Why Do States Want to Possess Nuclear Weapons?

Despite all the above-mentioned limitations and international reactions, the desire of countries to possess nuclear weapons has not ended. In fact, it is even stated that a "second nuclear age" has entered after the Cold War. It is stated that most of the existing research focuses more on why countries want this weapon, while the dimension of how this decision is made is left incomplete (Narang, 2016). For this reason, the reasons that led countries to the nuclear option will be discussed first. According to Müller, the factors shaping countries' desires on this issue are categorized into four groups (Müller, 1997).

For Security

Countries are willing to develop nuclear weapons when they believe that their security is in grave danger and that they have no other alternative. India against China, Pakistan against India, Israel against the Arab world, Iran against Israel, and so on, countries see nuclear weapons as the last means of ensuring their security. Iran's motivation lies in its desire to acquire nuclear weapons not only to strengthen its hand against Israel, but also to become the leading country in the Middle East and to resist the United States. What is striking in these examples is that the possession of nuclear weapons by one party encourages the other. Weapon ownership creates a kind of chain reaction for the countries in the region. 

For example, after the Korean War, China developed this weapon against the threat posed by the United States, and the problems in its relations with China led India to acquire nuclear weapons, and the threat emanating from there led Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons. The developments following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and India's close relations with the Soviet Union despite its neutrality also support the view that the US turned a blind eye to Pakistan's efforts. The only country that does not fit these examples is Israel. It has no neighbors or enemies that would threaten it with nuclear weapons. Israel's strategy of using nuclear weapons is called the Samson option, which is rooted in religion and represents the concept of destroying oneself and the holy temple along with those around one's self as a last resort. 

Thus, a sacred meaning is attached to the use of this weapon. This means that in the event of a defeat that would destroy its existence, it can resort to nuclear weapons to destroy its enemies, even if it would harm itself. However, with the level of military, economic and political power that Israel has reached, these weapons have become not only a means of deterrence, but also a means of intimidation, intimidation and expansion of its sphere of influence. Today, the Iranian situation provides Israel with an excuse to justify the possession of nuclear weapons.

For Prestige and Respect

The idea of transforming the military and political power of these weapons into benefits for the protection of national interests creates a demand for nuclear weapons. Joining the nuclear club is considered by some countries and leaders as a symbol of national independence and national pride. The desire to make national security more resilient to external influences with nuclear weapons can also be a motivation (Way & Weeks, 2014). For example, countries such as Pakistan and North Korea see these weapons as a safeguard against US interference in their internal affairs. For leaders seeking security against external threats, the presence of a nuclear weapon, however small, is a valuable capability. 

Ambitious Leaders and Regimes' Willingness to Use Nuclear Weapons as an Element of Power to Expand Their Sphere of Influence

In autocratic regimes based on personal leadership, in periods of rising nationalism and in a political atmosphere dominated by populism, this capability is seen as an attractive tool with high prestige that can be used in both domestic and foreign policy. 

As it provides more cost-effective solutions for the maintenance of military power and deterrence

According to a study conducted in the United States, it is necessary to spend 5 dollars on conventional weapons in order to achieve the effect of 1 dollar spent on nuclear weapons (Hartley, 1991). In other words, nuclear weapons are 5 times more cost-effective than conventional weapons. Although far from current information, some information from the 1990- 91 UK Defense budget is given here as an example to give an idea. Accordingly, the resource allocated for Strategic Nuclear Forces in a year is 1.480 billion, the annual cost of the British corps stationed in Germany is 2.319 billion, and the total defense budget is determined as 21.223 billion pounds sterling. 

The share of strategic nuclear forces in the total defense budget is 7%. The annual cost of a corps is more than 1.5 times the annual cost of all nuclear forces. The figures taken into account in this calculation are probably annual operating costs. If the establishment cost of a corps with all its materials were calculated, the cost figures would be much higher and would reach the rates mentioned in the US sources. In sum, nuclear weapons create the opportunity to provide more deterrent power at a lower cost. 

In addition to the cost factor, the main contribution of nuclear weapons to military power is their destructive power, that is, the enormous loss of life and property they can cause on the other side. Moreover, this effect is not limited to the moment of use. It is known that the smallest nuclear bomb in the US inventory during the Cold War period had an explosive power of 300 tons of TNT equivalent, whereas the warhead carried by the GBU-57 bomb, which is expressed as the most powerful penetrator bomb in the inventory, has a destructive power of 3-5 tons of TNT equivalent (Lieber and Press, 2016). In 2017, the most powerful conventional bomb tested in Afghanistan, which is still defined as the mother of all bombs, has 11 tons of TNT equivalent explosives. In recent years, there have been developments in this field and new tactical nuclear weapons with reduced destructive effect (Low Yield Nuclear Bomb) have been produced by the US and Russia. Low-yield nuclear bombs, which are believed to provide an option to provide deterrence through a controlled nuclear escalation by avoiding an unlimited nuclear conflict, are said to range from 1 KT to 10, 20, 50 KT. 

In this respect, the smallest nuclear bomb has 1000 times more destructive effect than the most powerful conventional bomb. This makes nuclear weapons an attractive option in terms of cost-effectiveness in countries' security design and power development programs. This capability provided by low-impact nuclear weapons is considered an important tool of regional deterrence for both the US and Russia (Taylor, 2022).

Among the factors listed above, the need for security and prestige and prestige stand out as the two most important factors. There are also those who argue that factors reflecting more security perspectives are incomplete in explaining the desire to have this capability (Sagan, 1997). In addition to the question of why, as briefly mentioned at the outset, it is also necessary to look at how countries make this decision and how they go about developing it.