Does Turkey Need Nuclear Weapons for Prestige and Respectability?

A country's nuclear power does not always have the expected effect when it is considered independently from conventional military, economic and social forces. Therefore, if the ability to intervene in regional crises with conventional forces is limited, the effectiveness of nuclear power in foreign policy is not at the expected level. Even if the prestige provided by nuclear weapons is valid in the eyes of third world countries, it will create different results in relations with the leading countries of the West. Add to this the negative propaganda of public opinion and anti-proliferation organizations, and it is possible to lose prestige. The international backlash Pakistan has faced is a case in point. However, although it would be difficult, Turkey's ability to produce such a weapon with its own means and without foreign aid could contribute to its prestige. 

The Community of Turkic States, which has gained momentum in recent years, has not yet reached the organizational level. Kazakhstan, one of the member states, is a country that had nuclear weapons on its territory during the Soviet Union. Together with Uzbekistan, it is one of the world's two nuclear fuel suppliers. If Turkey or any other member aims to acquire nuclear capability in order to bring power and prestige to this community, it will also have to withdraw from the NPT treaty. This would inevitably lead to the country's ostracization in the international system, and to political, economic and diplomatic pressure, restrictions and embargoes, and the risks of these developments must be taken into account. Iran's desire to acquire nuclear weapons can also be evaluated in this framework. Iran is working not only for the power that nuclear weapons would bring, but also for the psychological superiority and prestige it would bring (Kibaroğlu, 2013).

In this regard, an alternative that South Africa tried and then abandoned can also be taken into consideration. The country in question joined the NPT treaty by destroying nuclear weapons after producing them. Having the capability and know-how to produce nuclear weapons is not the same as having the capability to produce them and have them ready for use. Having the knowledge of production means that it can be produced when necessary, and can be a method that can be used for deterrence purposes. Today, countries that do not possess weapon systems are considered as potential threats as long as they have the production know-how and infrastructure. For example, countries such as Japan, Germany and Brazil do not possess nuclear weapons but are seen by their neighbors as countries that can quickly acquire them if necessary. In this regard, there is a gray area in the provisions of the treaty (Ülgen, 2013). 

The aforementioned countries, Japan in particular, are considered to be "nuclear weapon threshold states" (Ülgen, 2013). and are seen as countries that can easily make weapons. Depending on the developments in regional balances, if Turkey turns to the option of learning and developing nuclear technology in this gray area, even if it is not in accordance with international law, this will mean an important policy change. While having production information is considered a great advantage for countries in their search for a balance of power, it should not be forgotten that this situation is also a factor that feeds insecurity. Efforts to possess nuclear energy are more meaningful for a country if they also provide the opportunity to possess nuclear knowledge. Existing and prospective projects can create opportunities for Turkey in this field. 

After the US produced the first nuclear weapon and used it in Japan, proposals known as the Baruch plan were made in 1946 to restrict the production of these weapons. Soviet opposition to these proposals was due to mistrust (MccGwire, 1987). According to the plan, a commission would be established at the UN and the control and supervision of nuclear weapons would be entrusted to this commission. The Soviet side rejected this proposal, fearing that even if restrictions were imposed on weapons on a technology that they did not yet possess, the US could produce them in case of need and they would be vulnerable in this race. As can be seen, the availability of information can be as worrisome a source of threat as the weapons themselves. 

The restrictions imposed on Iran today stem from these concerns. It is not difficult to imagine that Turkey would be subjected to similar restrictions if it were to pursue such an option. To date, no other country in the NATO alliance, other than those known to be members, has had any intention to do so. In light of recent developments, Ukraine has openly expressed its desire to regain this capability. If this happens, Poland is likely to come forward with a similar demand. As a matter of fact, it has requested NATO to deploy nuclear weapons on its territory after recent developments. Therefore, it is clear that as long as Turkey remains a NATO member, its request in this direction will not be approved by others. However, there is no harm in practicing thought exercises against rapid changes in the security environment. 

Does Turkey Have the Desire to Expand Its Sphere of Influence and Possess Nuclear Weapons for Expansionist Ambitions?

As long as Turkey's democratic values and Atatürk's principle of peace at home and peace in the world are adopted as a guide in foreign policy, it is pointless to discuss such a justification. Turkey's active foreign policy in recent years and its efforts to expand its spheres of influence in the Caucasus, Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean are interpreted in some circles as a desire to realize the imperial dreams of the past. If this becomes a permanent state policy, having nuclear weapons will undoubtedly be seen as a source of prestige. However, such policies, which will vary with political preferences, will not be sustainable unless they are supported by economic and political power.

Do the Dynamics of Domestic Politics and Political Agenda in Turkey Support the Possession of Nuclear Weapons? 

In the formulation of security strategies, threat assessment and the preparation of military strategy, the working methods adopted predominantly by NATO countries are also used by Turkey, in addition to its own cultural values. Although the institutional structure is similar, the public and parliamentary debate on armament programs is not transparent enough. In the aftermath of previous events, most recently the attempted coup d'état on July 15, 2016, many measures have been implemented to increase the political authority's control and supervision over the armed forces. The control and supervision authority of the political leadership has been strengthened with the structure established. The authority of civilians to formulate and approve security strategies was greatly increased. Whether these measures have a negative impact on the military's ability to fight can only be tested in a conflict environment. Therefore, it is unlikely for Turkey to put the nuclear option on the agenda to compensate for a deficiency in this regard. 

On the other hand, it is considered that the current political authority has the political power to overcome the objections of the opposition circles in case of such an intention. However, such a decision, which could change many issues, would require consensus among military leaders and the opposition. Consensus among all actors on the development strategy to be pursued will have a positive impact on the secrecy and speed of development of the program. This unity will be easier to achieve if the magnitude and urgency of the threat is unquestioned. It is assessed that the current political structure has the will to take decisions without consensus when needed.