Last-minute scenarios in Gaza
It can be argued that some far-right members of Netanyahu's cabinet want to reoccupy Gaza. However, it is known that they are willing to do so on condition that the area is first depopulated. This scenario was hinted at by some as a solution to Israel's security problem in Gaza.
What is the Latest Situation in Gaza?
If the leadership vacuum in Gaza cannot be filled by an Arab state or a Palestinian actor, then what awaits Gaza? In its recent statement on Gaza, the Netanyahu government mentioned several options. The first was a direct reoccupation. The second was to create a buffer zone. The third was to maintain Israeli security control for an indefinite period of time through deployment along the perimeter of Gaza. In fact, these three options were interrelated and did not offer independent solutions. The only thing they had in common was that they did not want to leave Gazans on their own, hoping to ensure the security of Israelis by restricting their freedom.
Under the current circumstances, it can be argued that some far-right members of Netanyahu's cabinet want to reoccupy Gaza. However, it is known that they are willing to do so on condition that the area is first depopulated. This scenario has been hinted at by some as a solution to Israel's security problem in Gaza. This solution, which would mean a mass exodus of Palestinians from Gaza, would be nothing more than a narrow view of Tel Aviv's power politics, far from having the support of the international community.
As the war continues, the search to rebuild the future in Gaza continues. I believe it is important to mention some of the interrelated scenarios in order to be able to read and follow possible developments.
Scenario 1: A Joint Force of Arab States Administering the Gaza Strip
One of the proposals for the "day after" in Gaza is for Arab countries to send a peacekeeping force to administer the strip. The reasoning goes that Arabs are all brothers and sisters, so Arab regimes should be prepared, if not willing, to take care of their relatives. At least this is the fabric of the Arab fabric, the apparent obligation, at least in the Western news media. But Arab regimes have signaled that they have no appetite for such a job. The Arabs themselves are already divided among themselves, with different regional interests and objectives. None of the Arab regimes are aware of how difficult it would be to govern the Palestinian people, who have been struggling with Israeli security forces and Tel Aviv for years, and who are trying to survive through armed resistance. No one wants a proxy government on behalf of Israel. Arabs are also reluctant to be part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in any way, to be a buffer between the Palestinians and Israel, to take the burden off Israel's shoulders.
Scenario 2: Abbas administration rules Gaza
One idea that is gaining more traction in Western countries, including the United States, is for the Palestinian Authority to replace Hamas in Gaza. It would be led by the former Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), now Fatah. In 2006, Hamas emerged victorious in the struggle between Hamas and Fatah and drove Fatah out of the Gaza Strip. Since then, the Mahmoud Abbas administration, which has been left with only the West Bank (in reality 18% of the West Bank), hoped that with foreign aid, Hamas would be driven out of Gaza and it would be given control of all Palestinian territory.
It is hard to imagine how the new order in a Gaza under Abbas would work. Nominally governing the Israeli-occupied West Bank, the PA hoped to be the head of a future Palestinian state, as envisioned in the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO. However, developments since then have made it unlikely that the Abbas administration will be able to lead the Palestinians as a whole and govern a future state. The PLO has long since lost credibility in the eyes of the Palestinian people. The Palestinians see the Abbas administration, the authority that supposedly has power, as ineffective, ruthlessly authoritarian, malicious, and even Fatah as a facilitator, if not an arm, of the Israeli occupation. It is therefore possible that the Palestinian Authority, which has no credibility even in the West Bank, may additionally try to govern in Gaza, but at the end of the day, it will not bring a new situation beyond the conditions of 2005 and will not be a solution to the current situation.
On the other hand, the PA leaders themselves have said that they are not interested in governing Gaza. The PA's mother ship, the PLO, is fragmented and struggling to keep up with the power competition with the more popular Hamas. If the PA can barely govern the West Bank, what role will it be able to play in a 'day after' scenario in Gaza, where the population will be even more hostile to it, especially if it takes over at Israel's behest? No one expects Abbas to do better in Gaza, or rather, to be able to do better in Gaza.
