Does Turkey Need Nuclear Weapons as an Alternative Solution for Armament and Maintenance of Military Power?

This is one of the most realistic reasons besides the other reasons mentioned in my previous articles. It is clear that nuclear weapons, which are claimed to be more cost-effective in providing deterrence and maintaining military power by a ratio of 1 to 5, would be an alternative element of power in reducing the risks that may be encountered in transition periods that require time for modernization and large-scale force structure changes. 

During the Cold War, having superior forces in numbers was considered as a force multiplier to meet the weaknesses that could not be eliminated in some areas in terms of military capabilities and qualifications. Today, as the amount of professional personnel increases, it has become preferable to operate with smaller but more effective elements in force structures. However, considering the experiences of developed countries in this regard, it is clear that a smaller military force does not necessarily mean less expenditure. The need for replacement and renewal of existing weapon systems within the life cycle of the TAF force structure, as well as annual operation and maintenance costs and increased personnel costs due to the transition to a professional army, increase the need for resources allocated to defense. Maintaining the effectiveness of existing forces while allocating resources for modernization for transformation is a challenging task for planners. 

Making major changes in force structure without acquiring new capabilities is highly risky from a security perspective. This paradox creates a delaying effect in making future decisions involving major changes. The deterrence provided by the possession of nuclear weapons can facilitate bolder decisions on force structure in response to changing needs and can be a safeguard to mitigate the risks involved. 

In addition to the resources required to acquire nuclear weapons, the sustainment costs of keeping such a force ready for use are prohibitively expensive. In addition to the cost of production, maintenance, training, and warning systems for air and ground delivery vehicles, the presence of this weapon would also increase the risk of exposure to the same type of threat, and therefore require investment in safeguards. With the exception of North Korea, space-based systems are used extensively by other countries for the command and control, guidance and target acquisition of these weapons. In addition, the number of these weapons is another factor affecting the cost. Depending on the power of the other side, the amount of nuclear weapons needed for a second strike capability to replace the facilities damaged in the first strike will also need to be calculated. 

One of the most important cost considerations is the impact of interceptors. A study conducted in the United States during the Cold War, which inspired the Star Wars project, attempted to calculate the cost of an Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) missile defense system against Soviet missiles and its impact on the other side. As a result of the study, it was calculated that for every $1 spent on the ABM system, the other side would need to spend $7 to penetrate this system and ensure mutual assurance of destruction (Malmgren, 2023). 

In other words, the side with missile defense systems will force the other side to spend more in order to provide deterrence with nuclear weapons. Countries with both launch and defense capabilities have a more deterrent power. For this reason, it would be useful to evaluate Turkey's advancement of its missile programs and air defense efforts in recent years, the sanctions it has been subjected to with the purchase of the S-400 Air / Missile Defense System, its exclusion from the F-35 program (The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act-CAATSA), and the problems it has experienced in the procurement and modernization of F-16s from this perspective.

It is imperative to build strategic and technical know-how on both the civilian and military sides to enable these assessments to be made soundly. There is a need for civilian and military personnel trained in the doctrine of the use of these weapons, the methods to be applied in deterrence, and the interpretation of the threat perception and intentions of the other side. In academic circles, knowledge and studies on this subject are insufficient. The Turkish Armed Forces is not familiar with this culture, as it has not planned for the use of nuclear weapons in its training, war games and exercise scenarios to date. 

Are Developments in Turkey's Defense Industry and Delivery Vehicles Sufficient for the Infrastructure to Possess Nuclear Weapons?

The momentum Turkey has gained in the defense industry in recent years and the systems it has developed have aroused interest both at home and abroad. In terms of the components of a nuclear weapon, the most striking ones are the systems that can be used as delivery vehicles. The most prominent options in this regard are airborne or ground-based delivery vehicles. Although some of the existing aircraft have this capability within the scope of NATO missions, Turkey is unlikely to use this capability for its national interests. In this regard, there will be a need for air vehicles to be developed with national capabilities. Launching ballistic missiles is the most widely used concept in the world. Although these missiles have a slightly higher probability of deviating from the target, this margin of dispersion is considered to be an acceptable error since it will affect large areas when nuclear warheads are used. 

Turkey first developed the Bora missile with a range of 80 km. with the technology it purchased from China, then increased the range of this missile to 280 km. and finally took its ballistic missile production capability to the next level with the Tayfun missile tested in the Black Sea in 2022. Press reports suggest that hypersonic missiles are also being worked on. In this context, there was also information in the press that the Cenk missile, which will reach a range of 1000 km, is being worked on. In addition, the production of air defense, cruise and anti-ship missiles, as well as the space program initiated in recent years, will open the door to the development of surface-to-surface models of these missiles. 

In particular, the test with the Typhoon missile has led to further questioning of Turkey's capabilities and intentions. With a range of over 500 km, the Tayfun missile draws attention in terms of FTKR rules. The indigenous development of the propulsion and guidance systems of these missiles creates a chance to escape the restrictions of these control regimes to some extent. Tactical ballistic missiles, which can carry nuclear warheads, are manufactured for use at ranges up to 1000 km. Higher ranges are considered strategic missiles. The fact that some political leaders have mentioned the goal of building missiles with a range of 2500 km in some of their statements causes Turkey's intentions to be questioned and the signs to be monitored more carefully. In a study (Dizboni, 2021) that examines the reasons for countries to have ballistic missiles or to develop this technology, it is stated that countries that assess that their armed forces are weak or vulnerable to a specific threat turn to this capability as an alternative to eliminate the vulnerability. Turkey's missile development efforts should be viewed in this light.