The Open Seas Doctrine and the Blue Homeland

Firstly, discussions regarding Turkey’s maritime zones are assessed within the framework of the concepts of territorial waters, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (United Nations, 1982). Within this context, the Blue Homeland approach is also considered as one of the perspectives on Turkey’s maritime security and maritime geopolitics (Simonyan, 2023).

There is also a concept known as “Gunboat Diplomacy”. This refers to exerting pressure on another country by utilising the navy and naval forces. It is an argument we did not utilise until 1974, as we had not fully grasped the importance of our seas. It is also an option we subsequently neglected, as we failed to develop a maritime culture. It would also be no bad thing if we were to recognise the importance of concepts such as our territorial waters, inland waters, continental shelf, and “Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)”, and, in particular, if we were to train experts in international maritime law. We truly need to address these matters in order to protect our rights in all inland and coastal waters (i.e. the ‘Blue Homeland’) situated between 25° and 45° east longitude and 33° and 43° north latitude.

In an article I wrote in 2019, I was the first to mention the signing of an EEZ agreement with Libya. Subsequently, I stated on one or two occasions that Libya alone was not enough; we must also conclude EEZ agreements with Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. This is because the issue of delimiting maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean has become particularly prominent following the Turkey–Libya Memorandum of Understanding on the Delimitation of Maritime Jurisdiction Areas. Disagreements regarding the interpretation of international law persist amongst regional actors (Gözügüzelli, 2019). Whilst we were complacent, since 2019 Israel, Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration have taken advantage of the vacuum and acted in a planned manner, concluding EEZ agreements with the countries in question. Their aim is to encroach upon our economic zone, claiming 150,000 km² in the Mediterranean and 50,000 km² in the Aegean Sea.

For this reason, it is essential for Turkey to establish a resolute stance that safeguards its geopolitical, political, maritime, land and air economic interests, based on its sovereignty over its maritime zones. Of course, it is not limited to these issues alone. There are other problems we must resolve: the 153 islets, islands and rocks in the Aegean whose ownership is unclear (we must ensure the status of these locations is clarified by submitting a note to the UN Security Council prior to deploying troops there), the FIR line, the extension of Greek territorial waters from 6 miles to 12 miles (we had already declared this a ‘casus belli’; we must now discuss reducing it back to 3 miles), and the status of the islands that, according to the Treaty of Lausanne, should be demilitarised (we must raise the argument that, due to a change in status, a transfer of sovereignty must take place). Meanwhile, due to the Bern Agreement dated 11 November 1976, drilling activities are prohibited in the Aegean. Once the status of the 153 islands, islets and rocks in the Aegean has been clarified, the two countries can come together and commence reciprocal drilling operations.

Greece is not an island state in the Mediterranean either. It is not even a peninsula. It is a country with a coastline, just like us. Therefore, it is illogical for Greece to attempt to classify the islands in the Aegean and the Mediterranean (such as Kasos, Rhodes and Crete) as an “Archipelagic State” and to define its continental shelf accordingly. On all these issues, we must insist on the rules of international law. Proof that Greece fears international law in matters where we are in the right is its notification to the UN in 2015 that it does not recognise the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Furthermore, as Turkey, we did not grant Greece any continental shelf rights beyond its territorial waters in the coordinates we declared to the UN in 2019. This is because the region lying between 26 and 28 degrees east longitude is indispensable for the ‘Blue Homeland’. Indeed, the drilling operations we intend to carry out in the future west of 28 degrees east longitude are of great importance in terms of the registration and demarcation of maritime zones. In this way, we will not only refute Greece’s ‘island state’ thesis but also demonstrate our firmest stance regarding our non-recognition of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreement concluded between Greece and Egypt in 2020. Furthermore, a unilateral declaration of an EEZ in the Eastern Mediterranean in line with our positions, and the signing of an EEZ agreement with Egypt, will significantly strengthen our geopolitical position. Indeed, Egypt did not include the area west of 28 degrees east longitude in the EEZ agreement it concluded with Greece. In fact, Egypt has even lost an area of 10,000 km to its own detriment. A new EEZ agreement between Egypt and Turkey would also contain advantages for Egypt itself. Furthermore, Turkey must learn to assert its dominance over the seas. It must safeguard and protect all its interests in the Aegean and the Mediterranean, based on international maritime law. The world is entering a new mercantilist era. New centres of power are emerging within the context of the Pacific-Atlantic rivalry. Establishing our sovereignty over the seas and initiating our defence from the ‘Blue Homeland’ will render Anatolia impregnable.

