Does Turkey Need Nuclear Weapons for Its Security Needs?

Turkey's official policy on nuclear weapons has been to adhere to its commitment not to develop them for other than peaceful purposes. In 1980, Turkey ratified the NPT treaty, continued its activities as a member of the IAEA, and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, which is still under construction, is open to the inspections of this organization. Founded in 1956, the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) continues Turkey's work in the field of nuclear energy. 

Although Turkey has long stated its intention to work in the field of nuclear energy, the US and Western countries have been reluctant to provide support and have kept their distance. For many years, there has been no official declaration of intent to develop capabilities and weapons beyond energy. Since 2017, the President's remarks at some events have attracted the attention of domestic and foreign public opinion. In his statements, President Erdoğan criticized developed countries for banning others while they possess and continue to develop missiles with nuclear warheads. In addition, news reports and columns in the press, defense industry projects and arms trade with Pakistan, and statements made by some politicians in the past have raised concerns that Turkey has a hidden nuclear agenda (Ophir, 2021). 

The publicly disclosed national security policy documents and Turkish Armed Forces modernization plans do not include such a goal. However, the fact that fuel wastes will be stored domestically once the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is operational, the high number of personnel sent abroad for training within the scope of the project, the fact that nuclear literacy, which has been mostly at the theoretical level until now, will increase with the experiences to be gained from practice and its reflections on the defense industry should be expected to increase interest in the subject. 

In parallel with these, the developments in this field in the world in general and in neighboring countries, which were discussed in the previous section, and the geostrategic divergences that have deepened in recent years with the NATO alliance will be the factors that will affect the security parameters of the Republic of Turkey in its second century. Therefore, there will be a need to expand options against threats that create security risks. There is a difference between the use of nuclear energy and the possession of nuclear weapons. While every country has the right to possess nuclear energy, there are restrictive provisions in international treaties on the possession of nuclear weapons. 

Turkey has tried to ensure its security in the order that emerged after the Second World War by choosing to be a member of the NATO alliance. Security, like any other service, is a service that can be obtained as long as the price is paid. It is not possible to provide security without paying the price. However, it is possible to share this very expensive price by establishing alliances. During the Cold War, by becoming a member of NATO, Turkey benefited from the security umbrella created by the Atlantic alliance against the Soviet threat, provided weapons and equipment, and contributed to this partnership by maintaining a large army as a first line country and enabling the alliance to benefit from the opportunities of its geography. Moreover, by allowing the deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory, it has in a sense itself become the target of the nuclear threat posed by the other side. After the end of the Cold War, the US removed its nuclear weapons in some countries. There is no precise information on whether the US removed its nuclear weapons in Turkey. On the contrary, there is information that they are being renewed and continued to be stored. In addition to military factors such as proximity to the target, tactical situational superiority and priority of strike, it is also possible that the reason for keeping these weapons is to eliminate the need for Turkey to launch a nuclear program on its own. 

Considering the developments in recent years, Turkey's regional security needs do not overlap with those of NATO. This divergence has increased even more after the end of the Cold War. Therefore, Turkey has started to develop its own security systems. Unlike European NATO countries, Turkey found itself in a different security environment in the process that started after the 1990s. Located in the middle of the triangle of the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, threats to Turkey have changed shape and conflicts of interest with neighboring countries, especially terrorism, have become a threat to national objectives. Moreover, the military and political attitudes of some countries in the alliance towards Turkey are incompatible with the spirit of alliance. This situation has created a need for national armament beyond the alliance objectives. In particular, the incompatibility between the regional interests of the US, the major partner of the alliance, and Turkey's interests has led to this situation. 

NATO's obligations to its members in the face of a common threat have not changed, but it is not as easy as before to reach a consensus on the nature of the common threat. Especially in the period leading up to the Ukraine-Russia war, the rationales for determining the common threat were not very convincing. In the new security environment, hesitations arise about the automatic automatic operation of NATO obligations for the region where Turkey is located with the common will of all member states. This is because, in the absence of a direct threat to Turkey, it would not be easy for the other NATO countries to justify to their own public opinion that they should provide support to Turkey, which is exposed to these threats due to its geographical location. More importantly, the possibility of being threatened themselves due to this support may force countries to act reluctantly. In other words, one of the countries in the alliance (Turkey) has started to be considered as an indirect risk factor for others. 

