If Greece and/or Iran acquire nuclear weapons, should Turkey also focus on developing nuclear weapons?

Nuclear weapons are not only military means to be considered in terms of their effects. Despite some military advantages, all factors such as political problems, technical requirements and cost should be taken into account. In light of the above-mentioned factors, Turkey's need for nuclear weapons is evaluated as follows. 

The scope of the concept of security is very broad. From a military perspective, as a member of the alliance, there are assurances provided by NATO against a nuclear threat from the north. Even though joint decision-making processes have been carried out for this purpose, some nuclear weapons authorized for use by the United States are also located on Turkish soil. The option of resorting to nuclear weapons against neighboring countries with conflicting interests is not possible as long as Turkey remains a member of NATO, and such an intention would require leaving the alliance. On the other hand, the need for nuclear weapons will have to be re-evaluated depending on the situation that will emerge at the end of the Ukrainian-Russian and Palestinian wars, and the developments in Iran and other Middle Eastern countries. If developments not only in the Middle East but also in the Caucasus pose a security risk, Iran may accept the nuclear weapon option as a higher priority force element. In the coming period, if negotiations fail to reach a conclusion, a possible military operation against Iran's nuclear capacity by the United States or its allies will also create problems for Turkey. 

In this context, Israel's weapons will continue to be a potential risk for Turkey. Because their presence is a factor that triggers other countries' desire to arm themselves. Turkey, which has set a policy that its region should be free of nuclear weapons, should also question the existence of US-controlled nuclear weapons, which are not officially declared but are said to be located at the Incirlik base. Since other NATO countries that do not have nuclear weapons on their territory have the assurance provided by the United States against threats from Russia, it is not militarily necessary to have these weapons (Kibaroğlu, 2018). The view that Turkey possesses these weapons for political reasons is gaining weight. 

In terms of prestige and prestige, the benefits of having nuclear weapons are not always as high as expected. The use of such a weapon for the protection of political and economic interests is not an element of power that can be easily justified. The regime stability of nuclear weapon states is also considered a risk factor. It is inevitable that this capability, which may bring Turkey prestige in the eyes of some countries in foreign policy, will create problems in its relations with countries with which it has greater economic and political cooperation. Measures taken for non-proliferation and monitoring have increased considerably compared to the past. The economic interdependence of countries has strengthened the range and impact of measures. Therefore, it is very difficult for Turkey to bear these measures under the current economic conditions. 

Although it provides some advantages in terms of maintaining military power and armament, it should also be taken into account that the cost of acquiring such a capability, maintaining it and the protection measures that need to be developed against the threats of the other side will be very high. This is because the possession of nuclear weapons will change the threat perception of the other side and cause it to develop new capabilities. As a result, it is imperative to have various options against the risk of escalation of the arms race. In addition, the choice of the country from which technical assistance in weapons production can be obtained will also be binding in terms of which alliances to be in in foreign policy. Gaining an independent capability while maintaining NATO membership is only possible with the approval of the United States. This would require a serious threat that poses a danger to both Turkey and the United States, as in the cases of Israel and Pakistan. It is considered that such a situation would not be possible. 

In the light of these explanations, Turkey should determine a strategy if it wants to acquire nuclear weapons. First, the processes leading to the decision and then the development strategies have to be determined. Accordingly, the methods that Turkey can consider are evaluated as follows. 

First method 

Conduct some work in secret while maintaining NATO membership and not withdrawing from the NPT. Technical know-how packages can be developed with the help of other programs. Even the knowledge gained in this area could be used as a power factor. Such a strategy can only be a transitional strategy for active armaments, as it would require slow work over a very long period of time in order to remain secret. It must be taken into account that if the intentions are revealed, alliance membership will be questioned and sanctions will be imposed. 

