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What are the Effects of Nuclear Weapons on Changing Threat Perception?

With the invention of the nuclear weapon, mankind for the first time in history had the capacity for the total annihilation of species. This brought the cost and frightening nature of war to a crucial point.

Developments have shown that no invention in the history of warfare has caused as much fear and anxiety as nuclear weapons. Soldiers are the most exposed to the psychology of warfare and the effects of conflict. However, as they move away from the front line, people's perception of the destructiveness of war weakens. However, nuclear weapons have changed this perception, causing fear and survival concerns not only among soldiers but also among all segments of society. Whereas in the classical understanding, the source and degree of threats are based on the capabilities of the other side in proportion to its existing military power, the threat posed by nuclear weapons implies a disproportionate power. When it was first made ready for use, such a weapon had to be tested in some way to show its effects and to make policy based on the fear it would create, and the Japanese were the victims of this test. 

It should not be forgotten that this weapon was used against an enemy that did not have such a capability. Despite the opposition of some scientists involved in the development of the weapon, it was necessary for the United States to demonstrate this power. Otherwise, it was considered that it would not be possible to create nuclear awareness in the public and to conduct policy based on the fears that would arise. As expected, the world became acquainted with this terrifying weapon. The most fundamental reason for its impact is the fear arising from its unknownness. Until that day, human psychology had never in history been confronted with such a great sense of fear that could affect everyone in such a way. Buzan states that with the invention of the nuclear weapon, mankind for the first time in history had the capacity for the total annihilation of species, which brought the cost and frightening nature of war to a crucial point (Buzan, 2013). 

Some scientists have also argued that this development could unite the world by stopping wars. There has even been an attempt to prepare a constitution for a world state to be governed under the umbrella of the UN, of which all countries would be members like a federal state. However, this idea was considered too utopian and abandoned, as it would be difficult to move other states in a desired direction without a threat to the order in the envisioned federal world state system. The climate of fear created by ideological polarization and the division in the existing world order has always been seen as a convenient tool for states claiming world domination. 

At the end of wars, the victorious side has the psychological advantage of having its demands accepted. However, it is a rare event in the history of warfare for a war to end with uncertainty and a sense of fear for the victors, as was the case in the Second World War. The bombs dropped on Japan created this fear in the victors as well. The threat perception created through this fear played an important role in shaping the international order established after the Second World War and in the formation of military pacts.

Nuclear weapons are a revolution in military strategy. However, its consequences do not guarantee security for those who want to use it to defend themselves. Therefore, the main purpose of possessing nuclear weapons has been to keep the threat of using them to deter the other side for political goals and interests rather than actually using them. Throughout the Cold War, both sides made policy by keeping the fear of using these weapons alive. The so-called Mutual Assurance Destruction (MAD) strategy evokes this fear. This is the essence of deterrence theory, which is based on the idea that having the capability to use such weapons against an enemy will prevent the enemy from using the same weapons. The existence of these weapons has prevented the superpowers from facing each other in direct confrontation, but it has not prevented the outbreak of many wars. 

During the Cold War, only Russia, a member of the Warsaw Pact, possessed these weapons, and although France and the UK also possess them in NATO, the US has been the decisive power in their use. Both states have used the threat posed by this power to keep the members of the alliance together and to make policies unified. Thus, countries voluntarily gave up their sovereignty in exchange for security. Obtaining information on the quantity, location and means of delivery of these weapons required strategic intelligence capabilities. Since other states did not have this capability, they created a threat perception based on the information they were given and did not have the chance to question the real situation. Even though efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons have continued, the countries that possess this power have not given up on it and have continued their development efforts, while new countries have joined this group. 

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the fear of nuclear danger became less present in the consciousness of the masses in the unipolar world as ideological hostilities ended. The Ukraine-Russia war revived this danger and the nuclear threat reached its highest level in history after the Cuban crisis. The breakdown of strategic-level talks between the two sides also increases the risk of misinterpreting each other's intentions. Russia has suggested that it could use these weapons in the event of an existential threat to its homeland, while the US has felt the need to limit its aid to Ukraine in order not to fuel these concerns. 

On the other hand, the deployment of new weapons in various parts of Europe is adding to Russia's concerns and causing insecurity. Recent events have once again shown that the threat factor is still a useful tool for deterrence when backed by certain capabilities. During the Cold War, Turkey lived with the perception that it would not be able to counter such a large nuclear and conventional threat on its own and developed policies accordingly. On the one hand, it relied on the security umbrella provided by NATO against this threat, and on the other hand, it allowed the US to have nuclear weapons on its soil, thus increasing the threat to itself. 

 

Note: The author wrote this article together with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ersoy ÖNDER.

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Araştırmacı Yazar Nazım ALTINTAŞ
Research Author Nazım ALTINTAŞ
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  • 01.02.2024
  • Time : 5 min
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