Some argue that the PA will only play a token role and that Gaza's bureaucracy, currently in survival mode, will be able to run state institutions to provide services to the population. However, it is not clear whether Abbas will take the plunge without a green light from what is left of Hamas. Even if Israel succeeds in destroying the Kassam Brigades, the military arm of Hamas (which seems unlikely given the developments), Hamas is not just the Kassam Brigades. In the eyes of the Palestinian people in Gaza, it is much more than a militant organization. Hamas has been the government of Gaza since 2006, has a presence in key institutions and civil society, and enjoys significant popular support. Palestinians now appreciate Hamas for defending their national rights against Israel, and they stand with Hamas despite all the suffering and tears. While Israel has been targeting civilians in the Israel-Hamas conflict that began after Hamas' October 7 attack, it would be wrong to deny the popular support that Hamas has gained by dealing a blow to Israel, despite the enormous price Gazans have paid in lives and property.
If Israel fails to destroy Hamas's military capabilities, including its tunnel network, rocket launching capability and high-level command structure, it may have to accept Hamas's continued control of Gaza, albeit behind the scenes. Given the mood in Israel, such a scenario seems like an inconceivable outcome for Israel, for madmen like Netanyahu. For the moment, Tel Aviv's expectations are secondary. Hamas is a hope for the Palestinians. Their future depends on Hamas' success. At the moment, there is no organization that can replace Hamas. Therefore, in the eyes of the Palestinians, there is no alternative to Hamas.
Scenario 3: Fatah leader Mohammed Dahlan rules the Gaza Strip
The American leadership continues its search, possibly against the Hamas leadership. Some are suggesting that Mohammed Dahlan, the Fatah commander formerly based in Gaza, now living in Abu Dhabi and supported by Israel and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the United States, could be the head of the leadership in Gaza. But since Dahlan lacks the local support of Gazans and Palestinians in general, any attempt to impose his leadership is dead in the water. It is interesting to note that Dahlan himself is reluctant to take over the leadership of Gaza, saying that he is not interested.
Scenario 4: Population dilution of Gaza, condemning the majority to live in Egypt
Expulsion of Palestinians is also kept on the table as an option. More precisely, the Netanyahu government continues to use it as a threat against the Palestinians.
On the other hand, the recent messages from the Biden administration that a move that would push the Palestinians into Egypt, or even a reoccupation of Gaza by Israel, would be unacceptable, may have given Israeli leaders pause, if only in public discourse, to talk about scenarios for a full occupation of Gaza. But it remains an open question whether the United States will actively support Israel if it pushes hundreds of thousands of desperate and panicked Gazans across the border. Egypt strongly opposes such an influx of refugees: The Egyptian leadership does not want to take care of millions of Palestinians on its territory, to be a partner in their struggle with Israel, in their infiltration operations into Israeli territory to return to Gaza. Egypt would rightly not take part in such a future scenario, which could lead to an Israeli-Egyptian conflict over the Palestinians. But it is not clear whether Egypt would prevent millions of Palestinians from entering its territory if such an expulsion were to take place. Imagine if Egyptian soldiers opened fire on Palestinians streaming to the Egyptian border. Thousands dead. After Israel, the Egyptian government would be damned in the eyes of the Palestinians and the Arab world.
As the Arab state neighboring Gaza, Egypt ruled Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula until the 1967 war. However, it lost these territories to Israel in that war. Egypt only regained the Sinai Peninsula in 1979 as a result of a peace agreement with Israel. However, it is known to have rejected all proposals to take back Gaza, for example, and to re-establish control over the Palestinian heartland. The Sisi regime is well aware that taking control of Gaza would pose a much greater challenge to conditions in Gaza than before 1967, as the Palestinians would see it as a successor occupier to Israel and actively resist Egypt's presence in the territory.
