A Brief Review of Douhet's "Air Power" from Today's Perspective

Giulio Douhet, an Italian officer who had never learnt to fly, became famous as the author of the best-known work on air power, Air Power. Despite the end of the First World War and the first widespread use of aeroplanes in that war, this new technology had not yet been fully integrated into military strategy. Douhet saw the superior capabilities of the aeroplane as a kind of saviour in order to avoid the devastation of the First World War in future wars. In his work, he presented a new concept based on Air Power, which he saw as a new weapon, and a strategy for the use of air power in theory and practice. In this framework, he used his book as a medium to defend his ideas while putting forward his courageous and timeless ideas.

In this work, Douhet synthesised concepts such as air power, which promised a quick and decisive end to war, strategic bombing, which contributed to the development of modern air power, as well as the formation of an independent air force, the dominance of an aggressive air strategy on the battlefield, and the use of aerial bombardment to break the will of the civilian population. As a result, with this work, he made a great contribution to the realisation of the importance of fighter aircraft, air vehicles in general, air operations carried out with them, and ultimately air power, which was still developing in those years.

Chapters of the Book "Air Power"

Part One Technical Means of War

In the first chapter titled "The Technical Means of Warfare", Douhet states that he sees aviation as a new science, a new weapon, and that the war gave impetus to aviation, which was still in its infancy when the (First) World War broke out, and opened up a new field of action for the armed forces. He states that the sudden entry of this new weapon into the battlefield led to the need to define its characteristics, which were radically different from the other weapons used until then. Initially, he says, the aircraft's speed and freedom of movement led it to be seen primarily as a reconnaissance and reconnaissance tool, and then as a rangefinder for artillery, but it was judged that it could not be used in offensives because it was thought that the aircraft could not carry heavy ammunition. Meanwhile, the need to counter enemy air operations led to the development of anti-aircraft guns and defence aircraft. Douhet claims that the illogical notion of using air power only as an aid to the army and navy prevailed for almost the entire First World War. However, towards the end of the war, he states that it was wise for a few countries to evolve to the idea of using their air forces independently. Comparing air power to the use of naval power, the author argues that since time immemorial, naval power has been used independently of, but in co-operation with, land forces, and that the sky is now much more interesting to the people living on earth than the sea, and therefore the air is a battlefield of equal importance. He emphasises that both the army and the navy may have aircraft to assist their land and naval operations, but that this does not preclude a separate, independent air force. In such a case, he believes that air forces should logically be of equal importance to the army and navy, and that air forces should have the same relationship with each other that land and naval forces currently have with each other. Ultimately, he insists, an air force should always co-operate with the army and navy, but should be independent of both. I have no hesitation in asserting that air power, which he calls the new weapon, will completely overturn all forms of warfare hitherto known.

Part Two: New Possibilities

In the second chapter, entitled "The New Possibilities", the author describes the nature of the land theatre of operations, where armies move along lines of least or no resistance, and where obstacles encountered in difficult areas have to be overcome by long and arduous labour. The sea, on the contrary, is equally navigable everywhere on its surface and is limited only by coastlines. He states that in war, the attacking power will try to advance along the lines of least resistance or the most easily accessible lines towards the territory it wants to occupy, while the defending side will try to deploy its forces along the lines where the terrain is in its favour in order to counter the enemy's advance. Therefore, he argues that in order to win, in order to gain control of the desired territory, one side must break through or breach the other's fortified defences. He argues that the civilian population behind these lines, or in settlements outside the maximum range of surface (land and sea) weapons, do not feel the war and are not directly harmed. According to the author, this situation is now a thing of the past, as it is now possible to reach behind the fortified defence lines with aircraft and air power with complete freedom of movement and direction. In this respect, the author claims that from now on, the way wars are fought will undergo a complete change. Douhet explains the cruel but inevitable conclusion we must draw from this as follows: In the face of the present technical development of aviation, in the event of war the strongest army we can deploy in the Alps and the strongest navy we can have on our seas will not be able to provide an effective defence against the determined efforts of the enemy to bomb our cities.

Chapter Three Ascension

In the third chapter, entitled "The Upheaval", the author states that with the increase in the effectiveness of firearms, both absolute and relative advantages of defence over offence emerged, and that in order to win, the attacking side had to disrupt the balance of forces in its favour by bringing more forces to the front than the defenders waiting in their trenches, and therefore offensives were difficult and costly. He claims that the Germans fought knowing the advantages and disadvantages of defence and offence, that they held one part of the enemy forces with their own small forces along the defence line, and at the same time attacked another part of the enemy forces by concentrating forces, and that with this strategy of using force, the Germans were generally successful for a long time. According to the author, no fortifications could compensate for these new weapons, which could strike deadly blows at lightning speed into the heart of the enemy.