As a member of the NATO alliance, Turkey is under a global security umbrella, but it does not have enough confidence in the security provided by the alliance for the threats it faces regionally. This was evident in the Gulf War and the fight against ISIS. Likewise, even if a threat to the US or European members is not of vital importance for Turkey, it may have to act together due to its membership in the alliance. After the 9/11 attacks, Turkey's approval of the implementation of NATO's Article 5 in Afghanistan is an example of this. For Turkey, this situation necessitates the creation of alternative policies for security. The practical reflection of this is the need to invest in national armament programs with its own resources. 

Security is not a concept that can only be achieved through military means. There must also be the political will to use military power when necessary. In this respect, while the security provided by NATO, which was established against a common threat, was sufficient during the Cold War, today Turkey is paying the price by spending more on security because it is not included in the political organization that controls this military power. 

The justification for Turkey's possession of nuclear weapons for security purposes is that there is a very strong enemy/enemies for its survival, in which case it would have to use this weapon as a last resort. Currently, none of the neighboring countries has the military power to threaten Turkey's survival, either alone or in combination, in the context of a regional conflict. A crisis with Russia would be a problem for NATO as well as Turkey. Therefore, having nuclear weapons for security needs against a superior power may not be a justifiable justification that can be accepted internationally. The scenarios that would require Turkey to use its military power are not suitable for the use of nuclear weapons. Since the mainlands of countries such as the United States, Russia and China are many kilometers away from each other, they are unlikely to be harmed by the effects of their own weapons. The option of using nuclear weapons in a conflict with one of Turkey's immediate neighbors is not an easy decision. The proximity of geography creates the risk of being harmed by the effects of this weapon ourselves. Therefore, there is not a very convincing reason for Turkey to want to have nuclear weapons for its security needs under current conditions. 

When conditions change, Turkey is in a position to experience security risks depending on the developments in its region. Developments in neighboring countries in this direction may bring up the need to acquire new capabilities. As a matter of fact, Turkey has registered some reservations while becoming a party to the relevant international treaties. Looking at the countries around us, Russia, Pakistan, India and Israel are all nuclear-armed states. It is not yet known how the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will end and Ukraine's intentions regarding nuclear armament at the end of the war. 

Iran has long been subjected to international sanctions for its work, and it is no secret that Saudi Arabia is trying to acquire such a weapon in light of developments in Iran. Indeed, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia has recently stated in the press that if Iran acquires a weapon, Saudi Arabia may also seek to acquire nuclear weapons. It has also been reported in the press that Saudi Arabia is considering a green light for nuclear energy technology, including enrichment, in exchange for establishing diplomatic relations with Israel.

Although Turkey did not want Iran to be explicitly included in threat documents for a long time on the grounds that it would encourage proliferation, the latest NATO Strategic Concept, adopted at the Madrid meeting, states that Iran is a country with nuclear and missile programs. If, as claimed, Iran eventually develops nuclear weapons, Turkey will have to take this into account. In the event that Iran is likely to use nuclear weapons due to problems with other countries, this could turn into a security problem that closely concerns Turkey. Since such a development would also affect the regional balance of power, Turkey would not be indifferent if a new arms race is launched by the countries in the region. 

The search for balance and protection will also make the Middle East vulnerable to the intervention of extra-regional countries and the risk of destabilization will create new security problems for Turkey. In sum, even if good relations are maintained, Iranian nuclear weapons have the capacity to create indirect risks for Turkey. In particular, the Caucasus is an area where Turkey and Iran will have difficulty in harmonizing their interests. It should not be forgotten that one of the reasons for Iran's intention to develop weapons is Israel. In addition to missiles and airplanes, there are also reports that Israel owns nuclear submarines and operates them in the Persian Gulf. 

Israel is one of the countries in the region that closely follows and questions the status of the US nuclear weapons in Turkey and Turkey's intentions regarding nuclear weapons. Taking into account Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, Turkey strives for the region to be free of nuclear weapons and expresses this from the most authoritative mouths. This is the most realistic approach for Turkey. Otherwise, it is obvious that Turkey, along with other countries in the region, cannot remain indifferent to these developments. 

In terms of security, the most vital problem Turkey will face will be related to a decision it will take on its own. In the event that Turkey leaves NATO or NATO disappears, Turkey's concerns will increase if some of its neighbors have nuclear security provided by another power. As in other cases around the world, nuclear armament would then become a more debatable capability to redress the resulting power imbalance.