

This tension is exacerbated by problems such as difficulties in communication, inoperability of GPS (global positioning systems), movement in unknown narrow areas and command and control difficulties. It is difficult not only for the personnel entering the tunnels to communicate with the outside, but also for the personnel inside the tunnels to communicate with each other.

Soldiers often have to move alone, especially in narrow tunnels. In other words, it is not even possible for two soldiers to make a coordinated jump. The commander of the unit inside the tunnel is often unable to communicate with the personnel in front of and behind him and does not know what his soldiers are doing. This makes it difficult for him to direct and manage his unit.

For this reason, troops fighting underground should use alternative means and methods of communication in addition to conventional means of communication. For example, the methods used by miners can be utilised. Remote-controlled devices including micro drones and robotic devices should also be used as much as possible.

Tunnels should be cleared by the defenders considering that they are equipped with many traps and obstacles. A sudden narrowing of the tunnel and the necessity to use a passage through which only one person can crawl means that there are one or more people on the other side, ready to shoot any soldier who enters.

When travelling through the tunnel, one may suddenly encounter a slope upwards or downwards from the ground. Moreover, in wetland areas the downward slope may be filled with water and rendered impassable without diving into it. This makes it highly probable that there are enemy elements waiting at the point of emergence from the water.

In addition, mines and IEDs can be found in many places. Since these mines are likely to be trapped, it will be very dangerous to clear them. Remote-controlled ground vehicles, robots and drones should be used to deal with all these problems.

In addition, a possible explosion will cause major damage not only to the body but also to the ears of the personnel in the narrow area. Composite shields similar to conventional shields should be used against explosions and sudden fire. In addition, earmuffs to protect the ears, masks against toxic gases and oxygen cylinders against oxygen-free environments will be necessary.

Maps and sketches of the tunnels, if available, should be provided to facilitate command and control. If not, sketches should be made by utilising the devices that can be used from the ground and that show the underground spaces. These sketches and maps should be given to both the troops that will enter and those that will remain outside.

Wire lines should be laid for communication with each other underground and with the troops outside. These lines are also useful for locating and orientating personnel inside. In addition, ropes of one colour should be used from the entrance and of different colours in each direction from where the tunnel branches off into separate branches. These ropes should be of colours that can be seen in the dark. Spray paints that can be seen in the dark should also be used to mark important points as triangulation points for staff.

The worst case scenario is a fire in the tunnel or the use of flammable materials. If this is highly probable because of the nature of the tunnels and the precedent set in previous conflicts, fire extinguishers and water hoses can be used from the entrance onwards.

The supply of all supplies, especially ammunition, is a problem in tunnels. Personnel should take ammunition with them in the form of rations and weapons, but additional supplies should be available from the smallest unit onwards. If a long stay in the tunnels is expected, a supply system should be established by following the ropes drawn from the entrance. For this purpose, small wheeled carts that can move in the tunnels can be used.

Evacuation of martyrs and wounded is also a big problem in tunnels. The moaning or crying of the wounded personnel will demoralise the other personnel and reveal the location of the unit to the enemy. Failure to evacuate the martyrs may cause even greater problems. Because the odour that will emerge as a result of the onset of decomposition will make it impossible for the personnel to shelter in the tunnel.

For this reason, the martyrs and wounded should be evacuated immediately. For this purpose, evacuation points for the martyrs and wounded should be determined at certain places in the tunnel, and wheeled counters should be constructed to pull the martyrs and wounded. If evacuation is not possible, martyrs should be buried temporarily inside the tunnel. It may be useful to utilise the equipment used in fire brigades and mining in the evacuation of the wounded and martyrs. If available, civilian personnel who are engaged in this field should be utilised.

As a result of clashes or explosions in the tunnel, some parts of the tunnels may collapse. In this case, search and rescue units such as AFAD, miners or firefighters should be used to locate and rescue personnel. Their devices will be very useful in locating the personnel trapped underground. In short, close co-operation between soldiers and civilian institutions is a must in underground warfare.

The biggest problem in tunnels is the limited visibility. For this reason, troops should be equipped with night vision and thermal cameras. If a long stay in the tunnels is planned, it will be useful to provide lighting in the captured and cleared areas by installing cables from the entrance. It is even possible to connect internet to the tunnels with mobile stations or cables for small data transfer.

Underground warfare has many more limitations for the attacker. However, it also has many advantages for the defence. For this reason, underground warfare will be used intensively in future conventional wars as it is today. It is even possible to say that it will be used more.

Already, many states see underground warfare not only as a necessity but also as an opportunity. For this reason, elements such as subways, sewerage lines and large water pipes, which are built for civilian purposes, will also be used for war in the future. In this way, underground warfare will be conducted in conjunction with urban warfare operations in all kinds of settlements.

As seen in Ukraine, all underground facilities, including subways and mines, which are used for other purposes in peacetime, can also be used in wartime to protect civilians from bombardment. Sometimes civilians and soldiers will use such underground facilities at the same time, as in the case of Ozovstoll in Mariopol.

This has also affected the military doctrine of many countries. Almost all armies now train in urban warfare and, in conjunction with or independently of this, include underground warfare in their training plans.

As such, it has now become imperative for governments, when planning underground facilities to be built for civilian purposes, to seek the views of the military on what is needed to utilise them in a possible war. Perhaps every city administration should prepare a plan in coordination with the military units, police, gendarmerie and other relevant state institutions on how to protect and keep the people of the city alive against a possible external attack.

Because, as weapon technology develops and wars are fought in the form of residential neighbourhood-oriented battles, underground warfare or the protection of the civilian population will become the most important issue. Even the connection of these underground facilities with the sea and lakes will be emphasised. Perhaps similar facilities will be built under the sea and lakes.

As a matter of fact, HAMAS has connected its tunnels to the Mediterranean Sea in some regions. These passages from the tunnels to the sea make it possible both to communicate with the outside world and to attack Israeli troops by infiltrating from the sea. Realising this, Israel has been scanning the seabed in the coastal area by placing sensors on its ships for a long time and trying to detect any kind of movement.

As a final word, it is possible to say the following. Tunnels and underground facilities alone do not lead to victory, but they have a significant impact on the achievement of victory. For this reason, every army should be prepared for underground warfare from the time of peace. Civilian administrators should attach as much importance to this issue as soldiers. The joint training of miners, AFAD, etc. with the soldiers should be considered. In addition, it would be useful to act in coordination with the soldiers during the planning phase of constructions such as metro etc. to protect the city people in a possible war.