Chapter Four: The Offensive

In the fourth chapter, entitled "The Offensive Arm", the author argues that the greatest advantage of the offensive is that it is free to choose the point of attack and can shift its maximum striking forces, while the defender will keep his forces at possible attack points along the defensive line and can shift them to the area actually attacked in the event of an actual attack, and that all war tactics and strategy are essentially related to understanding this fact. He points out that armies are now large mass armies compared to the past, that it is becoming very difficult to move armies from one place to another, that an air force is a threat to all points within its radius of action, that aircraft taking off from different bases can combine faster than any other known means and attack the enemy rapidly, and that air power is therefore an extremely suitable weapon for offence. He argues that aircraft, which suddenly appeared during the last war, are primarily an offensive weapon, that whenever an air offensive is carried out decisively, it will achieve its goal, and that the weapons and resources distributed to the countryside for air defence will not be sufficient to stop the aircraft. From this point of view, the author shares the belief that, just as the control of the seas is achieved by ships, the side that controls the air and achieves air dominance can safely carry out its offensive and achieve victory. According to Douhet, the seizure of air supremacy implies positive action, that is, offensive action, not defensive action, which is the action best suited to air power.

Chapter Five: The Importance of Air Attacks

In the fifth chapter, entitled "The Magnitude of Aerial Offensives", the author explains that the bombs dropped by aircraft in aerial offensives are technically different from artillery shells, and points out the issues to be taken into account in bomb-making. According to Douhet, the basic principle of aerial bombardment is that the target should be completely destroyed with a single attack (precision strike) and that there should be no need for another attack on the same target. He argues that, in general, air strikes should be directed against the enemy's industrial and commercial establishments, important buildings, transport arteries and nodes, and areas densely populated by civilians, using explosive and incendiary bombs containing poisonous gases. He argues that explosive bombs dropped by aircraft on targets would destroy them, incendiary bombs would set them on fire, and poison gas bombs would prevent enemy firefighters from extinguishing the fires. As an example of the use of air power, Douhet argues that 10 planes, each carrying 2 tonnes of bombs, could destroy everything in a circle 500 metres in diameter, and that it would be sufficient to train pilots in advance so that the bombs could hit the desired points. As a result, the author argues that the construction and development of large and heavy aircraft continues, that new explosives, incendiaries and poisonous gases are being developed, and that all these technical developments are increasing the impact and potential of air power. Douhet argues that he who dominates the air will prevail, and he who is defeated in the air will be defeated in land and sea wars.

Chapter Six Air Dominance

In the sixth chapter, entitled "The Command of the Air", the author very accurately defines air dominance as being in a position to prevent the enemy from flying while maintaining its own ability to fly. Douhet argues that the ability to attack with aeroplanes is far more effective than any other form of offence hitherto known, and that a nation with air dominance can protect its territory from enemy air attacks, and even stop enemy land and naval operations, while destructively bombarding the entire territory of the enemy country, destroying the physical and moral resistance of the population. Moreover, the character of future wars will be completely different from the character of past wars, he said: "Today we are fully aware of the importance of dominating the seas, but soon dominating the air will be no less important."

Chapter Seven: The Devastating Gains of Air Power

In the seventh chapter, entitled "The Extreme Consequences of Air Power", the author argues that henceforth, in any war, seizing air dominance will mean victory, while defeat in the air will ultimately mean defeat and acceptance of any terms imposed by the enemy. Therefore, he argues, the main objective of war must be the seizure of air dominance. Any endeavour, any action or any resource that deviates from this basic objective will increase the likelihood of defeat against the enemy, as it will reduce the likelihood of seizing air dominance. In this context, he postulates that air supremacy requires depriving the enemy of all means of flight by destroying them in the air, in their bases of operations in the interior or in their production centres, in short, wherever these means can be found. This war of annihilation, he argues, can be waged only by air means, excluding army and navy weapons. Therefore, he emphasises that air dominance cannot be achieved without an adequate air force. He argues that in the future, air forces will be superior to both land and naval forces because air forces have a much larger operational radius than the other two forces. In this context, he suggests that the land and naval forces should be gradually reduced, whereas the air force should be increased to the point where it is capable of dominating the air, and for this purpose, the air force should be organised as an air force that is organically self-sufficient and independent from the land and naval forces in its operations.

Chapter Eight: Independent (Detached) Air Forces

In the eighth chapter, entitled "Independent Air Force and Auxiliary Aviation", the author argues that an adequate national defence cannot be achieved without an air force capable of seizing air supremacy in the event of war, or at least air superiority in a given area. Douhet argues that at present, aircraft are only meant to assist the operations of the land and naval forces and are therefore under the command of the army and navy, and that so far there is no air force capable of dominating the air anywhere in the world, but that this situation will change in the future. The author goes on to explain that the air elements attached to the land and naval forces cannot devote forces to air dominance, that they will not be able to show any presence in the face of an enemy air force whose main purpose is to obtain air dominance, and that, in the end, a nation without an independent air force will be doomed to defeat.

In this chapter and throughout the book, Douhet insists on using the term "Independent Air Force", as he argues that once this level is reached, Air Power is the only force capable of fighting in the air theatre of operations in which neither the army nor the navy can play any role.

The author also suggests that aircraft operating under the command of the army or navy are only auxiliary weapons in their own right, and that they could therefore be called "auxiliary aviation of the army and navy" or land-aviation, naval-aviation.

Conclusion

In 1921, Douhet published his Italian treatise Il dominio dell'aria (The Air Power), which made a great contribution to the development of military aviation, and became a world-renowned figure. With this work, a first in its field, Douhet conceptualised one of the most comprehensive military theories in the world, contributed greatly to the development of aviation and pioneered it. This valuable work, written a century ago, continues to be an important part of the air power theory debates today, as it was in the past.