What are the Initiatives to Prevent the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the World?
Treaties prohibiting the production and use of chemical and biological weapons have been accepted by all signatories, while the rights of the five nuclear weapons states (the US, the UK, France, Russia and China) are reserved.
Various initiatives have been launched to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons outside existing countries. In 1963, a limited treaty banning underground tests was signed, and in 1968, the more comprehensive "Non Proliferation Treaty-NPT" was opened for signature (Nuclear Arms Control, 1985).
Some countries, such as France, refused to sign the treaty for a long time, and the treaty, which was signed in 1970, finally entered into force indefinitely in 1995 after 25 years. Turkey signed the treaty on March 5, 1970 and the Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified and enacted it on April 17, 1980 (TAEK, 2000).
Turkey signed a full-fledged Supervision Agreement with the IAEA in 1982. After attending the meetings as an observer for a long time, Turkey became a full member at the Conference on Disarmament held in Geneva in 1997. Eventually, Turkey joined non-proliferation initiatives such as the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2000 and signed and ratified the Treaty on the Comprehensive Prohibition of Nuclear Testing, known as the CTBT, in 2001. In 2001, Turkey also signed and ratified the Additional Protocol, which greatly enhanced the IAEA's inspection and verification capacity (Kibaroğlu, 2012).
It is also known that Turkey signed the 123 Treaty with the United States in 2008, which prohibits testing in the surface sea and space. The main thrust of Turkish foreign and security policy has been to become a state party to international nuclear arms control and disarmament treaties (Kibaroğlu, 2005).
Some important provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are as follows.
1. Nuclear-weapon states shall not assist non-nuclear-weapon states in building nuclear weapons.
2. Countries that do not possess nuclear weapons shall not develop, produce or supply these weapons.
3. Nuclear materials used for various purposes in non-nuclear-weapon states shall be open to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
4. The export of nuclear materials and equipment shall be subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
5. The Parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
6. Countries possessing nuclear weapons shall work to reduce and destroy them.
7. Nuclear weapon-free zones shall be established.
8. Implementation will be reviewed every five years.
9. Countries can withdraw from the treaty 90 days after announcing their decision to withdraw.
This treaty is different from the treaty banning chemical and biological weapons. While treaties banning the production and use of chemical and biological weapons are accepted by all signatories, the rights of the five nuclear weapons states are reserved. Likewise, the IAEA's inspections do not apply to the five countries with the legal right (the US, the UK, France, Russia and China), while nuclear materials in all other countries can be inspected. This reflects the desire of these five countries to hold these weapons as an element of military and political power and not to share this privilege with other states.
Although the Treaty on the Prohibition of All Nuclear Testing, whether for peaceful or military purposes, was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1996, it has not yet been ratified and entered into force. Its entry into force requires ratification by 44 countries with nuclear reactors or research laboratories. Apart from N. Korea, Pakistan and India, which have never signed the Treaty, there are five other countries that have signed but not ratified it. These are the United States, China, Israel, Egypt and Iran. In response to the US position, Russia announced its withdrawal from the treaty in November 2023. It is noteworthy that Egypt is among the countries that have not ratified. In light of recent developments, it would not be misleading to expect that the tests will continue. This situation points to the existence of a more risky and dangerous process for the world.
Note: The author wrote this article together with Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ersoy ÖNDER.
Bibliography
Alım, E., Füze Teknolojisi Kontrol Rejimi: ABD Merkezli Hegemonik Bir Yapıdan Normatif Bir Yapıya Geçişin Önemi. Güv. Str. Derg. 2020, 16(36): 821-872. DOI:
Brown, Cameron S., Leonard Davis, Christopher J. Fariss ve R. Blake McMaho: Recouping after Coup-Proofing: Compromised Military Effectiveness and Strategic Substitution, International Intersections, Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations. Volume 42, 2016- Issue 1
Buzan, B. Barış, güç ve güvenlik, Uluslararası ilişkilerde anahtar metinler, 2013 s.165 U/A İlişki ler Kütüphanesi, Özener matbaacılık, Cambridge University Press yayınından hazırlayan Esra Diri.
