What is the Impact of a Country's Regime and Form of Government on Nuclear Weaponization?

The Impact of Domestic Policy Dynamics

As I have stated in my previous articles on nuclear issues, the desire to become a nuclear power is mainly considered in terms of security and foreign policy needs. In order to make this choice, some work needs to be done in domestic policy decision-making processes. Undoubtedly, the personality and management style of the leader in these processes are also effective. Those working in the civilian and military security bureaucracy and those consulted on technical issues play an important role in decisions regarding nuclear weapons. The functioning of institutional structures that analyze the security environment and threats in domestic politics and determine their priorities varies across countries. How the functioning of domestic politics and the institutional structures of states affect nuclear armament preferences has been the subject of research in academic circles. Excerpts from a study published on the subject are summarized below (Saunders, 2019). 

"It is important to consider whether discussions on armament options and decision-making are shaped from the top down or from the bottom up. Since political power and leaders want to keep policies on this issue under their centralized control, bottom-up requests and opinions do not have much influence on the decision; if this control is loosened, discussions can be held in wider circles. Leaders want more control over the nuclear option, so the debate is usually conducted in very narrow circles."

The magnitude and uncertainty of the threat perception is the most important factor in the discussion of the nuclear option in domestic politics. The greater the uncertainty about the source of threats and the intentions of the other side, the more room there is to discuss the option of developing nuclear weapons, among other options. If there is a common understanding of the source and nature of the threats, there is little room for such discussions. 

Some in the institutional structure may overestimate threats. The perception of a rising threat can be used both to support political actors and as a justification for increased defense spending. 

In countries where civilians have control and oversight mechanisms over the military, civilians are the decisive authority in the development of nuclear policy. Therefore, the structure of civil-military relations is important. Leaders concerned about regime security may restrict the role of actors other than their inner circle in nuclear policy-making. 

Countries that have adapted to the workings of the international economic and political order are wary of nuclear weapons ownership because they fear that possible backlash could disrupt domestic peace and economic stability. 

Weapons development programs can also serve ulterior motives. In domestic politics, over time, this capability can become a tool that some leaders can use to strengthen their position and build admiration among their support base. It should not be overlooked that the decision to launch a weapons program may be more easily taken if the political leadership is persuaded or encouraged by a group of influential scientists, representatives of the bureaucracy and the military."

Do Regimes and Forms of Government Affect Nuclear Weaponization?

There have also been arguments that the form of governance of countries has an impact on the desire to possess nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction (Way, C. and Weeks, J. L. 2014). According to these views, in democratic governments, since society is more open and governance is transparent, armament preferences will be a matter of debate and nuclear weapons will be more distant. On the other hand, in regimes where personal leadership is predominant, leaders are more likely to see nuclear armament as an attractive option for the security of the regime, and in fact, if they want to do so, they will not have an environment that will resist them in domestic politics. On the other hand, there are those who argue that regime differences have no effect because the factors for armament are similar in every country, regardless of regime. It is also argued that in some democracies, nationalist movements may use nuclear proliferation as a tool to stay in power by developing popular discourses based on symbols of power. It is also noted that in any regime, the military, scientists and business interests with the power to influence decision-makers can play critical roles and encourage political leadership. 

The negative security implications of measures taken to protect the regime against coups and nuclear armament as an alternative option to address the vulnerability 

In some countries, military coups themselves are a security problem for the regime. It is stated that in order to prevent coups and uprisings, especially in regimes based on personal leadership, these leaders resort to some measures to limit and control the fighting power of the armed forces and to disband the forces so that military leaders do not become too powerful (Brown et al. 2016). Some of these measures include keeping the institutions of the army under control, limiting communication between forces and units, and organizing promotions on the basis of loyalty instead of merit. While these measures help to ensure the leader's security, they increase the vulnerability of a reduced military power to external threats. It is argued that leaders who do not want to take this risk may want to retain nuclear weapons as a last option and may be more eager to acquire them. 

On the other hand, who will be in control of nuclear weapons after they are acquired is also important for the security of the regime. Because when those who have the authority to use these weapons feel too powerful, they will be a new source of danger for the regime. Therefore, the authority to control the weapons is given to a group trusted by the leader to ensure centralized control. This view is supported by the news that the rebels seized the nuclear weapons base and weapons in the Wagner group's action, which was an uprising against the government in Russia in June 2023. 

External threats and the assurance provided by alliances are also important factors in decision-making. According to Narang, if a country is exposed to a clear nuclear threat and is not under the protection of a superpower, the constraining effects of other factors such as domestic politics and civil-military relations disappear and the decision to arm becomes easier. Similarly, if a country that is considered an enemy has the protection guarantee of another nuclear power even though it does not possess nuclear weapons itself, this will increase the threat perception of the target country and is considered a justification for armament. As an example, it would not be wrong to say that the assurance provided by the US to South Korea, which does not possess nuclear weapons, is a development that encourages the nuclear option for North Korea.