There is talk these days of a second mass exile of Gazans. Although a temporary ceasefire has been declared. However, it is unlikely that the Israeli army will leave the Palestinians in Gaza alone and end the war while Hamas is present, without a lasting peace. In this situation, the expulsion of the Palestinians from the Gaza Strip is kept on the agenda by Israel and its supporter the United States, even though it is not wanted. The "second nakba", a term referring to the forced displacement of Palestinians during the 1948 war that led to the creation of Israel, is not something that can be accepted.
The idea of the expulsion of Palestinians is being pushed by some Israeli leaders as a clear threat to the Palestinian people struggling to survive in Gaza. The Palestinians call it without a doubt a nakba or "catastrophe". This catastrophe will not only result in the displacement of Palestinians, but it will also lead to a huge wave of anger and hatred against Israel and to the continuation of endless conflicts. It will be impossible for any Arab state to control the Palestinians from Gaza, who will live in their homelands longing for their homeland and hating Israel. This option is being kept off the table by prudent Israeli leaders, since Israel will inevitably foot the bill for this exile.
Scenario 5: Continuation of the Humanitarian Tragedy in Gaza
Looking at the above scenarios, it seems that "the day after" for Gaza will become an increasingly dire scenario. As things stand, the most likely scenario is the establishment of a situation in which the United Nations and other humanitarian organizations provide basic needs such as fuel, food, water and medicine, and most Gazans are displaced but continue to live in the Gaza Strip, albeit under difficult conditions. In this scenario, after Israel takes control of all of Gaza, Israeli troops will continue to maintain a 'security' presence in Gaza, probably for a long time, arm in arm with whoever will govern Gaza. In this scenario, Tel Aviv would also be responsible for providing electricity and water to Gaza territory.
Scenario 6: Worst Case Scenario: Expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza, East Jerusalem and the West Bank
Some observers take the worst-case scenario (the expulsion of Palestinians from Gaza and the resumption of Israeli occupation) one step further. According to them, Israel will not only defeat Hamas and expel the Palestinians from Gaza, but will do the same in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. They claim that the Hamas offensive has given Tel Aviv this golden opportunity. There are also many desperate scriptwriters who believe that Israel must do this for its complete security. They are throwing their unbridled ideas around in abundance.
In this context, after Israel finishes off Hamas in Gaza, it could turn north to attack Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel could even go so far as to drag the US into a war with Iran as a result. Netanyahu has been trying for years to convince Washington of an American attack on Iran. But so far it has been a futile endeavor. The October 7 attack, however, has exploded Israel's sense of security. The tendency to look at everything from a security paradigm has strengthened in Tel Aviv. Those who see things differently are silent, unable to speak out. Even the Biden administration, which has avoided a war with Iran or a regional war, may find it impossible to leave its fierce ally exposed in the event of a regional life and death war for Israel. In bombing Israel's opponents, Netanyahu may see Biden as his closest ally.
If Israel chooses this path, or if Hezbollah and Iran decide to attack Israel out of fear of losing their credibility as an "axis of resistance", a full-scale war could further destabilize the region. Even if there are no winners and losers in this war, as Netanyahu insists, it could change the maps in the Middle East and trigger a redrawing of borders.
Scenario 7: Establishing a lasting peace in Gaza
Is there another way forward for Gaza in the context of 'the day after'? Yes, of course there is. And this is the most humane way, the way it should be.
The humanitarian pause in the fighting between Israel and Hamas for 4 days may be a hope for all of us, for the Palestinians and for Netanyahu, who may not believe it, but for himself and for Israel, that a new scenario can be put in place. Although Israel has announced that it will resume its attacks on Gaza after the humanitarian pause, I believe that this temporary ceasefire can be a ground for new hope. Although Israeli War Cabinet Member Benny Gantz said, "I want to reassure the families of all the hostages: We will not stop, we will resume efforts and 'military action' in Gaza to retrieve the hostages and restore deterrence," he knows the difficulty of mobilizing the Israeli Army again after the fighting has stopped. In the foreseeable future, Hamas will release all Israeli hostages. In return, in an atmosphere of détente, the 'day after' scenarios for Gaza could be more humanitarian.