On the other hand, we must work towards establishing new bases and collaborations in line with maritime geopolitics in the Mediterranean and Africa (Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria and the TRNC). We must restrict the manoeuvring space of the Israel-Cyprus-Greece triad. In this way, by ensuring the security of oil, fertiliser and LNG shipments from the Gulf states via the Basra-Hormuz and Red Sea routes, and the continuity of the supply chain, we can secure a dominant position. To thwart projects such as EastMed—which aim to transport Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe via Greece, bypassing Turkey—we must ensure that gas is transported to Europe via the TRNC through the Mersin–Ankara–Istanbul–Thrace route (utilising existing infrastructure where possible). The Ceyhan oil terminal could easily be converted into a natural gas terminal, as could Anamur.

Within the framework of marine spatial planning studies and the ‘Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission’, analyses must be carried out regarding data on hydrocarbon reserves, minerals and other underground resources, as well as energy transport routes; We must work to complete the mapping of the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, determine the potential for wind and solar energy in our seas, and assess the current state of fisheries and other aquatic product activities within the scope of the blue economy, alongside maritime trade, port operations and combined transport activities.

We must also work on how to promote maritime development (such as increasing the number of marine engineering departments, manufacturing ship engines, commissioning new shipyards, opening at least 50 maritime vocational secondary schools, and increasing the number of two-year maritime vocational colleges to 20, etc.). Most importantly, we must abandon projects such as the ‘Istanbul Canal’ that would undermine the Montreux Convention. By raising awareness amongst all our citizens on these issues, we must demonstrate to both friend and foe that no power can confine Turkey to the gulfs of Iskenderun and Antalya. In particular, we must vehemently oppose the policies of encircling Turkey through the establishment of new bases—in the Aegean Sea in collaboration with the US and Greece, and in the Eastern Mediterranean in collaboration with the Republic of Cyprus and Israel. We must also prevent the militarisation of the islands in the Aegean Sea, which contravenes the Treaty of Lausanne, using the various legal, military and diplomatic methods I have mentioned.

Finally, and most importantly, we require a strong navy not only for the surrounding seas but also for any joint activities and deterrence efforts with friendly nations in our immediate vicinity or in distant regions. In addition to projects specific to the naval forces, such as Milgem and Genesis (combat management system), we must also work on new missile systems capable of being launched from sea towards land and air targets. We must develop frigates, nuclear submarines, air-powered diesel submarines (Type-214TN –Reis) submarines and corvettes, anti-surface warfare (ASUW) helicopters, USVs equipped with short-range air defence missiles, the STM-MPAC multi-purpose fast attack craft, and multi-purpose LHD-class amphibious assault ships. We must work on national and domestically produced systems that will make the most efficient use of these assets, including support vessels, maritime defence systems integrated with air and land defence systems, and UAV, drone and armed UAV technologies. We must develop a ‘sea denial’ perspective – that is, ‘anti-access’ and ‘area denial’ – against those hostile to us within our Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelf areas. We must be in a position to implement a strategy covering both the high seas and coastal waters simultaneously in all four seas bordering our shores.

References

Gözügüzelli, E. (2019). An analysis: Maritime boundary delimitation between Turkey and Libya.

Simonyan, A. (2023). The origin and development of the Mavi Vatan doctrine in Turkey: A brief overview.

United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.