Second method 

To carry out the work openly, to obtain the technical know-how package, but to declare that there will be no transition to an active armament strategy and that it will not acquire nuclear weapons. This can only be considered if the search for new alliances is on the agenda. Such an option could lead to sanctions, ranging from physical interference to embargoes, at the very beginning. It could also have a chain reaction effect on the policies of other countries in the region, such as Syria, Egypt and Iraq, which are known to have worked in the past, making the region more vulnerable to foreign intervention. 

The third method

When a major threat arises that changes the balance of power, it may be possible to carry out an explicitly accelerated armaments program with technical assistance from another country. 

An option would be to enter into an agreement with another country to provide arms as needed, but there is no precedent for such a trade. There have been allegations that Saudi Arabia once negotiated such a deal with Pakistan, and similarly Libyan leader Gaddafi tried to procure arms from China but was rejected. Most recently, Russia announced the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. This should not be seen as an exchange but as a treaty within the framework of the alliance. However, the tolerance shown to the development of weapons and delivery vehicles by some countries in the Pacific and the understanding of bending the provisions of the treaty will encourage other countries. 

Turkey should continue its long-standing policy of denuclearization in the region. For Turkey, the need for nuclear armament may only arise when security conditions in its region change or when new alliances outside NATO are sought. In this case, despite its drawbacks, the second option, having a technical know-how package but not pursuing an active weaponization strategy, may be the most reasonable option. 

Apart from the above-mentioned options, instead of developing weapons, acquiring nuclear-powered warships or submarines by utilizing nuclear technology would be an important capability that would contribute to Turkey's deterrent power. The acquisition of such a capability is more related to the country's financial power than international constraints. Discussions on this issue should be carried out with a visionary perspective. Apart from the five legal nuclear powers, India and Israel are also known to have nuclear-powered submarines. Under the AUKUS alliance between Australia, the US and the UK, Australia will have nuclear-powered submarines. While some countries interpret this initiative as a violation of the NPT treaty, others see it as exploiting a loophole in the treaty provisions. Although Australia has declared that it will not have nuclear weapons on its submarines, it is difficult to guarantee that other alliance members will not provide weapons to these platforms in case of a crisis. For this reason, it would not be wrong to assess that other countries may wish to have similar capabilities in the following processes. 

Military and academic circles should contribute to studies that will analyze the issue, develop strategies and accumulate knowledge, or at least raise awareness. More resources should be allocated to projects to develop air and missile defense systems. 

Nuclear weapons are a very difficult capability to decide on the use of, as they are a means of military power that cannot be won due to the destruction they will cause. The dangers posed by nuclear weapons are not only due to their destructive power. Misjudgments in the interpretation of the threat perception and intentions of the other side in the decision to use this weapon carry risks at least as dangerous as the weapon itself. The nature of the regimes, instability and decision-making methods of some countries in the region where Turkey is located may further increase the risk of misperceptions about its use. 

In recent years, the destructive power of conventional weapons combined with the dangers arising from cyber threats and artificial intelligence applications has increased significantly. Nuclear weapons, which have long been seen as a coercive negotiating factor in international relations, have been replaced by artificial intelligence and advances in chip technology. New and destructive technologies are changing the art of war and strategies. If wars move into space, the destruction of satellites may not have the same destructive effect on humanity as nuclear weapons, but it could set back the level of civilization we have reached. Countries that shy away from the use of nuclear weapons for fear of mutual destruction would be more likely to start a war if they believe that they have the capabilities to protect themselves while inflicting great damage on the other side with these new technologies. For this reason, it would be useful to prioritize work on these capabilities in the name of deterrence. 

In the worst-case scenario, major changes such as the disintegration of NATO, Turkey's exit from membership, or the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states in our neighborhood would require Turkey to reconsider its need to acquire nuclear weapons. In the absence of such drastic changes, the best option seems to be not to have nuclear weapons as per the treaties. However, this political preference should not be seen as an obstacle to the policy and strategy development work that should be carried out by other institutions and organizations, especially the military and academic circles, and the work that will ensure the accumulation of technical know-how in the defense industry.