Hamas could announce a permanent humanitarian pause in military operations against Israel. It could release Israeli prisoners over time, though not unconditionally. Under these conditions, Israel could lift its blockade on the delivery of aid to Gaza. Perhaps it could gradually release Palestinians held in Israeli prisons. Such humanitarian steps could pave the way for new negotiations and gradual progress towards a permanent ceasefire between the parties.
The biggest obstacle to this scenario is the Israeli government. Israel is already saying that it rejects a ceasefire. Tel Aviv is unlikely to accept a ceasefire before the hostages are largely released and before what could be portrayed as a military victory against Hamas. But at the same time, Israel's narrow calculations could change and its horizons could broaden if it is offered a political horizon for a way out of the Gaza impasse.
There is such a political horizon, but this scenario is unlikely to materialize unless the release of hostages and a humanitarian pause create space for further diplomacy. It seems that Israel would be reluctant to realize this scenario if its expectations were largely met. By making the absolute defeat of Hamas its top priority, Israel is losing sight of what it needs and values most.
Since October 7, Israel has lost its sense of security in its own territory. No one wants to live in an insecure environment. At this rate, it seems difficult for the Israeli army to keep the Israeli people safe in Israel. This psychological superiority has passed to Hamas and more generally to the Palestinians. As long as the enmity between the two communities continues, the Palestinians will one day carry out attacks bigger than October 7. No one should doubt this. As long as this kind of threat remains, Israel will not feel safe and some of the Israeli population may have to leave the Land of Israel. Tel Aviv would probably not want that. This sense of security cannot be established as long as there is no trust in the other side. The security dilemma cannot be overcome.
Therefore, the Netanyahu government can no longer continue with the illusion that it can establish security for the Israeli people by putting common sense aside and simply killing innocent Palestinians in Gaza one by one with a hammer. This is a futile military action that will only feed terrorism, will not bring peace to Israel, will only increase Palestinian discontent and anger, and will not serve anything, not even Israel's security. Of course, Netanyahu, who has already been blinded by yesterday, is far from being able to think so rationally, and he is busy attacking left and right like a chicken with its head cut off. I hope that the second day of the 'humanitarian pause' will serve as a starting point for Israel to start realizing common sense options for Gaza in the 'day after' scenarios.
Conclusion
I believe that a 'day after' in Gaza is only possible if a sense of security is restored in Israel.
Gaza territory needs to normalize as much as Israel does. A sense of security needs to be restored there too. A Palestinian child, as much as an Israeli child, needs to go to school safely, to play with his friends, to eat peacefully at home at night, to sleep in a comfortable bed. All these are human things. It is a necessity of being human. The Palestinian Arab is as much a chosen person as the Jew. Being human requires this feeling.
One could say that Israel's overwhelming use of force against the Palestinians has created an illusion of peace and security in Tel Aviv. But events show that this is not true at all. It is not possible for Israel to build security with these harsh policies of force, state violence and even state terror. The best way to achieve greater security on a lasting basis is to put the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the center. Israel needs to take steps to build peace in a broader perspective, through normalization agreements or some other mechanism. Tel Aviv must move towards reconciliation in one form or another. For a lasting peace, the Netanyahu government must recognize that Palestinians are human beings too.
This requires Israel to make major concessions on the settlements in the West Bank and the establishment of a Palestinian state. In fact, these are not concessions, but a necessary step for coexistence in the same geography. Perhaps Netanyahu's government, or any like-minded successor, is unlikely to accept this peace-building scenario. But a change of heart is needed for lasting peace. With a change of heart, Israeli leaders can take sincere steps towards a lasting solution. Before that, with their petrified hearts, it seems unlikely that they will be able to bring peace and tranquility to either the Israeli people or the Palestinians.
Despite everything, I remain hopeful for a lasting peace.
References
Joost Hiltermann, “No Exit From Gaza”, Foreign Affairs, November 22, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/no-exit-gaza-hiltermann
Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Hamas’s Asymmetric Advantage”, Foreign Affairs, November 22, 2023. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/israel/hamas-asymmetric-advantage-gaza-cronin