Dizboni, A. Karim E. El-Baz, Towards Building a Missile Proliferation Theory: The Moment of Ballistic Consciousness and the Tactical Rationale.Journal of Defense Management, Vol.11 Iss.6 No:1000 p.421. 05 KASIM 2021. https://www.longdom.org/abstract/towards-building-a-missile-proliferation-theory-the-moment-of-ballisticconscious ness-and-the-tactical-rationale-87125.html
Garwin, R. L. The Future of Nuclear Weapons Without Nuclear Testing, Arms Control Today November/December 1997, Vol. 27, No. 8
Hartley, K., The Economics of Defense Policy, Brassey’s UK, 1991, syf:43.
Holloway, D., Stalin and the Bomb, Yale University Press, CT. ABD. 1994.
Karen, D. W., Facing the Missile Challenge, Rand Corperation. S.11 http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/mtcr/index.html Erişim 05/07/2023,
Kibaroğlu, M., Ortadoğu’da nükleer silahların yayılması ve Türkiye’nin olası yanıtları, EDAM tartışma kâğıdı, 27 Aralık 2012
Kibaroğlu, M., Isn’t it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey? European Security (2005), Vol.14, No.4, 443-457.
Kibaroğlu, M., İran’ın Nükleer Programı ve Türkiye. Bilge Strateji. (2013). 5 (9) , 1-8 . Retrieved from https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/bs/issue/3801/50981
Kibaroğlu, M., Türkiye’deki Amerikan nükleer silahları gitmeli mi kalmalı mı? Bilge Strateji, Cilt 10, Sayı 19, Güz 2018, ss.1-9
Kissinger, H., Dünden bugüne yeni Çin. Kaknüs yayınları, İstanbul, 2015.
Lieber, K.A. ve Press, Daryl G. The return of nuclear escalation, How America’s Adversaries Have Hijacked Its Old Deterrence Strategy, Foreign Affairs, 24 October 2023
Lieber, K.A. ve Press, Daryl G. The new era of nuclear weapons. SSQ Strategic Studies Quarterly, 2013 Vol.7 No:1,
Lieber, K.A. ve Press, Daryl G. The new era of nuclear weapons. Strategic studies quarterly, USStratcom 2016.
Malmgren, H., Malmgren, P., Gaza will change the future of War, UnHerd, 18 October 2023. https://unherd.com/2023/10/gaza-will-change-the-future-of-war/ Erişim Tarihi: 25 Ekim 2023
MccGwire, M. The Genesis of Soviet Threat Perception, Brookings Institute, July 1987
Müller, H., Neither Hype Nor Complacency: WMD Proliferation After The Cold War. The Nonproliferation Review/Winter, 1997. s.62-71, DOI: 10.1080/10736709708436667
Narang, V. Strategies for Nuclear proliferation, How States Pursue a Bomb. International Security, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Winter 2016/17), p. 129
Nuclear Arms Control, Background and Issues, National Academy Press, Washington DC 1985, s.224 https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/11/nuclear-arms-control-background-and-issues
Ophir, A., Turkey’s nuclear future, Turkeyscope.15 December 2021. https://dayan.org/content/turkeys-nuclear-future Erişim Tarihi: 11 Kasım 2023.
Önder, E., İran’ın Nükleer Programının Analizi ve Türkiye, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, İstanbul. 2013.
Önder, E., Başkanların Doktrinleri Çerçevesinde ABD’nin Yeni Güvenlik Anlayışı ve Soğuk Barış.
Stratejik ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi (2020) 4 (1), 27-39. DOI: 10.30692/sisad.660225
Sagan, S. D. Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? International Security, MIT Press, Winter 1996-1997, Vol.21, No. 3, pp. 54-86
Saunders, E. N. The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices: A Review Essay, International Security (2019) 44 pp 146–184. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_0036110.17752/guvenlikstrtj.847719
Taylor, J. Deterring Russian Nuclear Threats with Low-Yield Nukes May Encourage Limited
Nuclear War, MCU Journal, Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 2022.
TAEK, Türkiye Atom Enerjisi Kurumu Bülteni, sayı:43, Şubat 2000.
Ülgen, S. Türkiye’nin nükleer silahlanmaya bakışı, Bilge Strateji, Cilt 5, Sayı 9, Güz 2013, ss.9-13
Way, C. ve Weeks J.L.P., Making It Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, No. 3 (July 2014), pp. 705-719
